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SOE
18-06-2017, 01:39 PM
Порука: #15
RE: SOE
BRITONS IN THE BALKANS

After Fitzroy Maclean's death, Noel Malcolm on the effect, for good and ill, of young adventurers now gone, or grown old

REBECCA WEST used to tell a story about an aristocratic lady who asked her, towards the end of the second world war, `Can you tell me how I can get my son sent out to Tito? I'm told it's the thing for a young man to do if he wants to get on.'

For some young men — notably the Scottish diplomat-turned-soldier, Fitzroy Maclean, who died this month — a visit to the Balkans was certainly a step on the road to fame and fortune. Those who had a 'good war' behind enemy lines could have a very good war indeed, particularly if they went on to publish vivid accounts of their adventures. Good fortune and colourful writing explain some of the glam- our which accumulated round these Balkan adventurers; but they are not the whole explanation. The plain truth is that the British officers who were dropped into the Balkans formed a constellation of indi- vidual talents which it would be hard to match in any other theatre of the second world war.

Apart from Sir Fitzroy, they included the young Oxford historian Bill Deakin (now Sir William), the future minister Julian Amery (now Lord Amery), the dashing young soldiers David Smiley, Billy McLean and Billy Moss, the actor Antho- ny Quayle, the Himalayan mountaineer Bill Tilman, the young intellectual Alan Hare (future chairman of the Financial Times), the journalist Peter Kemp, the reg- ular officers Eddie Myers and Monty Woodhouse (later a Tory MP), Winston Churchill's son, Randolph, and (at a late stage) Evelyn Waugh, the future diplomat and ambassador to France Reginald Hib- bert (now Sir Reginald), the journalist (and later left-wing authority on Africa) Basil Davidson, the classicist (now Profes- sor) Nicholas Hammond, and, if Crete can be counted at least politically as part of the Balkans, the young adventurer Xan Field- ing and the exuberant latter-day Byron, Patrick Leigh Fermor.

This list is nothing like a complete roll- call, of course, but it happens to contain most of the names of those who later wrote books about their Balkan experi- ences. The literary legacy of this corner of the second world war is not the least extraordinary thing about it. Oddly, one person who has never set down his memo- ries of the war in print is the most gifted writer of them all, Patrick Leigh Fermor; but his most famous exploit, the kidnap- ping of a German general in Crete, was fully described by his friend Billy Moss in his book III-met by Moonlight. Some, on the other hand, have written more than one book covering their Balkan experi- ences — such as Julian Amery, whose account of the war in Albania, Sons of the Eagle, richly deserves reprinting. And the flow of writings has barely halted over half a century: both Peter Kemp's autobiogra- phy and Sir Reginald Hibbert's account of the Albanian guerrilla war came out with- in the last five years.

Any readers who work their way through a whole shelf of these books will begin to feel that each new volume they open takes them back into a world they know well: places recur, characters reap- pear, and the entire atmosphere of this special type of Balkan warfare becomes hauntingly familiar. In some cases, there are so many overlapping accounts involv- ing the same central figures that the expe- rience is rather like reading one's way around other much-written-about group- ings such as Bloomsbury — though the setting here has caves instead of drawing- rooms, and it is bridges rather than liter- ary theories which get demolished.

The only group of officers which could be described as a coterie was the one which gathered intermittently at Tara, a house in Cairo presided over by an exiled Polish countess. Cairo was — before the taking of southern Italy — the base for all actions mounted by SOE (Special Opera- tions Executive) in the Balkans, so it was to Cairo that these adventurers would return between missions. At Tara, the reg- ular residents were the two young Etonian officers David Smiley and Billy McLean, and the three daredevils who operated in Crete, Patrick Leigh Fermor, Xan Fielding and Billy Moss. Between these men a spe- cial camaraderie developed. But the social world of the young officer class was a small one, and there were plenty of other friend- ships and connections linking officers in the Balkans. Julian Amery, for example, was an old school-friend of Smiley and McLean, and when he landed in Albania the first officer he met there was one of his closest friends from Oxford, Alan Hare.

Such interlinkings may give the impres- sion that the method of recruitment was the old school tie. In fact, most of those who got these jobs did so because of their own special abilities. Smiley and Billy McLean, for example, had already directed irregular warfare in Abyssinia and the Sudan; Amery had been organising Albani- an resistance from the British embassy in Belgrade; Kemp, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, had been conducting commando raids on Brittany; and Tilman's request to go to a mountainous Balkan country was not unreasonable, given that he was a mountaineer of worldwide repute. (In Albania, to keep himself fit, he would climb the local mountains before breakfast — causing dismay and exhaustion to his Partisan guards, who had been given strict orders not to let him out of their sight.) Bill Tilman was untypical in one respect, however: he was already in his late thirties, which made him, by the standards of most British liaison officers, an old man. From all the accounts of these wartime adven- tures, and from the photographs which so many of them contain (a Leica seems to have been an essential piece of equip- ment), the most striking thing to emerge is the sheer youth of the participants. Most were in their mid-twenties; some looked like undergraduates; and even Fitzroy Maclean, promoted to brigadier for his mission to Tito, was only 32 years old.

Their youthfulness explains why so many of them are only now reaching the ends of their lives, more than half a century later. And it explains why so many of them sur- vived. Not only did they have the physical strength and energy of young men, they also had the ability to learn new tricks, unlearn- ing some of the things they had had drummed into them at staff college. And at the same time they could still enjoy one of the privileges of youth: an indulgence in game-playing and swashbuckling. Both local adaptation and role-playing were combined in their choice of dress. In Albania, Billy McLean wore jodhpurs and a red cummer- bund, while David Smiley sported Albanian sandals, corduroy trousers and a white fez; in Crete, Patrick Leigh Fermor wore an embroidered jacket, riding-breeches, long black boots and a maroon cummerbund from which there protruded an ivory-han- dled revolver and silver dagger. As his friend Billy Moss recalled, 'Paddy did his utmost to keep up appearances . . . "I like them to think of me as a sort o' duke," he explained, striking a Byronic pose.'

Just how far the methods of irregular warfare diverged from those of the staff college was made clear to Smiley and McLean when their camp in the Albanian mountains was joined by Brigadier Trotsky Davies, a splendid, red-faced, bull-necked regular army officer twice their age. (The name 'Trotsky', a source of great puzzle- ment to the Communist Partisans, was a nickname he had been given at Sandhurst for being difficult and tolshie'.) To the amazement of the two younger officers, Davies brought with him the complete staff and equipment of a regular brigade headquarters, including camp furniture and an NCO with a typewriter.

His first complaint was about the absence of 'stand-to': a textbook proce- dure at military camps which involves mounting an armed guard before dawn and after dusk to repel enemy attacks. In future, he announced, there would be stand-to at one hour before dawn — and, by the way, what time was dawn? Smiley and McLean had no idea; they were not in the habit of getting up that early.

A soldier of Trotsky Davies's generation would assume that his job was to make irregular warfare similar in many ways to the regular variety; he would also suppose that there was a hierarchy of command, with all the locals treated as auxiliary `other ranks'. Today, when soldiers consid- er operations behind enemy lines, their first thoughts are probably about SAS-style exploits involving small units of utterly self-reliant men, who carry all their own supplies and have little or no contact with the local population.

But irregular war in the Balkans lay somewhere between those two extremes. These British officers certainly had to be tough and mobile; yet at the same time they always depended on local people, not only for military support, but also for food, shelter, transport (mules were vital: no one could live for long out of a rucksack) and intelligence.

When the surrounding population was sympathetic, as it was in most of Greece and many parts of Yugoslavia and Albania, there was little that could not be arranged with the outlay of a few gold sovereigns. (Sovereigns were the essential lubricant of all these British operations; some of them came from the Bank of England in boxes with Arabic markings, untouched since they had been prepared for Lawrence of Arabia during the first world war.) Houses could be rented in villages, mules and muleteers hired for a whole season, and peasants sent off into the local towns to buy large quantities of food and other sup- plies under the noses of the Germans.

It is their contact with the local people which provides so much of the atmosphere of the officers' later accounts. The old tra- ditions of courtly hospitality which they met with in the remotest mountain villages charmed and impressed them: a peasant might kill his last chicken to feed his visi- tors. Throughout the Balkans, men were reverting to the codes of behaviour of their traditional mountain fighters. Such behaviour included bravery, endurance and strict rules of personal honour; but it could also involve wholesale thieving, as the British officers noticed when half their precious parachute drops of supplies (especially the one containing gold sovereigns) went missing within minutes of hitting the ground.

As the officers also discovered, traditions of fighting which had evolved through gen- erations of highway robbery and occasional attacks on Ottoman gendarme posts were not perfectly adapted to the requirements of guerrilla war against the Wehrmacht. Without people such as David Smiley in Albania and Eddie Myers in Greece to plan the operations, badger the local leaders for support and plant the explosives themselves, many of the most important sabotage oper- ations against the Germans would never have been carried out.

