AN
INNOCENT ABROAD: POWELL IN BELGRADE
by Srdja Trifkovic
Secretary
of State Colin Powell made a brief visit to Belgrade on April 2. It
was the third visit by a top American official to the Serbian capital
since June 1991, when then-Secretary of State James Baker made a failed
bid to persuade Serb, Croat, and Slovene leaders to preserve the old
Yugoslav federation and avoid war.
Twelve
years ago Mr. Baker left Belgrade expressing disdain for his interlocutors
and saying how sorry he felt for the people of Yugoslavia. Mr. Powell,
on the other hand, was full of praise for the Serbian government. Following
a meeting with Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, he stated that that he
came to Belgrade "to demonstrate strong United States support for Serbia
and Montenegro" following the assassination, on March 12, of Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic (see this). Of Djindjic's successors at Serbia's helm
Mr. Powell said the following:
"I
am absolutely delighted with what I have heard about the commitment
that they have made to reform. Reform of the type started by the late
Prime Minister, and reforms that are underway and the aggressive action
that is being taken against criminals and others who would corrupt and
destroy your society, are the greatest tribute you can pay to your late
Prime Minister… I am especially pleased to hear how the people have
come to the support of the government in these efforts. Success against
organized crime and reform of the military will improve cooperation
with The Hague Tribunal, an important element of Serbia and Montenegro
s international obligations. By carrying through on these obligations,
Serbia and Montenegro can look forward to NATO s Partnership for Peace
and moving closer to E.U. membership… Just as we are here to help you
to achieve democracy, the United States will do everything we can to
support Serbia and Montenegro in your aspirations to become an integral
part of Europe."
Later
on Mr. Powell reiterated these sentiments: "There is no limit to the
areas of cooperation that I think are ahead of us now that the government
has committed itself so firmly to reform, so firmly to getting rid of
corruption, so firmly to eliminating criminal elements and working with
the people in a unified effort to move forward and make this a better
society, transparent society, one that will in due course allow this
nation to take its place fully in the transatlantic alliance."
It is hard to believe that Mr. Powell's compliments were paid to that
same government that has used the state of emergency for the past four
weeks as a crude but effective tool of crushing dissent, gagging the
media, and silencing all forms of political opposition to its own illegitimate
rule. Over seven thousand people have been arrested since March 12—the
equivalent of 200,000 Americans being locked up in the aftermath of
John F. Kennedy's assassination four decades ago. Not one is officially
admitted to have requested medical assistance—a statistical near-impossibility—and
none are allowed to see a lawyer for thirty days. Hundreds remain locked
up and strictly incommunicado, but that is not enough for Serbia's justice
minister who demands the doubling of remand period to sixty days. There
is no end in sight: the state of emergency is limited to thirty days
by statute, but a deputy Prime Minister says that it would last "until
Serbia is crime-free." That may well mean ad calendas Graecas.
Just
one week after the imposition of the state of emergency, the clampdown
on the media in Serbia prompted protests abroad. The International Federation
of Journalists issued a statement warning that draconian measures would
only make matters worse "by creating an atmosphere of intimidation,
fear and ignorance" (). The IFJ specifically protested the closure,
on 18 March, of two daily newspapers—Nacional and Dan—as well as the
weekly magazine Identidet and several independent radio and TV stations.
The closures followed government claims that they carried reports critical
of its response to the killing of Djindjic. The IFJ accused the Serbian
government of actions "that smack of the worst media controls since
the dark days of Milosevic rule." IFJ General Secretary Aidan White
issued a statement condemning the behavior of the Belgrade authorities:
"You cannot build democracy by violating human rights and you don't
build public confidence by imposing censorship," he said and demanded
that the restrictions on media be lifted: "Censorship and intimidation
were the tools of organized crime in the 1990s. It undermined public
accountability and protected the criminals. The last thing the government
should do now is to re-impose the very conditions that permit organized
crime to flourish… It may be necessary to purge the political and state
institutions of individuals who are contributing to the current instability,
but there is no excuse for restricting the exercise of professional
and independent journalism. The people have a right to know what is
being done and to subject the authorities to proper scrutiny." The following
week, on March 25, Human Rights Watch issued a statement in New York
saying that restrictions on rights imposed by the Serbian government
violated international law. In a letter to Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic
it specifically condemned "measures that restrict basic rights." The
organization singled out the ability of the police to detain anyone
who "endangers security" for up to thirty days, without access to a
lawyer, family members, or judicial review of the detention order. HRW
expressed concern over the incommunicado detention without judicial
review, particularly in view of many cases of reported ill-treatment
of detainees. It urged the Serbian government to lift the ban on contact
between detainees and their lawyers and families. The group also suggested
that the Serbian government open its detention facilities to independent
monitors, saying that could facilitate effective prosecutions, since
detainees might otherwise allege at trial that any confession before
the investigating judge was extracted under threat of torture or ill-treatment
by police during their incommunicado detention. It specifically reminded
the Serbian government that its obligation to respect the right to life
applies fully, even under the state of emergency. The Serbian minister
of interior recently announced that the authorities would "liquidate
everybody who resists the police" in its investigations, which goes
beyond the strict limitations on the lethal use of firearms by law enforcement
officials under international law. And finally, the group joined the
IFJ in calling on the government to rescind the ban on media reporting
of the reasons for introduction of the state of emergency.
