July 04, 2003

MUSHARRAF AT CAMP DAVID

by Srdja Trifkovic

Two weeks ago Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf became the first South Asian leader to be invited to Camp David. Encouraged by the honor thus bestowed and by Washington's post-9-11 largesse he asked President Bush for many things, from six billion in aid to updated F-16 fighters. He did not get them all-most notably those planes-but for a military dictator with links to militant Islam who makes and proliferates weapons of mass destruction, he did very well indeed. He did get a five-year, $3 billion package, some arms, and partial debt relief. No less important to Musharraf was Mr. Bush's refusal to comment on domestic political situation in Pakistan, giving the General a free hand in dealing with his political opponents.

Mr. Bush's continued pretense that Musharraf is an essential ally in the "war against terror" is acceptable as a political expedient, but it would be very dangerous for the Administration to start believing its own propaganda to the point of trusting the man's sincerity. In practical terms, any military assistance to Pakistan should be made contingent on four conditions:

1. Musharraf's permanent and verifiable end of support for cross-border terrorism in Kashmir;

2. Serious clampdown on medressas and other Islamic institutions in Pakistan that breed terrorists;

3. A thorough purge of the Pakistani army of all officers implicated in previous dealings with the Taliban and other Islamist movements in Afghanistan; and

4. Pakistan's strict observance of nuclear non-proliferation, most notably vis-Ð-vis North Korea.

In addition, Mr. Bush's stated objective of seeing Pakistan develop into a "moderate" Islamic state cannot be advanced if Washington continues to turn a blind eye to the nature of the regime in Islamabad. Pakistan's rival India-the most populous democracy in the world-has taken note of the fact that Musharraf became the first military dictator to be welcomed by President Bush into the homely warmth of Camp David on the very day Colin Powell was expounding on the importance of democracy at the World Economic Forum. As the Indian Express editorialist noted, democracy and freedom do not seem to be worthwhile American objectives:

How else to explain what the man most responsible for building the Taliban into an evil, religious terrorist group is doing in Camp David? How else to explain President Bush's promises of $3 billion of aid to a man whose nuclear scientists were in consultations with Al-Qaeda to help Osama bin Laden build his own nuclear weapon? … Islamic fundamentalism is not a person but an idea, a mindset, and there is sufficient evidence that this mindset has permeated the whole fabric of Pakistani society… There was a time that the American President could get away with befriending military dictators and lecturing the world about democracy at the same time. That time ended on Sept. 11.

By contrast, Pakistani commentators expressed satisfaction that the country's nuclear program was not discussed, "meaning thereby that America has recognized (and accepted) it." Instead of asking for the rollback of the program, Washington only demanded of Musharraf not to transfer the nuclear technology to another country-and specifically to stop helping North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The Bush administration went to war with Iraq over its alleged "weapons of mass destruction," and has put pressure on the regime in Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear project. Its soft-pedalling over the role of Pakistan as a proliferator is assumed to be the administration's view that Pakistan is a key player in the "war on terror," but almost three years after 9-11 it should be obvious that Musharraf will not reverse Pakistan's adoption of Islamic ideology. His army is commanded by officers whose loyalties are divided at best. They have allowed countless Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to slip across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan and to stay out of the U.S. military's reach. Musharraf 's government has ordered the release of many Islamic militants detained after September 11, and it has backtracked on its promise to control the Islamic schools that are breeding new terrorists.

A degree of cooperation with Pakistan in Mr. Bush's anti-terrorist campaign is perhaps inevitable, just as various Cold War alliances with nasty Third World regimes were sometimes necessary, but the relationship should not go beyond the pragmatic, give-and-take link based on limited objectives. It is impossible to contemplate a strategic alliance with a man of General Musharraf's ilk. Far from being a latter-day Mustafa Kemal, he fits in with the political tradition of Pakistan since her earliest days. She was the first modern state to be established on openly Islamic principles. Always on the verge of bankruptcy, she has, for most of her 55 years, been under military dictatorships. The Taliban and other Islamic terrorist movements were born of ideas conceived on the battlefields of Afghanistan and spread by Pakistan's political, military, and religious establishment. These movements enjoyed the support of the Pakistani military-intelligence structures, especially its powerful Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI).

The facts surrounding Pakistan's nuclear program, its links with Muslim terrorists in Kashmir and with Islamic extremists elsewhere, have long been clouded by the denial and the feigned optimism that have characterized Washington's relations with the Muslim world for decades. It is high time to acknowledge that, as an avowedly Muslim state, Pakistan suffers from the many defects inherent in her origins, including underdevelopment, illiteracy, oppression, and poverty. As long as the country's Islamic character is explicitly upheld, Pakistan cannot develop an efficient economy or build a civilized polity. It is a burden, not an asset, to the United States, and should be treated as such.

Long-term American interests and diplomatic pragmatism, as well as morality and justice, dictate a far closer relationship between the U.S. and India. It is a great economic and political power in the making, its democratic credentials are real, and its historical memories and political culture make it America's natural ally in the struggle against militant Islam.

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