The military and psychological problems of dealing with touchy local warriors were bad enough. But a far more serious worry overshadowed the activities of all the British officers: the danger of local politi- cal divisions between Communist and non- Communist resistance forces, and the ensu- ing threat of civil war. This problem seems to have taken most of the visiting British officers unawares, even though it loomed large over all the Balkan countries.

The general pattern was the same in each case. There was a Communist force (known as 'Partisans' in Yugoslavia and Albania, and by the acronym `Elas' in Greece): this had a secretive leadership which usually tried to camouflage its Com- munist intentions, and in some cases took control of other resistance forces by invit- ing them to join a so-called Popular Front. The Partisan leaders received encourage- ment and instructions from Moscow, but no physical support; they had to court the British for badly needed supplies of ammu- nition and equipment, while never forget- ting that Britain was an 'imperialist' power and therefore their long-term enemy.

On the other side of the political divide were various nationalist forces of a more traditional kind. In Serbia there was Gen- eral Mihailovic, who stood for the restora- tion of the royal (and Serb-dominated) government of Yugoslavia; in Greece there was General Napoleon Zervas, a well- known figure of the military Right; and in Albania there were a number of anti-Com- munist chieftains, of whom the most impor- tant was the northern clan leader Abas Kupi. One thing which all these men had in common was that they stood for the preser- vation of the old social order. This meant that they did not want to see the large-scale devastation of the countryside which would be caused by a prolonged uprising and mas- sive German reprisals. Their strategy was to husband their forces until the expected Allied landing, and only then to rise up en masse against the Germans.

The Communists, on the other hand, rejoiced in the destruction of the old order, and found that a population uproot- ed by war formed an ideal recruiting ground. From an early stage they had decided that their ultimate enemy would be not the Axis soldiers but the local non- Communist forces: these they denounced as 'collaborators', and as they increased their attacks on them, many of the non- Communist local commanders did indeed seek the -otection of the Germans.

The British officers were woefully ill- prepared for their encounter with this political vipers' nest. Of all the British liai- son officers, only Julian Amery had a solid grounding in Balkan politics from the months he had spent at the British embassy in Belgrade. Others who had some political savoir-faire (such as Fitzroy Maclean, who had been a diplomat in Moscow before the war) had no special knowledge of the Balkans. And those peo- ple who had been working at the SOE Balkan desk in Cairo, where much special knowledge was available, were usually too indispensable, or too much of a security risk should they be captured, to be sent in.

Most of the officers were trying to apply one simple rule of thumb, the rule express- ly stated to Fitzroy Maclean by Churchill: `Find out who is killing the most Ger- mans.' They regarded the local politics as a tiresome diversion from real military action, and many of them clung to the idea that if only they could get the rival political leaders round a table, they would be able to make them 'see sense' and work togeth- er. They also had a tendency, at first, to believe what they were told by the Com- munist commanders about such matters as their troop strengths: the figures reported by Fitzroy Maclean, for example, turn out to have been grossly inflated. The innate decency and honesty of these young Britons could at times come dangerously close to naivety; here the special qualities of youth, romantic adventurousness and a public school upbringing became more a liability than an asset.

Some learned their politics the hard way. Peter Kemp, although a man of dis- tinctly right-wing views (he had fought as a volunteer for Franco in the Spanish Civil War), seems to have taken little interest in Balkan politics until he learned that the Communists had deliberately passed on the news of his arrival in Kosovo to the Germans. In Greece, Eddie Myers became increasingly frustrated by the Elas leader- ship, as it refused to co-operate on the demolition of a crucial viaduct and devot- ed its energies instead to eliminating rival resistance movements. And in northern Albania, Smiley, McLean and Amery were hunted down by Communist forces and only just escaped with their lives.

Since British policy abandoned the nationalist forces in Yugoslavia and Albania and gave all its support to the Partisans instead, it is not surprising that many officers who owed their lives to nationalist guerrillas in those countries ended up with a bitter sense of betrayal. Some of them believed that they had lit- erally been the victims of treachery: they noted that some of their crucial signals had not been passed on by the SOE offi- cials in Cairo or Bari, and suspected a Communist plot.

One key figure at the Balkan desk in Cairo was indeed a prominent young Communist, James Klugmann (who after the war became editor of Marxism Today). The more evidence that emerges about Klugmann's work, the more it is clear that

he did have an influence on SOE activities which was much greater than his junior position there might suggest. But there were many reasons for the Allied backing of the Communists in the Balkans, and Klugmann can hardly have tipped the bal- ance on his own.

Reports from the ground were more important: here some of the most favourable comments on the Communists came from people such as Bill Deakin and Fitzroy Maclean, who were certainly not left-wing. Even Trotsky Davies sent in a message rec- ommending support for the Partisans. The only prominent British officer who could be called left-wing was Basil Davidson (a senior Yugoslav Communist described his views as `progressive'), but the decision to back Tito was not made by him alone. Although real suspicions remain about what was going on in Cairo and Bari, the idea that officers in the field were deliberately pursuing a pro- Communist agenda has never seemed plausi- ble. The only fellow-officer to make any claim of this kind was Rowland Winn, who, as Sir Reginald Hibbert has recently revealed, tried to halt Hibbert's career as a diplomat after the war, denouncing him as a dangerous Communist agent.

And yet there remains, if not a political division, then at least the embers of a long- burning resentment between those officers who supported the nationalists and those who helped the Communists to victory. On the one side are the Tara group, together with Lord Amery and several of the surviv- ing officers who served with Mihailovic in Serbia. On the other side have been David- son, Hibbert, Deakin and — until this month — Fitzroy Maclean. As the latter's death reminds us, the ranks of these old soldiers are dwindling now. Their fighting days are over, but the battle of arguments and recriminations continues in print. Here the writing of books, as Clausewitz might have said, has become the conduct of war- fare by other means.
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18-06-2017, 03:01 PM
Порука: #16
RE: SOE
Kajro 1941
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zn8uR7XM3mk
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28-06-2017, 07:00 PM (Последња измена: 28-06-2017 07:04 PM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #17
RE: SOE
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/ori...50fe4a.jpg

Гавриловић са Стафорд Крипс у Москви
http://serbianna.com/analysis/wp-content...00x218.jpg

http://serbianna.com/analysis/wp-content...Savich.png
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13-07-2017, 01:31 PM
Порука: #18
RE: SOE
SOE тотално контролисали ствари око Усташе у Кампове
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVcgYA5paXA

И Американци са својом ОСС и Operaion Paperclip су били утемељени у Пацони Канала
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11-08-2017, 01:52 PM (Последња измена: 11-08-2017 01:59 PM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #19
RE: SOE
Maria Krystyna Janina Skarbek
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krystyna_Skarbek
http://nigelperrin.com/christinegranville.htm

At war with the enemy within

The late Sir Fitzroy Maclean, sometimes (though mistakenly) taken as the model for Ian Fleming's James Bond, is one of Scotland's authentic war heroes. Last week's release of more papers from the Public Record Office relating to his wartime mission to Tito and the partisans in Yugoslavia follows hard on the heels of a trio of television programmes, fronted by the novelist Sebastian Faulks, on the role of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the Second World War. The SOE, founded with the intention of ''setting Europe ablaze'', was supposed to stretch Nazi occupation of the Continent to breaking point by specialising in sabotage missions, commando raids, and collaboration with national resistance groups, and, as such, Maclean's mission to Tito and the partisans ought to have been the jewel in its crown. But the main sabotage committed by the SOE's Cairo branch, overseeing the Balkans, was on Maclean's mission. Here was a dramatic illustration of the old saying that in wartime the only real fun is fighting your own people. Even the recently released papers, containing Maclean's cables to the Foreign Office, do not reveal the full story in all its black comedy.

Aged 32 when Churchill chose him as his ''kilted Pimpernel'', Fitzroy Maclean had made probably the most lightning ascent up the military ladder in modern British history. A ''fast track'' Foreign Office entrant after Eton and Cambridge, Maclean was already a veteran of the diplomatic service in Paris and Moscow when the war broke out. Aching to get into action as a soldier, he faced the dilemma that Foreign Office rules forbade him to resign to see active service. Having discovered the loophole that only membership of Parliament allowed a Foreign Office mandarin to resign, Maclean got himself adopted as Conservative candidate at Lancaster and then won a by-election there in 1941. Once elected, he took the extraordinary step of enlisting as a private in the Cameron Highlanders. After basic training, his obvious officer potential was spotted. He served as a commando with the newly created

SAS, and his exploits in North Africa and the Middle East saw him rise with meteoric speed through the hierarchy: he was briefly lieutenant, captain, major, and colonel before Churchill made him his ''Balkan brigadier''.