"It
is difficult to see how coverage of the social and political circumstances
leading to the March 12 assassination and the state of emergency could
hinder the investigation, " said Elizabeth Andersen, executive director
of HRW's Europe and Central Asia division. "Even in these difficult
times—maybe even especially now—the authorities must uphold human rights
and the rule of law." The atmosphere of fear and physical and legal
uncertainty nevertheless worsened and now equal the darkest times of
Milosevic. The killing of Djindjic was probably the result of an intra-gangland
settling of scores, the result of the slain Prime Minister's support
for one gangster outfit—the notorious Surcin Clan—against another, the
Zemun Clan. This view seems to be supported by the apparent immunity
enjoyed by the Surcin gang during the current clampdown. According to
one Belgrade source, "it's like the Russian government's so-called clampdown
on the mafia three years ago, which was in fact Berezovsky's day of
reckoning with Gussinsky."
At the same time Djindjic's heirs embarked on constructing increasingly
implausible conspiracy theories. At the end of March Deputy Prime Minister
Cedomir Jovanovic accused former federal president Vojislav Kostunica—universally
known as the paragon of legality and integrity—for having contributed
to the "criminalization" of Serbia together with his namesake Vojislav
Seselj, the leader of the nationalist Radical Party, and creating the
"climate" conducive to Djindjic's killing. The government subsequently
declared that the killing "was part of a plot by self-styled patriotic
forces, led by war criminals, war profiteers, patrons, and the inspirers
of criminal policies from the ranks of the regime party of Slobodan
Milosevic." Emboldened by the support received from Mr. Powell, the
authorities in Belgrade intensified the campaign of vilification of
their opponents. Attacks on Djindjic's policies by opposition parties
before March 12—a normal part of the political life—were retroactively
called "creation of the climate of murder." Justice Minister Vladan
Batic described those behind Djindjic's killing as "fanatic disciples"
of Milosevic in the army, police, and the courts, who wanted to turn
back the clock. Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic said the people guilty
of killing Djindjic were also suspected of involvement in war crimes
and would be extradited to The Hague if indicted. The conspirators who,
we are told, called themselves the "Hague Brotherhood" (sic!) allegedly
hoped that the assassination would create widespread chaos and pave
the way for a coup. Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, who said that
"unbelievable" things were emerging in the Djindjic investigation, indirectly
contradicted Batic by saying that it was Seselj who gave orders for
the "physical elimination" of Djindjic. Covic claimed that the instructions,
which also included the murder of both himself and Education Minister
Gaso Knezevic, were given at a "farewell lunch" just before Seselj surrendered
to the Hague Tribunal.
"Unbelievable" indeed. Attempts to link the alleged assassins with Kostunica
are regarded as frankly ridiculous even by people unsympathetic to the
former president. However implausible, they led to the arrest of his
former security adviser, Rade Bulatovic, on April 8, along with the
former Army security chief General Tomic. The arrests appeared to foreshadow
a looming crackdown against Kostunica himself and his Democratic Party
of Serbia, which remains the most popular political party by far. Kostunica
immediately responded by accusing government officials of links with
organized crime, and claimed allegations against his associates were
politically motivated: "The tragedy of Djindjic's assassination and
the state of emergency are being used for a crackdown against political
opponents," he said, and asked: "Can you imagine anyone in America condemning
the Republicans for Kennedy's assassination?" The campaign against Kostunica
indicates the real government agenda: to eliminate political and media
opposition in advance of the lifting of the state of emergency, so that
a snap election—with a preordained result—can be called before the opposition
recovers and regroups.
Five
days after Mr. Powell's visit, on April 7, Human Rights Watch issued
another statement, this time urging the Serbian Government to immediately
open its detention facilities to independent observers and lift the
ban on contact between detainees and their lawyers and families. It
made its request immediately following the accession of Serbia-Montenegro
to the Council of Europe, stating that even in times of emergency "no
person should be held in isolation without communication with family
or a lawyer for more than a few days." Elizabeth Anderson warned that
the "extended incommunicado detention of suspects violates Council of
Europe norms." HRW statement concluded that "the absolute and continued
isolation of the detainees is disproportionate to any possible threat
to Serbia's stability."
Last
but by no means least, on the same day, April 7, the Financial Times
of London reported that senior European diplomats accredited in Belgrade
have warned prime minister Zivkovic against authoritarian policies and
demanded the lifting of the state of emergency as soon as possible,
reminding him that its extension beyond 30 days was illegal. The diplomats
were not named but our source says that they included the ambassadors
of France, Germany and Italy.
Our
source adds that the efforts of European diplomats will not be taken
seriously "for as long as the government of Serbia believes that it
is fully authorized by Washington to proceed with its clampdown." Colin
Powell provided that authorization, whether he was aware of it or not.
To Mr. Powell's hosts it became obvious that "democratic reforms" do
not signify broad participation of the country's citizens in the business
of governance—although he mysteriously claimed that Djindjic's heirs
enjoyed popular support for their measures—but it denotes the desirable
social and political content of government decisions. The outcomes,
such as "full cooperation" with The Hague quasi-tribunal—are preordained;
the process of reaching them is indicative of "democratic reforms,"
thousands of incommunicado arrests notwithstanding.
Mr.
Powell's only excuse for the consequences of his Belgrade visit is ignorance:
he was not told by the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, William Montgomery,
what the real score was, and his desk officers in Washington also kept
him in the dark about the dark side of "the aggressive action that is
being taken against criminals and others who would corrupt and destroy
[Serbian] society." That excuse is no defense, however: just ask The
Hague tribunal.
