July 01, 2003

EXCLUSIVE: INTERVIEW WITH VOJISLAV KOSTUNICA
SERBIA IS NOT A BLACK HOLE IN EUROPE

by Srdja Trifkovic

Dr. Vojislav Kostunica is no longer Yugoslavia’s president: his post has ceased to exist, together with the country itself, when the Union of Serbia and Montenegro came into being four months ago. He should be Serbia’s president instead, having won two rounds of presidential elections last fall, but his political opponents deprived him of that position by a nifty piece of subterfuge. The late Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and an array of small parties forming the ruling government coalition used an obsolete law enacted by Slobodan Milosevic as a tool to effectively annul the election. That law, initially devised to secure Milosevic’s rule in perpetuity, demands that a majority of all registered voters (“fifty percent plus one”) cast their ballots in order for a general election to be valid. It now provides the formal basis for the current government’s real objective: an illegitimate extension of its mandate.

Kostunica is out of power, but not for long. He is still the most popular politician in Serbia by far, and his return to top office is merely a matter of time. When that happens there are things that he intends to do differently. When we met last Tuesday in his elegant headquarters in the old part of Belgrade—a great improvement over Tito’s kitchy, cavernous office across the Sava river—he admitted that when he came to power in October 2000 he had not fully appreciated the depth of depravity and corruption of his erstwhile partners in the anti-Milosevic coalition: “I was wholly focused on the task of rebuilding the state and its institutions, but now I realize that this was impossible for as long as people connected with criminals and disrespectful of the rule of law remained in government.” In announcing that his first task will be a thorough clean-up of Serbia’s tainted political elite Kostunica retains his usual calm manner and somewhat monotonous delivery, but his words display determination and energy that many say he had lacked during his first mandate.

Kostunica is especially concerned that the current government will make hasty decisions in foreign affairs that will haunt its successors. He points out that Belgrade is on the brink of signing a bilateral agreement with the United States on non-extradition of U.S. personnel to the ICC—even though Serbian citizens are still being hunted by, and delivered to, the war crimes tribunal at The Hague. Saying “no” to Washington under these conditions is “an easy decision to make for a reasonable government, for reasonable authorities,” he says, “but at this moment reason is not something that is prevailing in Serbia-Montenegro.” He sees Serbia’s future in European integration, not in accepting the status of an American satellite:

Europe is much closer to us than Washington, of course, but at this moment Washington seems to be nearer to Serbia-Montenegro and some other post-communist countries. To the authorities in Serbia-Montenegro in particular, responding to demands from Washington—on the bilateral agreement, or on NATO membership—seems to be more important than the issues of daily life, of the survival of people, of resolving the problems of poverty, increasing unemployment, difficult conditions of refugees. It would be reasonable and wise to follow the European road, and to use the explanation—the need for European support—that might be understood even by Washington. That, however, is not the approach that is prevailing in Serbia-Montenegro at this moment.

Another looming decision to which Kostunica is adamantly opposed concerns Serbia’s membership in NATO. If the country’s political elites listened to what the people of Serbia-Montenegro think about NATO membership, he says, the answer would be clearly negative: most Serbs feel that Europe, and in particular such European countries as France and Italy, are much closer to them, not only geographically, but also politically, culturally, and economically, than the United States:

Even if "Partnership for Peace" is a political necessity, NATO is not a necessity. It is not justified politically, and it is unacceptable emotionally, having in mind the bombing of Serbia in 1999. If we had a more responsible leadership in the country, then the call for NATO membership would not be something to be thought about at this moment. It is sometimes said that by staying outside NATO this country would be a “black hole” in Europe, but there are other examples of such “black holes” in Europe that are not doing badly at all—take the case of Switzerland, which for many years had not even belonged to the United Nations. There are specific reasons for our country to stay out of NATO, and this is an instance of a clear disagreement between the position of authorities in Belgrade and what the public at large thinks.

Kostunica is also concerned that the current government does not have a coherent counter-strategy to the increasing pressure for a quick “final solution” to Kosovo. “There is a tendency among a part of the political elite in Belgrade to seek a quick and easy solution to the Kosovo problem by getting rid of it,” he says, but undue haste is not necessary: in his view, an independent Kosovo would not be in accordance with the prevailing tendencies in the region, in Europe, and in the so-called international community:

The problem is too serious to be solved overnight. We are very far from the so-called final status for Kosovo. First of all it is necessary to implement the Security Council resolution 1244 from 1999. It is necessary to provide more safety for the Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo and to secure the return of IDPs [internally displaced persons]: less than one percent of Serb refugees have returned to their homes in Kosovo.”

What we have at the moment is the so-called architecture of Kosovo institutions, Kostunica says, but that has nothing to do with the respect for safety and human rights:

“There are institutions, there are no human rights. The new international administrator for Kosovo has an opportunity to make a fresh start. The previous three mandates have not been successful Kouchner’s, Haekkerup’s, and particularly Steiner’s. The last of them is a clear example of failure. There is still a chance to put things right and I feel that one should think in those terms. At this moment it is not necessary to talk of what Kosovo means for the Serbs and how fundamental it is for the Serbian national and cultural identity. Let us, instead, focus on what has been written down in Resolution 1244. Let us think what would be the consequences of any radical ‘solution’ at this moment, what would any change of any frontier in the region mean for the rest of the borders. There is no other solution than working slowly but steadily on the implementation of Resolution 1244, on returning IDPs, finding different forms of decentralization.”

The Serbs can feel safer only in their own municipalities, Kostunica concludes, and some sort of network of those municipalities should be set up in Kosovo as a form of devolution that would make the return of refugees possible.

Kostunica’s views on these and most other domestic and foreign issues are in tune with the prevailing popular opinion in Serbia. Almost three years after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, however, the gap between the will of the people and the decisions of the political establishment remains as wide as ever. It is ironic, and by no means incidental, that Kostunica keeps winning elections hands down and losing power. If “democracy” had anything to do with the political system that reflects the collective will of the people, he would lead the nation while the heirs of the late Dr. Djindjic would sit on the far back benches of Serbia’s Parliament—or be unemployed. But democracy, as it is currently propagated in the Balkans by the “international community” and as it is practiced by its local favorites, is defined not in terms of freely expressed political will of informed citizens, but through the looking glass of ideological preferences of political forces external to the region. The net result is that the enthusiasm and idealism of the popular uprising of October 2000 have been replaced by an all-pervasive cynicism.

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