November 6, 2004

www.rockfordinstitute.org

AFTER ARAFAT

by Srdja Trifkovic

The post-Arafat era has started. It opens some possibility of progress on the stalled issue of Israel-Palestine by removing Israel's ever-present excuse for not talking to the Palestinians. For years Arafat's inept, self-serving and corrupt leadership has been an obstacle to the quest for peace. His personal authority has been eroded since his disastrous choice at Camp David of an armed Intifada over Clinton's peace package. He has been long devoid of any power to direct the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, or of imagination and courage to help resolve it. This has suited Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was able to pursue his short-term objectives, the "wall of separation" and the consolidation of Israel's hold on the West Bank.

As France's Le Figaro noted in an editorial, "Everyone was so eager to be in the post-Arafat days, that now that they are upon us the world seems to be unprepared." This is Arafat's fault: like all autocrats he was loath to prepare an orderly succession to his allegedly indispensable self. Like most Arab leaders he will leave the seat of power only in a coffin. Because of his apres moi le deluge there may be a scramble for power on the Palestinian side and no single successor may be able to establish authority in the short term. It is not only a matter of power but also of money: no single leader appears to be able to control the bodies that are in control of finances. Arafat may have been inept in many other ways, but he appears to have been the only one to know where Palestinian money is.

One possible approach to the problem of succession would be to establish an interim leadership of national unity and to hold elections in which all groups would be allowed to participate, including Hamas. As Berlin's Tageszeitung commented, the international community could not ignore such an elected leadership and the talks could not be torpedoed by the claim that it lacks legitimacy: ?The precondition would be that Israel is interested in serious negotiations about a Palestinian state and the withdrawal from occupied territories. But the indications are that Sharon's government is just hoping that Arafat's death would further weaken Palestinians.?

Furthermore, it is possible that groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad would do too well in an election, which would bring us to square one: to the intransigence on the Palestinian side and the refusal of the Israelis to talk to terrorists. The Islamists would then feel free to mount an open challenge to Al Fatah, especially in the Gaza Strip which is already controlled by an array of armed gangs.

It is therefore safer for the United States to try and influence the succession process within the Palestinian camp and leave "democracy" for later. The former PA prime minister Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) and his successor Ahmed Qorei are the front runners. Abbas has a strong power base in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its dominant Fatah faction, while Qorei has been in charge of the Palestinian Authority (PA) for over a year.

Washington can do business with both men, but Abbas is a safer bet. American interests in the region demand peace and stability, which means a Palestinian state, which means a decent Palestinian leadership that one can do business with, and that Mr. Sharon cannot discount as corrupt or tainted by terrorism. The U.S. therefore must indicate to Mr. Sharon that he will no longer have the monopoly of deciding who is the acceptable interlocutor on the Palestinian side. As the Ha'aretz noted in an editorial on November 1,

"The Bush administration's welcome and unreserved support for Israel in the face of Palestinian terror was frequently also perceived as permission to reject every diplomatic initiative until the baseline conditions of the region had changed… It is possible that this conflict, which has known more disappointments than hopes, is once again on the brink of a turning point. Such a junction would necessitate the mobilization of a determined U.S. government, which will want to reexamine the policy of shrugging its shoulders that has characterized it for the last four years."

The U.S. should display determination by providing discrete support to Abbas, a moderate who is willing to settle for the two-state solution broadly in line with Mr. Bush's 2003 Roadmap. He was defeated later that year by the unholy alliance of Arafat's old guard, the young Islamic radicals who reject compromise of any kind with Israel, and the unyielding government of Mr. Sharon that claimed to support him but hever gave him any real breaks. Abbas is not a very popular figure at the moment but he can emerge as the most influential PA leader if he can produce speedy and tangible results that will alleviate the living conditions and economic prospects of ordinary Palestinians.

It is in Washington's power to grant him that. This would be in the interest of all parties. It is in the interest of Israel to have on the Palestinian side a credible and firmly entrenched leader after Arafat, and Sharon should make modest early concessions to that end. With Abbas in charge it will be possible to make progress on the issue of terrorism and security, the overriding concern of most ordinary Israelis. It is also in the interest of the United States to restart the peace process in order to improve its regional standing and to encourage the ‘winds of change' in the Arab world. Last but not least, it is in the interest of the Palestinian population to have a leader who is not discredited by corruption, nepotism, and links with terrorism.

Building Abbas up is only a short-term objective. It is not sufficient to resolve the most important issues that still remain open-the right of return, the status of Jerusalem, and the final borders-but it is a necessary prerequisite for the tackling of these issues at a later stage. Conversely, helping Abbas is meaningless unless those final status issues are always kept in mind as the only real purpose of any American involvement in the "peace process." When the two sides resume their path toward a permanent agreement, as they will eventually, the Bush administration should invoke the memory of Camp David with the sobering wisdom of an opportunity missed by all. Courage, skill and imagination of Arafat's successors, coupled with a more even-handed U.S. policy in the region, will be needed to correct that blunder.

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