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July
29, 2003
ROAD MAP IN BALANCE
by Srdja Trifkovic
After a faltering start in Aqaba on June 4, followed by several promising
gestures and statements on both sides (including a unilateral three-month
ceasefire declared by Palestinian militants on June 29), the latest
Middle Eastern peace process is stuck again. A meeting last Sunday between
the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, and his Palestinian counterpart,
Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Mazen)-the fourth since the "Road Map" was
launched-ended in failure to agree on the steps to be taken next. (It
even "included shouting on both sides," according to a participant.)
Israel demands permanent security guarantees instead of a temporary
truce and a determined crackdown by the Palestinian Authority on militant
groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Resistance Movement, while Palestinians
demand Israeli withdrawals in the West Bank, a halt on the construction
of Jewish settlements, and the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners
from Israeli jails.
President Bush will attempt to keep the Middle East peace process alive
with meetings with Abbas this coming Friday and Sharon next week. The
two leaders are heading to Washington hoping that the Americans will
force concessions from the other side. "We want the Americans to be
in a position of doing some muscle flexing on Abu Mazen and say, ‘It's
time for you to cash in a few of your chips'," a senior Israeli official
is quotes as saying. "We are trying to demonstrate that the U.S. has
to pressure both sides, that it's a give-and-take process," a Palestinian
official responded. "There's been no action on the part of Israel to
show they are going to end the occupation, and that's why the road map
is off-track."
Regional commentators agree on at least one thing: that President Bush's
"personal and massive involvement" is the most vital factor for the
roadmap's survival. Writing in The Financial Times of London on July
22, two Jordanian diplomats, Hasan Abu Nimah and Ali Abunimah, say that
the "road map" is in serious trouble "because the Bush administration,
the plan's chief sponsor, has allowed Israel to reinterpret it so that
it is gutted of the elements that offered hope of progress."
Since Israel depends on the US for the military and diplomatic backing
that allows it to continue its occupation of Arab land indefinitely,
the authors say, "the success or failure of the plan lies in Washington's
willingness to confront an Israel that remains committed to the settlements
and opposed to a genuinely independent Palestinian state." So far Israel
has continued to carry out substantial construction projects in the
occupied territories. It has also accelerated work on a concrete wall
that has in effect annexed large swaths of the West Bank to Israel and
cut off many Palestinian towns and villages from the rest of the occupied
territories:
These facts on the ground make a genuine two-state solution increasingly
unattainable in practice. But, politically, the road map has already
been emptied of the content that would make such an outcome possible
in the first place. By recognising Israel within its 1948 borders, Palestinians
have already conceded 78 per cent of historic Palestine-in which they
were the overwhelming majority until Israel's creation. In exchange,
they expect full independence and sovereignty in the remaining 22 per
cent-the whole of east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In this goal, they are supported by a vast body of international law
and United Nations resolutions.
Yet when Mr. Sharon stated in Aqaba that "we can also reassure our Palestinian
partners that we understand the importance of territorial contiguity
in the West Bank for a viable Palestinian state," he was essentially
ruling out a full Israeli withdrawal. The authors note that "contiguity"
is an issue only in the context of a continued Israeli presence on Palestinian
land. They allege that Sharon wants a Palestinian "state" based on an
arrangement in which Palestinians are given limited self-government
within a greater Israel where they have no civil or political rights:
"As the Bush administration does nothing to check Israel-and simultaneously
piles pressure on the deeply unpopular Mr. Abbas, whose appointment
as Palestinian prime minister it engineered-it is only a matter of time
before the situation explodes in a new and sustained round of violence,"
the authors say, and conclude that perhaps the only hope of saving the
process lies with strong intervention by the European Union, which nominally
co-authored the road map:
Hitherto, the EU has acquiesced in US leadership, even when it has disagreed
with US positions. And the US has been willing to ignore Europe on those
rare occasions when it has asserted itself, as the Iraq crisis demonstrated.
But, ironically, US difficulties in Iraq may give Europe the leverage
to demand real action towards Palestinian freedom and Middle East peace
as a prerequisite for help in extricating the Americans from their own
unraveling occupation of Iraq.
Somewhat surprisingly the Israeli foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, also
declared that Israel would welcome a greater EU role in the Middle East
if it is ‘more balanced.' Speaking in Brussels last Monday he said he
was pleased with the EU's involvement in putting pressure on the Palestinians
to rein in those supporting violence.
It is most unlikely that this statement signifies any greater willingness
by the Israelis to accept Europe's substantial involvement, however.
Mr. Sharon's recent trip to London and Norway has failed to drive an
open wedge between the Europeans and PA President Yassir Arafat. He
knows that he'll always have a far more sympathetic partner in Washington,
and the one most unlikely to push for serious Israeli concessions only
months before the presidential campaign is to start. Sharon is eagerly
awaiting the election year, during which both parties will be weary
of alienating a powerful voting bloc. As an Israeli commentator noted
in the Maariv daily (July 21), Mr. Bush wants quick results in the Middle
East in order to cast away evidence of his failures in Iraq and in the
economy, but "starting in January 2004, the government of Israel and
its leader will have a consequential influence on the shaping of the
U.S. policy regarding the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians…
the window of opportunity will begin to close and, should Sharon want
it, seal altogether until at least January 2005."
Aware of the fact that political clock is ticking in America some European
editorialists say that unless the United States exert real pressure
on Israel now, the "map" will indeed lead to nowhere. The Guardian thus
warned on July 22 that Israeli foot-dragging over its implementation
should not be tolerated: "As in the past, it is to be feared that Mr.
Sharon will portray any new but limited Israeli ‘concessions' as a great
and risky good-faith gesture, beyond which he cannot at this point safely
go." In return, he will seek increased US pressure on the Palestinians,
especially over disarming Hamas and Islamic Jihad, plus other, bilateral
favors: "This is an old game that Mr. Bush should refuse to play. As
ever, Israel holds most of the cards."
Mr. Abbas, by contrast, has very few. Unless President Bush gives him
a few trump cards by exacting concessions from Mr. Sharon-such as the
release of most Palestinians held in Israeli jails who have not been
convicted of violent crimes-he may be ousted by the Palestinian parliament
or else resign himself, as he had already threatened to do. Helping
Abbas survive and building him into a credible and effective figure
is a necessary albeit not sufficient prerequisite for making eventual
progress on the fundamental issues-the right of return, the status of
Jerusalem, and the final borders. Mr. Bush would be well advised to
ensure that Mr. Sharon brings some gifts to Washington that he was not
willing to deliver directly to Mr. Abbas in Jerusalem.
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