The salient point about Maclean's appointment by Churchill as his personal envoy to Tito in July 1943 was that he was to be the Prime Minister's eyes and ears in Yugoslavia at both a military and political level; for administrative, logistical, and supply reasons he was at the same time, somewhat illogically, to come under the aegis of the SOE. The guerrilla-like resistance of the SOE and its supremo, Lord Selborne, to the Maclean appointment is one of the most extraordinary tales in the annals of the ''secret armies'' of World War Two. SOE London at first pretended there were no flights to the Middle East because of bad weather. Having endured this excuse for a week, Maclean became suspicious and contacted his friends at the Foreign Office, only to learn that there was no bad weather. After booking himself on an RAF flight to Cairo, he announced the fait accompli to his official liaison officer at SOE headquarters in Baker Street. The upshot was an immediate interview with Lord Selborne, who tried to make him over as an SOE loyalist with a none-too-subtle offer of a DSO.

Having rejected this offer, Maclean was disconcerted to learn from Churchill that General Henry Maitland Wilson (nicknamed ''Jumbo'' for his girth), commander-in-chief, Persia and Iraq, had cabled Downing Street, objecting to Maclean's appointment in the strongest terms.

Maclean was surprised and disconcerted, for he had worked closely with Wilson on secret operations in Persia in 1942-43 and considered him a friend and ally. Churchill reassured Maclean that he intended to reprimand Wilson and fired off an angry cable to him to mind his own business.

Accordingly, Maclean's first port of call when he landed in Cairo was Wilson's headquarters. The general's assistants told Maclean that Wilson was piqued with Churchill for having given him a dressing down in response to an alleged cable, which in fact Jumbo had never sent. Wilson then told him that he suspected the SOE, who in Cairo were a byword for dirty tricks. Maclean next proceeded to SOE headquarters. Although Lord Glenconner was officially head of SOE, Cairo, he disliked living in Egypt and left most of the day-to-day running of the organisation to Brigadier Mervyn Keble, his

No 2. Keble was a cholerical, globe-shaped, workaholic and empire-builder, admired by a handful of assistants - such as Major Enoch Powell - but detested by the majority of those he came in contact with. Utterly ruthless, heedless of the lives of his agents and an expert in double-cross, Keble liked to storm around the SOE headquarters in Rustum Buildings from dawn till dusk, dressed in shorts and a vest.

The sight of the immaculately uniformed young brigadier seemed to drive Keble to apoplexy. He raged at Maclean, ordered him to break off all contact with Jumbo Wilson, and told him he would never see Yugoslavia. After a stormy meeting, Maclean returned angrily to Wilson. As he sat in the outer office, he began to scribble furiously a draft cable, telling Churchill he could not work with ''these apes''. He was interrupted by Wilson, who asked him to step into the inner sanctum to meet the Director of Political Warfare in the Middle East, Colonel P C Vellacott. From Vellacott, Maclean learned that he was the target of a SOE whispering campaign. Vellacott was supposed to noise it about in all the elite British watering holes in Cairo, principally Shepherd's Hotel and the Mohamet Ali Club, that Maclean was a hopeless drunk, an active homosexual, and a coward who had jeopardised SAS operations in North Africa.

After ordering Vellacott to scotch any such rumours, Wilson promised Maclean he would utterly destroy SOE, Cairo. To their alarm, Glenconner and Keble found they were fighting the wrong battle in the wrong place and time with the wrong man. Finally aware of the danger in which his organisation stood, Glenconner invited Maclean to the Mahomet Ali Club and, over dinner, tried to persuade him not to make his complaint against Keble official. Maclean would have none of it and sent off his damning report. It is this memorandum which has now been released and which at the time spelt the end for Glenconner and Keble. Churchill was incandescent with rage when he read it. By October 1943 SOE, Cairo had been gelded. A reluctant Selborne sacked Glenconner, Keble was shunted into a backwater position with the regular army, and SOE, Cairo, lost its independent role and came firmly under Jumbo Wilson's command.

Some have doubted Fitzroy Maclean's story of his turbulent relations with the SOE, but it receives confirmation from a number of unimpeachable sources. It seems that SOE, Cairo, really was a madhouse where the lunatics were running the asylum. One of the SOE's chroniclers, Bickham Sweet-Escott, remarked in his book, Baker Street Irregulars: ''Nobody who did not experience it can possibly imagine the atmosphere of jealousy, suspicion, and intrigue which embittered the relations between secret and semi-secret departments in Cairo.'' Another witness, Christopher Sykes, spoke of telephone-tapping, poison-pen letters, libellous verses, anonymous telephone calls, and even the suspicion of murder which his colleagues were happy to lay at Keble's door. In October 1943 Keble's deputy, Guy Tamplin, was found slumped over his desk, dead from a heart attack. Since it was known that Kebel had been experimenting

with a new poison for use in field operations, a string of anonymous phone calls from staff at Rustum Buildings resulted, congratulating Keble on the perfect crime.

Even given this collective SOE psychosis, we are entitled to ask what possessed the organisation to act in such a self-destructive way over the Maclean mission. It seems at least five issues were salient. The SOE thought Maclean's primary loyalty was to their bitter enemy, the Foreign Office; they considered that, as a known anti-communist he was an inappropriate choice of envoy to liaise with Tito, and they wanted a purely military mission in Yugoslavia headed by a ''real'' brigadier. Most of all, there was the personality clash between Maclean and Keble, who apparently detested the Scot on sight. He also felt that he had been sold down the river. In January 1943 he had urged on Churchill when in Cairo the importance of a mission to the partisans, but had imagined that any such operation would be strictly under his control.

Even the demise of Glenconner and Keble did not assuage Maclean's suspicions of the SOE. Hearing from other Balkan agents that the SOE was in the habit of suppressing any reports from the field they did not like, Maclean arranged with Sir Stewart Menzie, aka ''C'', head of the secret service (SIS), that all his signals from Yugoslavia to Cairo would be automatically copied to MI6 in London, thus preventing further sabotage. Maclean was a superb player of the ''secret army'' game, but remained wary of the SOE, even in its purely administrative role as support, supply, and logistical back-up for the mission to Tito. When the SOE distributed parachutes to the Maclean mission just before the plane took off from Tunisia for the drop zone over Yugoslavia, Maclean asked for several spare parachutes. ''I can assure you,'' he told me, ''that I did not take the first parachute that was offered to me.

Because one of the things the SOE did to people it wanted to get rid of was to put a blanket in their parachute.''

Oh, what a lovely war!

http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/12200...my_within/

Битка између
МИ6 и СОЕ
Неслагање Министар за Економичног и Политичког Ратовање, Министар на челу СОЕ Лорда Шелборна (Палмер Раундела)и сам Чурчил

ЗНАЧИ НЕКИХ СУ БИЛИ ТОТАЛНО СВЕШНИ ИЗДАЈА ЈОШ ОД ЊЕНИМ КОРЕНИМА!
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20-08-2017, 03:54 PM
Порука: #20
RE: SOE
Да се боље разуме издаја мораш да гледаш како су се енглези понашали према суседаним народима и државама и њихове разне борбене снаге.
На пример.....
бугари
Ромунци
Грци
мађари
шиптари
етничке групе Краљевине Југославије
словенци
хрвати
македонци
заратовани страна у Краљевине Југославије
Војске Краљевине
комунисте/партизана
усташа
муслимани сс/немачких јединице
шиптари
Фојцдојћери
мађари
бугари
Љотичевци СДК
Недичевци
Бела Гарда
Плава Гарда
Домобрани


Јели та понашање је трајала целог рата?
Јели та понашање се наставила после рата?
И све што је повезано са њега....

Један део те подршке је оружање.
Количина оружање сви групама
Кад стиже?
Шта се буквално шаље?
Колико комада оружање?
Каквог оружање се шаље?
И и преко којих траца/линије она улази у држави?
И зашто преко те линије и преко та места?
Учесталост снадевање
Јели се може повезати темпо снадевање, према ток рата око нас?

И како та подршка се може мерити са истим групама у тим суседним државама.
Јели је њихова стратегичност важније него наше, пример Грчке? И тако има другачији приступ?

Због забрана архива, са свих страна, историја је у константној ревзије, константно, или се историја замраћива, или се намерно збуњује, или се полако разблажује права истина, можда се истина намерно успрорава!

Али што сам приметио је баш енглеска индустрија у руковођавање са инфомације са сви могучним пољама над другом светском ратом. То се буквално мери са број књига својих припаднике у тај рат, академске књига, геопропагандске или чисте економске књиге......или медије као документарце, филм, или чланке што се често појављају у двеним новинама!

Тако нема ни једна друга држава на свету ко пише више книга од Срба (осим Срба) у другом светском ратом него енглеза!
И нико више прилепљива реч квизлинге него
КОМУНИСТИ
ХРВАТИ
МУСЛИМАНИ
ШИПТАРИ
И Енглеза! Можда ту има нешто!

