December 4, 2003

THE FORTHCOMING SERBIAN ELECTION

by Srdja Trifkovic

The forthcoming parliamentary election in Serbia (December 28) is likely to result in a major realignment of the political spectrum in Belgrade.

The big losers will be the ruling DOS coalition. That coalition has now disintegrated, and of its 17 mainly insignificant political parties only the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS) of the late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic is fairly certain to cross the threshold of 5 percent of all votes cast that is needed for parliamentary representation. Tainted by many corruption scandals and unable to kick-start the economy and improve dismal living standards, Serbia's government has made itself additionally unpopular by its abject submissiveness to the dictate of the "international community" epitomized by the war crimes tribunal at The Hague.

The main winners will be the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS) led by Vojislav Seselj-now incarcerated in The Hague-and the centrist Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS) led by the former Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica. It is also probable that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) of ex-President Milosevic-also imprisoned at The Hague-will make a modest comeback.

Had Kostunica forced an early election over two years ago, say in the aftermath of Milosevic's illegal extradition to The Hague (June 2001), he would have been the clear winner. Back then his party could have won an absolute majority in the 250-seat Parliament. But Kostunica has missed the boat. On too many occasions he has wavered, succumbing to the invariably bad advice of his former chef-du-cabinet and de facto principal advisor, Ljiljana Nedeljkovic. One notable example was his behavior during a political crisis caused by the murder of a former security service operative in August 2001. Kostunica first declared that an early parliamentary election was the only way out of the impasse-thus causing panic in the ranks of DOS-but within days he inexplicably declared that elections would have to wait until the new constitution was drafted and enacted. His opponents could breathe a sigh of relief: that they had the power to ensure that no new constitution would be enacted in the lifetime of this parliament. As Michael Stenton accurately commented at that time, "It is difficult for those who do not relish power for power's sake to wield it competently. Kostunica could already have trounced his opponents had he enjoyed the cut and thrust of politics, but he preferred to leave the direction of affairs to other hands, and then to offer dignified reproof of a dilute patriarchal kind. He offers guidance but does not want to impose the sacrifices that significant statesmen draw upon on their people."

Since that time on more than one occasion Kostunica was given all the rope he needed to hang DOS, and each time he had failed to use it. Over two years ago the DSS declared the government to be so corrupt that it withdrew its one minister from Djindjic's cabinet. This proved to be a meaningless gesture, as it was not accompanied by a sustained campaign to force an early election. It was detrimental to Kostunica's credibility, since it was perceived as an abdication of responsibility. It meant that the DOS coalition was given a free hand to indulge in corrupt practices, and notably in rigged privatization deals and to squander the remnant of Serbia's profitable enterprises (cement factories, sugar refineries, breweries, tobacco processors, etc).

By now Serbia has grown tired of waiting for Kostunica the politician to discover the inner fire to burn away his gloomy view of what is possible. The main winners are Seselj's Radicals. The party's acting leader, Tomislav Nikolic, has an effective message for the voters: "We don't want the votes of those who feel that they've done well under DOS. We are the party of those who are unhappy with their lot and who have not done well under DOS!" In addition, unlike Kostunica, the SRS is unambiguous in its rejection of The Hague tribunal and of Serbia's association with NATO. Aware that they will not have to share the burden of governance, the Radicals can afford to be intransigent. Sickened by DOS, many Serbs see the vote for the Radicals as the clearest way to voice their disapproval of the past three years. Not for the first time-the memory of October 2000 is still fresh-they will vote less "for" a party and its program, and primarily "against" their present rulers.

Kostunica's party will do reasonably well, although less well than it could have done a year or two ago. It will attract the votes of those Serbs who feel disdain for DOS but who also fear and reject the populist demagoguery of Seselj's party. As a somewhat disillusioned DSS supporter says, "Voja [Kostunica] is still the only game in town." With roughly a quarter of all seats it will need to look for coalition partners, however, and Kostunica has already declared that he would not enter a coalition with either the DS or the Radicals. It is equally unimaginable that he would contemplate a coalition with the SPS or with the small Serbian Unity Party (Stranka srpskog jedinstva, SSJ) founded by the late warlord Arkan.

Kostunica's probable coalition partners is a group of economic experts known as G17 and recently constituted as a political party led by Miroljub Labus. It is a self-avowedly "reformist," anti-nationalist, pro-Western party. This means that G17 will compete for the same one-fifth of the electorate targeted by the DS-and will probably score no more than a half of its vote. Even if Kostunica's tentative coalition includes a couple of smaller party coalitions likely to be represented-Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) and Velja Ilic's Nova Srbija (NS), for instance-it will remain short of the 126 votes needed for effective governance.

SEATS IN NEXT SERBIAN PARLIAMENT: A TENTATIVE FORECAST

SRS (Seselj): 70
DSS (Kostunica): 60
SPS (Milosevic): 30
DS (Tadic): 30
SPO-NS (Draskovic-Ilic): 15
G17+ (Labus et al.): 20
SSJ (Pelevic): 10
Ethnic Minority Coalition: 15
Total: 250

If by the end of this month Serbia's new parliament looks approximately like this, Kostunica will face a number of choices. The worst mistake he could make would be to succumb to Western pressure and yet again to include the Democratic Party in his coalition. In that case Serbia would witness a replay of the past three years, with the DSS delivering the votes, and its treacherous and corrupt "partners" enjoying the fruits. More significantly, the people who will vote against DOS on January 28-a good four-fifths of the electorate-will feel cheated and betrayed if the DS is allowed back into power. In that case social unrest that has been quietly simmering for months may erupt into street violence.

Kostunica would be better advised to try forming a minority government-with the G17 or without it-in the hope that the nationalist bloc (Radicals and Socialists) will quietly let him govern by default, i.e. by not voting against him. If Kostunica announces that there would be no further extraditions to The Hague and that Serbia-Montenegro would not join NATO's "Partnership for Peace," Seselj's and Milosevic's followers may do just that. For as long as Kostunica remains true to his self-styled "moderate nationalism" they are unlikely to join the "pro-Western" parties-the Democrats and a small coalition of their allies (ethnic Hungarians led by Jozsef Kasza, Sanjak Muslims led by Rasim Ljajic, and Vojvodinian separatists led by Nenad Canak)-in voting against the DSS-led government.

That would be an inherently unstable solution, but the new parliament should not be seen as a four-year solution anyway. Its main task will be to produce a new constitution within two or three months, and to call a general presidential and parliamentary election soon thereafter-probably not later than St. Vitus Day (June 28). Only then will Serbia have a "normal" government, devoid of the burden of Milosevic's constitutional straightjacket and his successors' quasi-legal shinenigans.

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