December 12, 2003

WOLFOWITZ'S PREMEDITATED BLUNDER

by Srdja Trifkovic

Most Americans who think about such things implicitly assume that the U.S. foreign policy-whether they agree with its conduct or not-is coherent and rational. In foreign policy analysis the prevalent model of the "unitary actor" likewise assumes procedural rationality and instrumental consistency of the "decision-making community." The circumstances of France under Napoleon, Russia under Stalin, or America under Reagan were vastly different but they are all studied and rated on the basis of the decision-makers' ability to identify their goals, to match them against a set of strategic objectives, define the options, assess the costs and benefits, and finally to make decisions and implement policy that optimally matches their perception of their country's, or their person's, or group's, best interest.

Judged by these criteria, the foreign policy of the United States at the end of 2003 is neither coherent nor rational. There is no unity of purpose and no unity of action. This conclusion follows from a sequence of very strange events in the space of one week.

On December 6 the Associated Press reported that "President Bush and his top aides were cajoling, imploring and even sweet-talking allies" into sharing the burden of Iraq with America. In a reversal of previous policy Washington declared that it wanted greater roles in Iraq for the United Nations and NATO. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were sent to Europe with a new, less confrontational message, initially delivered by Mr. Bush in London two weeks earlier, that the reconstruction of Iraq and the war on terror both demand allies, partnerships, and the cooperation of international organizations.

Mr. Rumsfeld was anything but his usual abrasive self when he met the alliance defense ministers in Brussels on December 2 and declared that Washington "welcomes more help in Iraq." When he went on to declare that "maybe we ought to try to do a better job of communicating," his audience could hardly believe this was the same man who was so dismissive of the "old Europe" less than a year ago. Rumsfeld even refused to repeat his previous criticism of the European Union's intention to create a military planning cell that could run crisis management operations independently of NATO.

Only days later, addressing his NATO colleagues in Brussels, Mr. Powell urged the Alliance "to examine how it might do more to support peace and stability in Iraq, which every leader has acknowledged is critical to us." He later told reporters that "it was striking today that as we discussed the possibility not a single member spoke against it or talked about reasons not to do it." NATO foreign ministers did not exactly embrace the idea but they left the door open for such possibility if a suitable political framework could be agreed upon.

As the New York Times commented in the aftermath of Rumsfeld's and Powell's tour, "there is a universal recognition among NATO members that the rift both within the Atlantic alliance and between Europe and the US has to be repaired if the alliance is to remain viable." The new mood went so far that President Jacques Chirac, the most outspoken opponent of the war in Iraq among NATO and EU members, started talking of a more active French role in the Alliance and even in Iraq. His officials hinted that France had not discarded a contingency plan send between eight and ten thousand soldiers to Iraq if the political structure was right.

Then came the bombshell. On December 9, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz released a memorandum dated December 5 announcing that countries that had opposed the Iraq war would be barred by the U.S. from bidding for billions of dollars of reconstruction contracts, ranging from equipping the new Iraqi army to rebuilding and refurbishing power and water plants, roads, oil installations and communications systems. Those contracts would only be given to companies from the United States, its coalition partners and force contributing nations, Wolfowitz said. In a sentence masterfully Marxian in its infathomable dialectics he declared that "limiting competition for prime contracts will encourage the expansion of international cooperation in Iraq and in future efforts," and that "every effort must be made to expand international cooperation in Iraq."

Wolfowitz's statement was the diplomatic equivalent of a barrel of gasoline being thrown into a barely extinguished fire. "We noted this news with amazement," German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said. Canada's incoming prime minister Paul Martin found it "very difficult to understand" that such a statement could be made. France and the European Union threatened to review the decision to determine if it violated commitments made by the United States in international agreements brokered by the World Trade Organization to open member-states' government contracts to foreign competition. "This is a gratuitous and extremely unhelpful decision," declared Chris Patten, the European Union's commissioner for international relations, and his language could not have been any stronger in a diplomat.

The anouncement effectively torpedoed a major American initiative led by the former secretary of state James A. Baker III to reduce Iraq's foreign debt of over $120 billion, much of it owed to France, Germany and Russia. "We are not going to write off any debts," Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov immediately declared. A senior official at the State Department was quoted as saying that Mr. Baker is "the one who's going to be carrying the water" and deal with the consequences of Wolfowitz's move. Baker's visits to Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany next week will proceed as scheduled, but after the announcement on contracts it is most unlikely that he will persuade any of those countries to forgive Iraq's debts.