Али ствар што сви сарадници тречог рајка, невероватно пролазе без било које озбилне анализе, неко бих рекао имао нека неѕвачни подршке......поготово ако су сви прислушних?
Тако бугари, Румунци, мађари, хрвати, словенци, украјинци, Руси, литванци, латванци, естонијанци, норвежани, свеђани, финци, данци, белгијанци, холанђани, свајцарци, италијани, французи, луксембергци, спанци, израелици, па и сами енглези/американци сви некако избегавају озбилна анализа!
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20-08-2017, 06:29 PM
Порука: #21
RE: SOE
https://postimg.org/image/z93sz8wxx/
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24-08-2017, 04:40 PM (Последња измена: 24-08-2017 05:38 PM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #22
RE: SOE
https://www.airbornehistorycanada.com/th...gence.html

At the beginning of the Second World War popular history purports that Britain and its Commonwealth had but a single enemy. That enemy was the alliance of the Axis powers. However what is rarely mentioned is the fact that Communism was an enemy of the western powers long before the Axis Alliance began to form and long before both Mussolini and Hitler achieved power. Countless documentaries, popular films and other media deliberately neglect to inform their consumers that the Communist Manifesto, published in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, predates by more than 70 years any Axis desire for complete global control. In fact, without this published mandate of Communist global control, the Axis never would have existed. Therefore popular historians need to be confronted with the fact that one of the first acts of the Axis powers was to sign the anti-Comintern agreement of November 1936.

With the formation of the first Communist state in 1919, the leaders of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Lenin and Trotsky immediately put into play plans to infiltrate western society to include top appointments within their governments, higher education, military and industrial complex. This coincided with the Moscow controlled establishment of western Communist Parties.

Selected agents of the Comintern bolstered existing Socialist and Communist groups around the globe to establish these Communist Parties. At the same time, with many left leaning political parties ( Labour in the UK, Democrat in the US and Liberal in Canada) around the globe choosing to recognize the USSR as a sovereign state, they immediately utilized trade delegations, political legations and embassies as bases for espionage. Their primary goal was twofold. First agents of the GRU, NKVD, NKGB, OGPU, KGB etc., posing as members of these offices, contacted members of these Comintern Communist parties and their sympathizers in order to begin infiltrating top educational institutions. They were seeking the like minded who had the potential to become top thinkers who also had the ability to infiltrate left leaning political parties, permanent bureaucracies and scientific and industrial research. This not only included countries like Germany, Britain and the United States but also Canada. In fact Canada was considered by Soviet intelligence to be a soft target. Canadian passports were regularly used by Soviet agents to traverse the globe as early as the 1920's.

The most successful venues for recruiting indigenous agents for the USSR were Universities like Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard and even the University of Toronto. Most people have heard of the Cambridge Five however most have not heard that these men, and their accomplices, directly impacted pre-war and wartime policies and actions taken by the ruling Canadian Liberal Government under William Lyon Mackenzie King.

With particular reference to the story about to unfold, they helped recruit Communist agents in the America's with the creation of a British Intelligence Special Training School in Canada popularly known as Camp X. At a time when Britain still had her back up against the wall and the United States was still neutral, British Intelligence contemplated opening a Special Training School in the America’s. Some state that this was originally intended to be a fall-back plan for the British should they be invaded however the timing of these discussions make this highly unlikely.

By the beginning of 1941 the Luftwaffe’s attempt to secure air superiority had failed and Britain was fighting a see-saw slugging match in North Africa. They also had strong forces in Greece and the Middle East. No, the original discussions around building a Special Training School in Canada were almost entirely based on what was happening, or what was predicted to happen, in the Balkans. It was not until April that Yugoslavia was invaded and it was May when Greco-British forces were pushed out of Greece. It was just before these British failures that serious discussions began regarding the establishment of a British intelligence school in Canada. The main object was to locate immigrants in the America’s that could be trained and infiltrated back into their nation of origin. Their goal was to join up with local resistance, build up that resistance and then mount operations against the occupiers.

Initially this was to help prevent or slow down an Axis advance via Yugoslavia and Greece into Turkey and the Middle East. One of the top men at Special Operations Executive Headquarters in Cairo assigned to develop policy on operations in the Balkans was Colonel William “Bill” Bailey. He made this point which resonated with Churchill in regards to future operations in Yugoslavia, “...What in fact is required is a counterblast to the Axis policy of 'divide and rule' and the Axis promise of a 'New Order' which will command unity of purpose between organizations and fanaticism on the part of individuals. After careful consideration SOE specialists in Balkan affairs have arrived at the conclusion that the concept of BALKAN UNITY may provide such a counterblast." (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/146, SOE Balkans No.2. Top Level Planning - Istanbul HQ - Planning & Organization of SOE Activities - General 1940-41. SOE POLICY FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE, D.P.A. PAPER No. 2.)

While it is stated in prior publications on Special Training School 103 that it was to be a showcase for British special operations in the America’s and a training facility for the members of various intelligence and police organizations from the US and Canada, this was a secondary consideration. In fact some of these people were involved with the recruiting and training of these immigrants. This was to be a joint allied scheme that had the potential to expand to expatriate’s of Eastern European nations that had previously immigrated throughout Central and South America.

While this sounds like a completely legitimate plan, what has not been fully understood by historians is the fact that this was an illegal recruiting scheme largely controlled by Communist moles and sympathizers within the western intelligence services. Not only were members of the Communist Party of Canada still banned but many of those recruited in both the US and Canada were illegal’s. All the men sought were to be Communists and their secret mission was to be inserted into Eastern Europe to assist, in whatever way possible, a takeover by Communist forces. This flying in the face of the Atlantic Charter which was signed by the Soviet Union in September 1941 agreeing that all nations under occupation, once liberated, will be given the right to free elections and self-determination.

In an attempt to oppose Hitler’s aspirations in the Balkans, the pro-Nazi Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia was overthrown by an anti-Fascist and non-Communist coup on 27 March 1941 involving a group of pro-Western Royal Yugoslavian Air force officers. They then placed 17 year old King Peter II Karadordevic on the throne and made one of the top instigators in the coup Slobodan Jovanovic Prime Minister. After the Axis invasion in April, the King and his government then went into exile in Britain. This government was also a signatory of the Atlantic Charter. Therefore the recognized ruler of Yugoslavia was a monarch not a Communist. Churchill hoped to harness the Royalist resistance, not that which might exist among the few Communists at that time.

However while it appears that Churchill and the Foreign Office were heading in one direction regarding Yugoslavia, Bailey and D/H Section (Yugoslav Section at SOE Cairo) proceeded in another, " The policy of SOE in SE Europe is to prepare a revolt of the Balkan peoples ( Greeks, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians and Hungarians) against the Axis forces and the local pro-Axis elements collaborating with them (the Governments and supporters of General TSOLAKOGLU [Greece], General NEDIC [Serbia], M.PAVELIC [Croatia], King BORIS [Bulgaria], Marshal ANTONESCU [Romania] and Admiral HORTHY [Hungary])...In the light of experience acquired in the period previous to the Axis occupation of the Balkans, and after due consideration of the information subsequently received, SOE's specialists in Balkan affairs are of the opinion that the masses of peasants and industrial workers constitute the most suitable potentially revolutionary elements in the different countries of S.E. Europe...it should be remembered that the conception of Balkan unity has long been familiar to the more progressive political leaders especially in Yugoslavia and that the prospect of playing the leading role in a new and greater Balkan order is likely to appeal to the imagination of all but the most reactionary of our supporters. In the same way it may be argued that the fact that our policy is primarily based on the support of Agrarian and Left Wing elements may alienate potential allies among the bourgeoisie. This is no doubt true but it is felt that the risk must be taken in view of the fact that the peasantry constitute some 80% of the population of the Balkan peninsula and that with the exception of certain bourgeois elements in Serbia and Greece, that majority of our sympathizers in the middle classes are not considered likely to give active expressions to their sentiments...There remains however the possibility that HMG may one day be called upon to implement this declaration and the question therefore arises whether Balkan unity is in the interests of the British Empire. It is beyond the scale of this memorandum to consider this question in detail but certainly the arguments in favour of Balkan unity as a British interest are strong." (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/146, SOE Balkans No.2. Top Level Planning - Istanbul HQ - Planning & Organization of SOE Activities - General 1940-41. SOE POLICY FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE, D.P.A. PAPER No. 2.)

