June 14, 2003

GAMES SURROUNDING KOSOVO

by Srdja Trifkovic

If a rifle figures above a mantlepiece in Act I it is likely to fire in Act III. Likewise, if a dozen well-known KLA apologists and pro-Albanian lobbies parading as think-tanks start simultaneously clamoring for Kosovo’s independence—making identical or similar statements in a ten-day period—it is almost certain that their efforts will be presented as a pressing policy issue before the summer is out.

The pursuit of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia provides “the only prospect for long-term stability in the Balkans” and must not be postponed, claim Paul Williams and Janusz Bugajski in a report (“Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo”) published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Bugajski, until recently a lavishly paid “consultant” for Milo Djukanovic’s kleptocratic little fiefdom, seems to have lost some of his enthusiasm for the cause of Montenegrin independence now that the retainer has ended; but the “analysis” vis-Ð-vis Kosovo is the same: “the only way” to achieve peace and stability is to cut another slice from the depleted Serbian salami. Until and unless this is done, the ethnic tensions in the region and political and economic stagnation in the Balkans will continue. The authors argue that a “freely elected” government in Kosovo would reduce the potential for social unrest and promote the rule of law and pluralism.

Only days earlier, on May 21, the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations held an open hearing (“The Future of Kosovo”) and heard Daniel Serwer of the United States Institute of Peace declare that the “specific problems” of today’s Kosovo “include failure of the Serbs to participate consistently in the Kosovo Assembly and continuing Serb control in the north.” Among those invited to testify were spokesmen for the Albanian-American registered lobby groups and their congressional supporters; not one invited speaker represented the interests of Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo, or the position and concerns of Serbia.

James Dobbins, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation and a key advocate of the war against Serbia in the Clinton administration, joined the chorus by saying that the unresolved nature of Kosovo’s status as potential independent state continues to be an obstacle to reconciliation between the ethnic groups in the region: “I always believed that the only result that would satisfy a majority of the people is some form of independence.”

Charles A. Kupchan, director of European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, bewails that “the Balkans as a whole have slipped off the radar screen” and sees the formal separation of Kosovo from Serbia as a welcome opportunity to put the region back on the map. Kupchan added that the situation in Kosovo holds important lessons for the United States’ effort at nation building in Iraq.

The billionaire “philantropist,” currency speculator George Soros, even went to Belgrade on May 27 to tell the Serbs that it was in their interest to support the independence of Kosovo. At a conference in Belgrade’s Hyatt Regency, Soros said that Serbia could be put into the “fast-lane to European integration” in exchange for Kosovo’s independence. Only days before his trip Soros wrote an article in London’s Financial Times (May 22) saying that Kosovo’s independence would be the logical end of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and that Macedonia in particular should be given some assurance that Kosovo’s independence does not herald any further fracturing of Balkan states.

In Washington the consensus among political analysts, including those who oppose any change in Kosovo’s status, is that these pro-Albanian lobbyists intend to package Kosovo’s independence in “realpolitical” terms in their pitch to the Bush administration. They will claim that doing a big favor to a Muslim community—the Albanians—could be subsequently presented as a counterweight to the coming adjustment of the “Road Map” to reflect Mr. Sharon’s many objections, both already stated and yet pending.

The precedent already exists in Mr. Rumsfeld’s pointed invocation, during the war in Afghanistan, of America’s intereventions in Bosnia and Kosovo as the conclusive proof that the United States is not a priori anti-Muslim. The KLA’s Washingtonian friends will claim that strip-mining Serbia costs nothing—the heirs of Zoran Djindjic in Belgrade will do exactly as told, whatever is demanded of them—and yields rich rewards in giving America leverage in appeasing enraged Muslim opinion around the world.

It is to be hoped that this time the bad guys will not succeed. If the Administration goes along with these proposals it will make a mistake for seven main reasons:

1. It will reward mass ethnic cleansing and murder, carried out on a massive scale by the Albanians ever since the beginning of the NATO occupation four years ago;

2. It will condone the principle that an ethnic minority’s plurality in a given locale or region provides grounds for that region’s secession—a precedent that may yet come to haunt America in the increasingly mono-ethnic and mono-lingual Southwest;

3. It will terminally alienate the Serbs, whose cooperation is crucial to making the Balkans finally stable and peaceful, at a time when American energy, money and manpower is more pressingly needed further east;

4. It will create an inherently unstable polity that will be an even safer haven for assorted criminals and Islamic extremists than it is today;

5. It will reignite the war in neighboring Macedonia, where the current semblance of peace is absolutely predicated upon the continuing status quo in Kosovo;

6. It will contribute to further deterioration of relations with the Europeans and Russians with no tangible benefit to the United States;

7. It will commit itself to continuing the Clinton-Gore “nation-building project” in Kosovo that culminated with the bombing of Serbia in 1999—an illogical, immoral, and utterly untenable rearrangement of the Balkan architecture which it would be in America’s interest to reverse, not ratify and make semi-permanent.

This time the “realists” have ample arguments against Cilnton’s model of the new Balkan order that seeks to satisfy the aspirations of all ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia—except the Serbs. Whatever is imposed on them in this moment of weakness, the Serbs shall have no stake in the ensuing order of things. Sooner or later they will fight to recover Kosovo, whatever its “status.” The Carthaginian peace imposed on them today will cause chronic regional imbalance and strife for decades to come. That is not in America’s interest, and therefore should not be condoned.

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