Wolfowitz's timing was particularly embarrassing for President Bush personally, since he had scheduled telephone conversations with French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Russian President Vladimir Putin for the following day (December 10) to discuss debt forgiveness. Instead of pressing his interlocutors for concessions he was subjected to their cold questioning about the decision. It is inconceivable that Wolfowitz was unaware of the arrangement at the time of making his announcement.

Most foreign commentators have accused Mr. Bush of insensitivity and arrogance, while most domestic commentators complained of his ineptitude. The New York Times set the tone by declaring that "President Bush has reversed field again and left the European allies angry, the secretary of state looking out of step, and the rest of us wondering exactly what his policy really is." It is remarkable that Wolfowitz himself was not included among those deserving reproach. The implied assumption is that the Assistant Secretary of Defense was simply acting as a loyal official carrying out his assigned tasks, and that the President was to blame if the result was an impression of illogicality and incoherence in his team's policy.

In another article, however, the Times interestingly revealed that "White House officials were fuming about the timing and the tone of the Pentagon's directive." Unnamed White House sources revealed that he was "distinctly unhappy" about having to deal with foreign leaders who had just learned of their exclusion from the contracts. Whatever his true feelings on the matter, in public the President defended Wolfowitz's announcement: "Our people risked their lives. Friendly coalition folks risked their lives. And, therefore, the contracting is going to reflect that." Colin Powell remained silent, however; a top State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, reflected his boss's feelings when he called the whole affair "a train wreck."

Why should Wolfowitz-an experienced, skillful, and highly intelligent operator-choose such a bad moment to make the announcement, and adopt such a gratuitously insulting tone? At the technical level, why was a memo written on December 5 released exactly four, and not ten or twelve days later, which would have given Bush and Baker an opportunity to launch the campaign for debt reduction without immediate hindrance? At the policy level, why was Wolfowitz allowed to impose the exclusion order in the first place-for it is clear that the policy was his, and that Bush condoned it against the better judgment of Powell and others-when it is so diametrically opposed to the thrust of this Administration's policy in previous weeks?

To cut the long story short here's why, and the explanation is eminently Unfit to Print. Wolfowitz is guilty neither of ineptitude nor of incoherence. Over the past three years his every statement and every move proved that he is rational and coherent in pursuit of his objectives, but those objectives are not identical with the stated goals of the Administration as a whole. To use the jargon, his behavior is personally functional but systemically dysfunctional.

Far from seeking cooperation and partnership, Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives want to create a permanent rift between the United States and Europe. His famous Vanity Fair admission last spring, that in seeking justification for war against Iraq "for bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on," likewise caused furore in Europe. It made a mockery of Powell's claim that Iraq was being attacked because it had violated its "international obligations" under its 1991 surrender agreement, which required the disclosure and removal of its WMDs. Just like his December 9 announcement, Wolfowitz's Vanity Fair admission appeared irrational and at odds with the Administration's stated policy objectives. In both cases a heavy spanner was thrown into the works of "rebuilding Iraq" through international consensus and cooperation.

Wolfowitz's behavior is coherent and logical only if his true objective is to make sure that the US remains the only outside power that matters in the Middle East. Since he is neither mad nor stupid his December 9 announcement must be seen as a deliberate move to preempt and torpedo Bush's, Baker's and Powell's initiative to get Europe, NATO and the UN involved in Iraq. He and his neoconservative allies do not want any foreign involvement there, except on their terms and under their control. They want the United States to remain engaged on its own, with all key decisions made by themselves and not through some multilateral mechanism that would be inevitable if NATO were to send troops and Europe to forgive debts. Wolfowitz's claim that "every effort must be made to expand international cooperation in Iraq" is a brazen lie, the exact opposite of his true intent.

Wolfowitz's premeditated blunder may have the additional objective to help detach President Bush from the remaining ties with his father's friends and advisors who still hope to pull him away from the neocons. In the final analysis the neoconservatives may be more interested in discrediting Baker, Powell and others like them personally than in controlling the occupation of Iraq. The Big Prize for them is to isolate Bush from competing counsel so they can completely control policy in the next administration.

Is George W. Bush aware of all this, and is he willing, or able, to do something about it? The answer will be known if Dr. Wolfowitz remains at his post three weeks from now. In a normal, well-ordered country, his actions over the past week-whether caused by malice, ineptitude, or stupidity-would be punished by immediate dismissal. If he remains at his post it is to be feared that America is no longer a normal country.

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