In short, Bailey’s opinion was that since all peasants/farmers and workers must automatically be leftists or Communists only by harnessing their numbers could Balkan unity be ensured. D/H Section continues to state that they desired to, "...guarantee that the peoples of South Eastern Europe shall be governed in accordance with the principles of democracy. (Political democracy)...To guarantee that the wealth of South Eastern Europe shall be developed in accordance with the interests of the masses of the Balkan peoples. (Social Democracy)...To guarantee the Balkan peoples against external aggression until such times as they may be judged ready to stand alone.” (NOTE: IBID) However it is obvious by the reactions of the peoples of these nations that Bailey was dead wrong. In fact most of the people were actually either more moderately left or more conservative. While Communists usually assume that agrarian and industrial workers must all be Communists, in truth they were very much aware of the threat of Communism to their sovereignty. Wartime intelligence statistic's make it very clear that Communist's were actually in the minority in Eastern Europe. The question is, did Bailey know this at this time and was he out to implement his own policies?

In order for SOE's D/H Section and Bailey's plan to begin, they needed men to implement it. Like all other SOE recruiting schemes, it was quickly determined that refugee and immigrant populations in Britain would not be enough. They immediately looked to their Commonwealth and more covertly to countries in the rest of the America's to fill their needs. The author of Camp X, SOE School for Spies David Stafford published in 1986 states that correspondence he had with Christopher M. Woods, SOE advisor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, indicates that the idea to recruit personnel for British intelligence in the Americas had existed as far back as the beginning of 1941 when SOE representative Colonel Jeffrey Vickers VC travelled to New York to meet William Stephenson. He was a wealthy Canadian industrialist who became head of the British Secret Intelligence Service in the America’s. Formally operating under the guise of the Passport Control Office in New York, it became known as British Security Co-Ordination or BSC. The resulting directive penned on 15 February charged BSC to, "establish an SOE network throughout Latin America, to recruit likely SOE agents in the United States and other American countries, to help influence public opinion in the United States in a pro-allied direction, to make contact with various European refugee and exile movements in the New World, and to help create secret communications channels for SOE networks." The idea to build a training facility in Canada also came out of these discussions. (Note: Stafford, David. Camp X SOE School for Spies. Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1986. Directive, Hyde Papers, 15 February 1941. Chapter 2. To Impress the Americans, pgs. 28-29.)


Shortly after this directive was made a major turning point in the war occurred. After being delayed by the brave coup in Yugoslavia, Hitler and his Axis allies broke their pact with Stalin and invaded Soviet held territory and pushed on into the USSR itself. History seems to have shut the door on this collusion between Hitler and Stalin. In fact most completely neglect to mention it when discussing the causes of the war. It is apparent that delving into this unusual collusion between heated enemies might reveal the fact that despite the propaganda, the USSR was never an ally of the west. While spying on the west and inciting labour agitation and violence, the USSR sat idly by while Europe was engulfed by Hitler. Rather than protest these actions, they joined with Hitler in carving up Europe. After Hitler predictably turned on the USSR, Stalin immediately starts demanding action from his sworn enemies to help them. It is evident that after Hitler invaded the USSR, Stalin’s intelligence services continued to expand their efforts against the west. In contrast, Britain’s coalition government completely shut down all intelligence operations against the USSR. (Note: See Jefferies, Keith. The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949. Penguin Group. 2010) As will be made evident, the continuing effort by the Communists to undermine foreign governments will soon result in a brand new British intelligence training school in Canada.

The effort," to recruit likely SOE agents in the United States and other American countries," fits perfectly into SOE Cairo's plans. In addition to this, after Yugoslavia was invaded and Hitler made his move on the USSR, a secret letter from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in London, The Right Honourable Vincent Massey to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson dated 4 July 1941 clarifies that the King and Government of Yugoslavia in exile wished to send military missions to both Canada and the US to, "...raise at least a brigade amounting to about 5,000 men."(NOTE RG24, Yugoslav Citizens of U.S.A. -Training facilities in Canada for - Vol. 5197) This is shortly after a Special Training School is proposed in Canada. David Stafford disputes the connection. However newly found documentation completely discounts Stafford's claim that the Royal Yugoslav Government did not know about a recruitment scheme for intelligence volunteers in the America's. However what was not apparently shared with the Royalists was that SOE Cairo was looking specifically for committed Communists. (NOTE RG24 Volume 2848, Yugoslav Military Mission File HQC 8594-2 and NOTE RG24, Yugoslav Citizens of U.S.A. -Training facilities in Canada for - Vol. 5197 and RG25, A-12, Volume 2116, Security BSC New York, File AR418/2.)

The men that these recruits would soon be working under mostly consisted of former experienced members of the Secret Intelligence Service who operated out of the Balkan branch of Section "D" under Colonel Julius Hannau. Men like Bailey, who we have already met, and Duane Tyrell "Bill" Hudson become integral to the story. After his policy papers were absorbed by his superiors at SOE Cairo and GHQ Middle East, Bailey was the one chosen to implement and actually travel to the United States to locate these prospective volunteers. Following "his" policy, it was Bailey who specifically sought out Communists in the Americas.

In the meantime, with the situation in Yugoslavia still up in the air, Stafford states that the final decision regarding a location for the intelligence school in Canada came at a party that Colonel F.T. "Tommy" Davies, the Chief of Staff to SOE’s Chief Director, Frank Nelson, attended at Stephenson’s Manhattan apartment in the St. Regis Hotel the evening of 6 September 1941. With a final location decided on and pressure from SOE Cairo (D/H Section) to get them recruits as soon as possible, Thomas Drew-brook (Stephenson's friend and BSC representative in Toronto, Canada.) forwarded the following letter to The Canadian Under-Secretary of External Affairs Norman Robertson on 18 September 1941, “I wish to advise you that the location of our ‘Special Police Training Centre’ has finally been decided upon. The site chosen is completely secluded, and lies two and a half miles East of Whitby, then a further two and a half miles South of the Highway [Highway No. 2] to the Lake Shore. We are anxious to proceed immediately with the construction of buildings and hope to have everything completed for occupation by the first of November. Preliminary plans have been completed but the working drawings will not be ready for several days.” (NOTE: LAC RG 25, File2490-40, Priority Rating for Materials req. for Special Police Training Center , Letter from T.G. Drewbrook BSC Toronto to Under –Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Norman Robertson, Vol. 2913)

The top-priority given to the completion of the school is made clear in a letter from Robertson to Mr. Berkinshaw, Director General of Priorities, Department of Munitions and Supply dated 20 September 1941, "...for various reasons, the purpose for which these buildings will be required cannot be spelt out in an application for priorities. I can, however, assure you that they are urgently needed for military purposes of some importance, with which the Commissioner of the RCMP and I are fully familiar." (NOTE: RG25, File 2490-40 Priority Rating for Materials Required for Special Police Training Center, Volume 2193, 20 September 1941.) So from the get-go External Affairs and the RCMP were in the know however what exactly did they know? Remember this was a British owned and operated installation within Canada.

The urgency of getting this school up and running was being pushed by SOE Cairo who, in their 29 September 1941 Memorandum on Balkan Work, declared that, " A. The whole of the BALKAN plan will be centralized in CAIRO. B. SOE will be directly responsible for all the contacts made with all the various BALKAN collaborators. C. It has been decided to give training in guerilla tactics and the aim is to train the following people between now and 1st April , 1942, namely,

200 Greeks

100 Yugoslavs

25 Rumanians

25 Bulgarians

25 Hungarians

The ultimate aim is to infiltrate these people back to their various countries before 1st April 1942. The representatives in the field should explore and report methods of infiltration from their end and state the number of people they are likely to pass by their channels. A representative of each BALKAN country will consider this memorandum and prepare a memorandum on their particular country, showing lines to be adopted in respect of their country so as to ensure the maximum co-operation from H.M.G. and from the propaganda people, bearing in mind that all suggestions must come within the general policy laid down in this memorandum. They should consider especially, the best methods of recruiting the personnel above."(NOTE UKNA, HS5/146, SOE Balkans No.2. Top Level Planning - Istanbul HQ - Planning & Organization of SOE Activities - General 1940-41. Memorandum on Balkan Work by D/H20, 29 September 1941.)


It must be remembered that the final policy memorandum of D/H Section was to largely support radical left wing elements within Yugoslavia. This was a policy completely opposite to that being developed by Churchill’s Foreign Office. While there was talk about Balkan unity, there was no talk yet about the political unity of existing resistance movements within Yugoslavia. While it was desired by Churchill and the Foreign Office, their main focus was on those representing the exiled King.

While Bailey was putting wheels on his recruiting scheme by initially contacting the likes of US Communist Milton Wolff who had led the Abraham Lincoln Battalion of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, SOE Cairo sent a man into Yugoslavia to see what was happening on the ground. The intended target of the BULLSEYE Mission was the Royalist resistance under Colonel Draza Mihailovic. However the man sent in, the previously mentioned Hudson first encountered the Communists. Was this by accident or by design?, "Nor was the position much clearer when, in the middle of October (1941), the British government accepted Mihailovic as the leading insurgent and instructed Hudson, whose first encounters had been with the Communist-led Partisans, to make contact with him. This decision was made after Mihailovic had established a W/T link with the Yugoslav government in London and had sent messages announcing that he was launching a national revolt as head of 'The Royal Yugoslav Army in the field'; but except that King Peter had shown these to the Prime Minister, the situation remained obscure." (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, Cambridge University Press, 1984. pg 137) After Hudson's hobnobbing with the Communists he got a rather cold reception from Mihailovic. They commandeered his radio set and Hudson virtually vanished. Originally SOE thought he had been captured. They then sent in two additional missions in January and February 1942, HENNA and HYDRA to see what was happening but both failed for one reason or another. It was not until April 1942 that Hudson was able to make contact.

In F.H. Hinsley's British Intelligence in the Second World War it is stated that it was revealed in reports now coming in from Hudson that it was Mihailovic's idea to unify all resistance in Yugoslavia against the Axis powers, "Whitehall accepted Mihailovic's claim in the belief that all the guerilla groups could be brought together in a single resistance movement. The Foreign Office responded sympathetically to the Soviet suggestion that the best way of creating a diversion in Yugoslavia was to grant support to all groups irrespective of their political colour. A series of meetings between Mihailovic and Tito and their staff's took place in November 1941. But Hudson's report on this [revealed that] fighting had broken out between the two groups in Serbia, he now gave the first of many warnings that Tito's Partisans suspected that Mihailovic's Chetniks were collaborating with Nedic's [ Croat Fascist Group under the Germans] government in Serbia and with other pro-Axis elements against them. "(NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, Cambridge University Press, 1984. pg 138.) What the Foreign Office understood and Hudson did not, was the fact that Mihailovic was biding his time while at the same time reducing any risk to his force by staying close to the Fascists. After all, the Royalists were still a fledgling force and still had not been supplied by the British. Like the resistance in France, it was SOE policy for these groups to train, arm and prepare and not to risk all out extermination by premature action. There is also the possibility that Mihailovics’ desire to work with all resistance actually meant the possibility of getting Nedic onside, not the Communists.

While the British were trying to figure out what was happening on the ground in Yugoslavia, ultimate approval to proceed with plans to build a training school in Canada was required from the Minister of National Defense, Colonel The Hon. J.L. Ralston and the Prime Minister of Canada W.L. Mackenzie King. Ralston was very enthusiastic about helping the British and was granted approval by the Prime Minister to assist in whatever was necessary to get the School up and running. This was NOT an approval to recruit Communists. This was strictly an approval to assist the British in the actual building and maintenance of the camp. Nothing yet had been agreed about recruiting. Again, it is not known exactly what King and Ralston were being told by the British. Correspondence seems to suggest that they thought the camp was to strictly train legally recruited armed forces personal for commando/para-military work behind enemy lines. (NOTE: LAC RG24, Microfilm Reel C-8383, Memo Special Training School Whitby, Ontario from the VCGS 16 November 1941.)

The Communist Party of Canada was banned in 1941 under the Defense of Canada Regulations under the War Measures Act. This was mainly due to the ever increasing arrests of their members for seditious behaviour. Curiously the Liberal Party refused to ban the Communist Party along with the Fascists in 1939. Sedition had to rear it's ugly head in court before they were prompted to do something by the opposition.

There was also disgust in the Communist Party support for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its intense campaign of labour agitation and strikes aimed at disrupting vital war production. While Communist apologists like to quote early war inflation rates to justify many of these strikes, they never recount the Government’s efforts to raise wages to reasonable levels. Nor do they recount the actual admittance of subversives and those committing the espionage who were members of these western Communist Parties. All global Communist parties outside the USSR were controlled by the Communist International in Moscow. All had direct contacts with the Soviet NKVD, NKGB, OGPU and GRU. They also don’t tell you about their printed and published dogma distributed by them at the time itemizing their militant, anti-democratic, anti-religious and anti-west tirades culminating in their desire to see a violent overthrow of the government. (NOTE LAC RG24-C-1, Files 8885-2, Secret and Confidential Subject File, Army, Special Training School 1941-1946, Letter Brigadier Stewart (for CGS) to the Minister, 21 October 1941, C-8383.)

Despite what was stated previously by Colonel Vickers and others who claim that the school was primarily meant to be a showcase of British Intelligence to the Americans, the first recruits were those found in the United States via Milton Wolff and Canada via their respective Communist underground sub-groups for operations in the Balkans and Italy. The BSC now dubbed the scheme PROJECT "J" (British Correspondence usually spelt Yugoslavia with a "J" rather than a "Y"...). This is revealed in correspondence between Major-General Charles Francis Constantine and the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) dated 17 October 1941, “In order to preserve secrecy, we have named this affair - project J - and numbered it, special 21-1-1.” . (NOTE: RG24-C-1, File 8885, MR C-8383, Secret and Confidential Subject Files, Special Training School 1941-1946. Staff Duties 3 to Director of Staff Duties, Estimate and Financial Implications, Special School "J" at Whitby, Ontario, 17 October 1941 also Major-General Charles Francis Constantine, CO of Military District 2 to Director of Staff Duties Colonel W.H.S. Macklin, 7 December 1941.)

In another document from Constantine, who was Commanding Officer of Military District 2, to the DSD on 24 October 1941 it mentions arrangements being made for the setting up of this project, "The Commandant will be a Colonel Lyndsay of the British Army and he will provide the instructions staff and the students (16 in number). He will run a series of courses." (NOTE: LAC, RG24, File 8885, C-8383, Major-General Charles Francis Constantine MD 2, to Directorate of Staff Duties Colonel W.H.S. Macklin, 24 October 1941) It further stated that the school should be up and running by 15 November 1941. The Official British designation for the school, as utilized for their international system of Intelligence schools, was Special Training School 103 (STS 103). No official document exists calling the School “Camp X”. The only reference being a doctor’s report regarding the death of a student at STS 103 in 1943. It is presumed it was simply used to denote the school without using any official terminology. To date no published source has understood that these original 16 "students" were the initial group of Yugoslav Communist para-military recruits. (NOTE: RG24-C-1, File 8885, MR C-8383, Secret and Confidential Subject Files, Special Training School 1941-1946. Vice Chief of the General Staff to T.G. Drew-Brook, 16 November 1941.)

Two of the major mistakes made by historians in relation to STS 103 is the belief that the above documents were referring to early trainee's put forward by Canadian and US police and intelligence services to operate in the America's as agents. The second mistake was not realizing that the Balkan recruiting scheme had actively begun as early as September 1941 and possibly even earlier.

Originally most of the men recruited were underground labour agitators or editors and workers at various Communist propaganda newspapers. All were members of ethnic branches of the Communist Party of the United States or Canada and many were neither US or Canadian citizens with some living in North America illegally. A few were also actively sought by the police for matters not related to immigration or labour agitation.

In a document dated 30 October the actual British staff sent to train these men in Canada was referred to as 207 Military Mission. This was a draft document that was not distributed but it reveals who was coercing this recruitment scheme directly with Canada, "We have ascertained that SOE have come to an arrangement with the Canadian Government for the setting up in Canada of a Special Training School to be known as 207 Military Mission. The School is for the purpose of training Agents and Organizers from the various states in South America and Central America and possibly USA [ where large Yugoslav immigrant groups existed] with the ultimate object of sending Nationals of these Countries to enemy occupied territory. The instruction comprises para-military training and S.S. [Secret Service] work. Is it possible for such a request to be passed to General McNaughton? The nature of the work is such that it is obviously desirable that only a few persons should know of it." (NOTE: NA UK, WO193/631 Military Operations 1 War Office SOE 9 Military Mission 207, STS Canada, 30 October 1941, ) Obviously it was decided that the information contained in this document was too sensitive to send. Was this because it revealed something that might spark suspicion as to the real motives behind this recruiting scheme? It is highly unusual that SOE was directly negotiating the set up of this project with the Canadian Government. There appears to be no additional British Government involvement and no further representation by the Foreign Office. This is highly unusual and the implications of this statement become clearer as the story develops.

One document from a Brigadier at the Department of National Defense in Ottawa to Canadian External Affairs reiterates that contact was made direct with British intelligence and not representatives of the British Government, "Mr. Norman Robertson telephoned this morning stating that Colonel Lindsay [the original proposed British Commanding Officer of the School] of the British Army was in Ottawa in connection with the setting up of a Special Training School in Canada. Preliminary discussions had taken place between British Intelligence officers and Commissioner Wood, R.C.M.P. A decision had been made to set up a school in Canada and Colonel Ralston, the Minister of Defense, had promised to assist." (NOTE: RG24, File STS, MS, Reel C-8383. From Brigadier for VCGS Major-General J.C. Murchie, DND, 16 November 1941) It is interesting that Lyndsay ultimately refused to take command of the school. The reason why is still considered a mystery. Did he see through the deception?

It was then proposed by External Affairs on 16 December 1941 to the Yugoslav Consul General in Montreal that a Yugoslav Military Mission could now join the Polish Military Mission at Windsor and set up one of its own at Owen Sound, Ontario. (NOTE RG24, Yugoslav Citizens of U.S.A. -Training facilities in Canada for - Vol. 5197) This mission was led by a Colonel Drag P. Savitch who was not overjoyed with his being reassigned to Canada from Cairo. It is not known exactly what he knew about the project however it was his mission that would house many of these recruits before they were sent overseas.

With the general Canadian public apparently unaware of the entrenched Communist subversion and espionage actually taking place in the America's (despite several sensational headlines between 1938 and 1941 covering the defection of Soviet agents operating in Britain, the US and Canada), polls at that time showed some softening of the Canadian public’s anti-Communist sentiment when members of Communist groups loudly voiced their will to fight. What the media conveniently forgot to mention to the Canadian public was that they had no intention of fighting for Canada. With that said, they had the support of government officials now directly involved in the setting up of STS 103 and recruiting. At the end of the summer of 1941 attempts had been made by these men to," work more closely with the Communists in Canada. In fact support for legalizing the CPC [Communist Party of Canada] and releasing the internees gathered steam. Lester Pearson and Norman Robertson felt that the Communists should be fully harnessed to the war effort," (NOTE: "Official Repression," pgs. 148-149; Whitaker, "Introduction," 17. Derived from http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/Hist...m#_ftn104) It was the likes of Prime Minister King’s Secretary Jack Pickersgill, Pearson, Robertson and other Liberals and Liberal appointed permanent bureaucrats that pushed King to recognize the Communist Party of Canada and to reinstate it as the Labour Progressive Party. (The only MP representing this party in Parliament Fred Rose will be convicted of espionage on behalf of the USSR.)

However 1942 would come and go with no change to the Defence of Canada Regulations, "The RCMP and the Justice Department insisted that the actual communist aim was 'victory for the Soviet Union over democracy,' and to 'subvert the Canadian Armed Forces to that end." (Note: Ditto pg 151.) Actual accounts by Communists at their meetings and their recorded plebiscite state that this was in fact the attitude of many leading Communists and their followers in Canada. As already stated, these men had no intention of fighting for Canada. What is largely forgotten by many Communist apologists is that a large number of active labour agitators and sworn Communists operating in the United States and Canada were not even citizens. Many were sent by their respective foreign Communist parties and groups to deliberately spread Communist subversion. The records of the British Communist recruiting scheme in the America's make this very clear. In fact most of these Communists recruited openly admit this. (NOTE: HS/9 SOE Personnel Records.)

As members of SIS and SOE continued with their plan to recruit Communists and labour agitators in the west, the United States found itself at war with Japan. Following a series of attacks on US territory in the Pacific and S.E. Asia, war was declared on 8 December 1941. Germany then declared war on the US. But the schemes to recruit men within the United States and the America's existed long before their entry into the war. This was illegal. It was also against British Government policy to recruit members of the Communist Party of Canada and the Communist Party of the United States. In Canada, under the Defence of Canada Regulations, it was also illegal to recruit known Communists into the Canadian Army. While some, likely unknown to the RCMP, did join the army it was not until 1943 that restrictions were relaxed. Even then, they were to be closely monitored by the RCMP. None of this changed the fact that it was strictly forbidden for known Communists to operate within any of the western intelligence services. (NOTE: http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/Hist...m#_ftn104)

A war was now being waged between SOE Cairo and the Foreign Office to shift support from the King of Yugoslavia and Mihailovic to an apparent Yugoslav Communist named Josip Broz or Tito, "Among these stood forth, pre-eminent and soon dominant. Tito, as he called himself, was a Soviet-trained Communist who, until Russia was invaded by Hitler, and after Yugoslavia had been assailed, had fomented political strikes along the Dalmatian coast, in accordance with the general Comintern policy." (Note: Closing the Ring, Marshall Tito and Yugoslavia, pg. 462) This not only meant the destruction of the Axis invaders but also the destruction of all other opposition. Churchill himself is quoted, "It was inevitable that the partisan movement should also come into savage quarrels with their fellow-countrymen, who were resisting half-heartedly or making bargains for immunity with the common foe. The partisans deliberately violated any agreements made with the enemy by the Cetniks - as the followers of General Mihailovic were called. The Germans then shot Cetnik hostages and in revenge Cetniks gave the Germans information about the partisans. All this happened sporadically and uncontrollably in these wild mountain regions. It was a tragedy within a tragedy." (Note: Closing the Ring, Marshall Tito and Yugoslavia, pg. 462-463)

What Churchill states, and later seems to forget, is the fact that the partisans had the active support and backing of the Soviet Union. While one side of history labels Mihailovic as an Axis collaborator, to many citizens of Yugoslavia, Tito was in fact a Soviet collaborator. The plain fact of the situation in Yugoslavia is that the USSR and Tito never had any intention of working with the Royalists. If the Germans did not get Mihailovic, Tito was bent on killing him himself. From the very beginning the Soviets, along with Tito and his Communist sympathizers in British Intelligence, had a three stage plan. 1. Discredit the Royalists 2. Shift ALL support from the western allies to the Partisans. 3. Destroy Mihailovic. A similar stage of events was in the works as well for the entire Balkan area and Northern Italy. It has to be remembered that the conflict that developed between Tito and Stalin did not begin until the end of the war.

SOE Cairo now began to look into the recruiting of Italians. The details that exist surrounding this effort clearly indicate coercion by Bailey. This is made evident when BSC's initial recruiter working within the RCMP was dismissed on paper by Bailey in favour of one who specifically recruited known Communists.

The following document dated 7 February 1942 titled Memorandum Free Italian Recruits was written by a man named Bersani (Agent 942). He was the first man approached by BSC to recruit Italian Canadians. Bersani worked at the RCMP in vetting Italian immigrants to Canada. The document makes the earliest reference to the Italian recruitment scheme, “…on November 10th 1941 I was first instructed to carry out the work in which I have been incessantly engaged during the past three months, I stated it was worthwhile to accomplish… In my report of December 1st, 1941 I suggested that an antifascist paper should be promoted as this offered a means of making contacts...proposal that a 'FREE ITALY MOVEMENT' should be organized for the purpose of providing a recruitment ground for Types 1, 2 and 3. Both these proposals were rejected". (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada.) What Bersani means by various “types” of recruit, is a classification system used by SIS and SOE to identify prospects better suited for either, Type 1 Secret Intelligence, Type 2 Para-Military or Type 3 Commando operations.

Bersani was simply anti-Fascist, he was not a Communist. It is interesting that Bailey did not appreciate the results of Bersani's work as he wanted him "discontinued." He then made arrangements for a known Communist to replace him, “Arrangements with regard to Antonio Verdi alias Ennio Gnudi [ Code V-1] are going forward." He stated the reason being that "This office is unfavorably impressed with the work performed by 942 [Bersani]." He then lets the cat out of the bag when he states that, "Out of the ten names [All Canadian or Alien] submitted there is only one who may be useful for the present purpose, and even he is questionable. The others, of course, may come in should the situation develop in another direction." This is because none of these men were Communists except one who was only suspected of being Communist. Bailey goes on, "Whilst every effort was made to give 942 a clear and concise picture of what we desired, he seems to have missed the point and has been carried away by his own enthusiasm and a desire to be more closely connected with the actual placing." Bailey then attempts to use character assassination to get Bersani sacked. In his place he states that, "It is recommended that the account be paid and from now on, we experiment with Gnudi." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. From DT-Section A.1 (Liaison with SIS) to UT (USA South America /Training) 14 February 1942)

While the Communist Gnudi is hired by Bailey, the following document dated 9 April 1942 from G.400 (Aleksandr Halpern SOE Chief of Minorities Sub-Section at BSC and former member of the Kerensky Government in pre-Bolshevik Russia) to DSC confirms that D/H Section at SOE Cairo was operating on their own volition. In a system that should have rung alarm bells amongst the Canadian authorities, it was not the British Government working out these delicate details. SOE Cairo was operating one on one with the Canadian Government, Military and RCMP. Bailey then asks for, “your authority [External Affairs Canada] to extend the work of my section to Canada. I understand that ROBERTSON, PEARSON and [Saul] RAE are the persons in the Dominion Government who are interested in the problem of minorities. I know that Robertson is rather skeptical of any positive results to be achieved. I do not overestimate these possibilities but they exist. There are 50,000 Austrians, 30,000 Czechs, 40,000 Hungarians, 100,000 Italians, 150,000 Poles, 30,000 Roumanians, 20,000 Jugoslavs, 4,000 Bulgarians in Canada. Canada has now a large number of representative leaders of various nationalities. It has branches of the so-called Free Movements. They should be watched, nursed, and contacted. S.O. and S.I.S. recruits could be found there if we approach the various racial groups through their recognized leaders. Any recruit we find and train there will have the advantage that we shall not be dependent on the Americans either as regards the training or as regards the incorporation and management of the recruits. If as I understood you agree in principle the best way would be to have a talk with Robertson or some of his people in Canada and if there are no objections to start the work forthwith. Stuart or Bailey could go from time to time to Canada to deal with the Southern Slavs and I or [Dr.Herbert] Sichel [BSC Statistician] could easily handle the Germans, Austrians and Italians." (NOTE:UKNA, HS8/75, SOE, America No.80, Balkan Recruiting in Canada, First Party (Shipwrecked) Pt.1.G.400 to DSC, 9 April 1942.)

Apart from Bailey confirming the involvement of Norman Roberson, Lester Pearson and Saul Rae, this quote again begs the question; If there were thousands of possible recruits, why did they specifically have to be Communists? It should be stated that External Affairs was Canada’s foreign intelligence service at this time. Canada's Liberal appointed permanent bureaucrats will see to it, despite pleas to the contrary from the military and opposition, that this remained the case until the formation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. Why was this? Something to hide? Even if many of these Communists had previous military experience fighting in Spain with the Independent Brigade on the side of the Republicans, the fact that their proposed role within SOE was simply to be translators, wireless operators, instructors and saboteurs does not back up any prerequisite that they be Communists. If it was simply military experience they were after, most of those supporting the Royalists in the Americas also had military experience due to the fact that the pre-war Royal Yugoslav Army was bolstered by conscription. The same can be said of Italian recruits. In fact, as far as it can be assessed as a matter of government policy, all of the British and US personnel that made up missions sent into the Balkans and Italy were to consist of non-Fascist and non-Communist personal as a matter of policy. No other Communist recruiting scheme for the war in Europe existed within the western intelligence services.

Other details surrounding the drive for Communists in the Italian recruiting scheme are brought forward on 14 April 1942 when G.400 ( Halpern) reverses D/H 2 (Bailey) decision to drop Bersani in favour of Gnudi. This was because Halpern thought that Bersani could still be used for locating recruits for American special operations/commando missions, "As regards Bersani, I consider that although his reports do propound his own capabilities and good qualities in an egotistical way they nevertheless make good sense; his general ideas of tackling recruiting seem to me very sound. I therefore feel that if we obtain permission to recruit in Canada for our own purposes, (i.e. to obtain men whom we would send to our camp in the Middle East, not to the Americans) the decision taken at the beginning of the year to dispense with Bersani's service should be reconsidered. He might well produce a number of useful people. Further, should it be decided that we start recruiting again independently of an unknown to the Americans, we ought also to keep in touch here with Gnudi, and utilize his Mexican contacts for ourselves." (NOTE: (UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. 14 April 1942)

Due to delays in setting up STS 103, the actual para-military course for the highly secret 16 Yugoslav Communist para-military recruits from the US and Canada did not take place until 1 March and ran to 17 April 1942. From that date those recruits located in Canada were maintained at the Royal Yugoslav Military Mission in Windsor and those located in the United States at a newly established COI /OSS base in Maryland until arrangements could be made to ship them overseas.

As this first group of trained men were getting accustomed to their new temporary housing, Bailey writes a report covering his trip to Canada over the April 23-25 period to interview the men located by Bersani. The trip was also meant to continue to enlarge the Communist recruiting scheme using the talents of other "progressive" recruiters, "I also took this opportunity to call on KOSTA, TODOROFF and other BALKAN friends in Montreal; this is dealt with in a separate report." He proceeds to mention a Mr. Bavin and a man code-named G.408 (Massimo Salvadori) from SOE who was recruiting on behalf of the United States (He would later parachute into Italy to work with the Partisans). Ernest W. Bavin was a Superintendent of the RCMP and head of their Intelligence Branch. After retiring in 1941 he was employed by BSC as a liaison between the Canadian Directorate of Military Intelligence and US Military Intelligence G-2. Bailey then states that when he, "arrived in Ottawa on the 23rd of April. MR. [Ernest] BAVIN had preceded me and made the necessary arrangements with the RCMP for BERSANI and GNUDI to be available. G.408 also reached Canada and was standing by to give expert assistance when required." Bailey then proceeded to smooth things over with the RCMP, "I first saw INSPECTOR [Alexander] DRYSDALE of the Intelligence Department [of the RCMP], and discussed with him the principles involved. DRYSDALE had been informed in advance by BAVIN of the exact nature of my visit and had discussed it with ASSISTANT- COMMISSIONER [R.R.] TAIT and the COMMISSIONER [Stuart Taylor] Wood. They very kindly decided that BERSANI could be at my complete disposal for rounding up and vetting recruits, but DRYSDALE expressed the desire that once the recruits were accepted, their actual enrollment and dispatch from Canada should be carried out by us, so as to relieve the RCMP of this responsibility. This I naturally accepted." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. 23 April 1942.)

This quote makes it very plain that several top members of the RCMP were completely in the loop regarding the recruiting of Communists in Canada. The question is, were these men being coerced by those mentioned from External Affairs? The RCMP knew perfectly well that Gnudi was not only a Communist but a man with ties to top members of the party and the Communist International. (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. 29 April 1942.) As stated, it is very clear that after war was declared by Canada in September 1939, the Defense of Canada Regulations opposed any dealings with Fascists and Communists. The attitude of the Prime Minister and the RCMP supposedly reflected these regulations. So, in addition to the Balkan recruitment scheme, who was it exactly that overruled these regulations? Bailey goes on to state that he, "was authorized only to deal with the specific case of the Italian recruits, but I understood that permission would shortly be sought, on a higher level, from the Federal authorities in Ottawa, to carry on certain minority and recruiting operations in the Dominion." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. 23 April 1942.) This statement essentially proves that members of Canada's External Affairs and certain members of the RCMP were complicit in an illegal recruitment scheme controlled by SOE Cairo and that it was being run under the nose of the Canadian Government. This is because men had already been recruited and trained.

In order to further operations in the Balkans, a Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian recruitment drive was now begun under the same auspices of PROJECT "J". The uprisings led by the Bulgarian Communist Party, which began in 1941, prompted SOE Cairo to canvas S.O. [Special Operations] London on 23 April 1942 to push their recruiter Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Gardyne de Chastelain to move quickly in the recruiting of Bulgarians or other suitable language groups in Canada, "We have received telegrams from Cairo asking if you can make special effort to obtain one or two Bulgarians and one or two Croatians for infiltration into Bulgaria and Croatia this summer. Recruits need not repeat not be trained as W/T operators as they will receive their training in Middle East. Recruits should be sent Middle East by quickest possible route." (NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1. S.O. London to D/H2 23 April 1942.) Since SOE gave each individual Country Section control of their recruiting, de Chastelain is not implicated in this Communist recruiting scheme. It has not been ascertained whether SOE Cairo tried to influence his decisions.

In a crucial document Bailey concluded his report on his visit to Canada by praising the assistance of the RCMP and again reiterating that while they were already using the RCMP and External Affairs, the actual Government of Canada had not yet been approached for permission, "In conclusion, I must refer specifically to the extreme kindness extended by INSPECTOR DRYSDALE and to the general assistance and reception which I received from all the members of the force with whom I came into contact. I am certain that once we obtain the necessary general permission from the Federal authorities in Ottawa, we shall enjoy the closest and most helpful collaboration from the RCMP throughout Canada, both for recruiting and in general minority political activity." After eluding that certain members of the RCMP were in the loop, he finally added that his Communist contact Gnudi mentioned that he was also in touch with, "Italian speaking Slavs [Slovenes and Dalmatians] and other ‘progressive’ Slav bodies, in Toronto, and said he thought we might find recruits among them too." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. 29 April 1942.)

Bailey updates the Italian recruiting situation but also reiterates the difference between their recruits and those sought by the US Coordinator of Information (later to be Office of Strategic Services), "G.408 [Massimo Salvadori] was then left with BERSANI to work out a plan for interviewing the candidates. In addition to the ten [largely non-Communists]already offered by us to the Americans, the names of six other likely persons arose, and it was felt that all should be interviewed, since it was unlikely that all would prove acceptable or willing." In order to interview these new prospects,"G.408 left for Toronto at the end of April 1942 where Bersani had a car at his disposal. Bersani and G.408 would spend the weekend interviewing candidates in Toronto, Sudbury, Hamilton and Niagara Falls. They would return to Toronto and turn in their reports to Drew-Brook's organization before returning to Montreal to interview more possibilities before returning to New York on 29/30 April." With the goal of the US representative G.408 being less covert, "Rather than keep things under wraps during the interview process, G.408 would approach the men as a bona-fide officer recruiting on behalf of the US Government, seeking men with an intimate knowledge of various districts of Italy and the dialects spoken therein, for use as guides and interpreters in American Commando operations. (I explained to G.408, in confidence and alone, the manner in which similar recruiting has been undertaken among the Poles and Czechs, when the initial approach is always for volunteers for 'assault engineering')." (IBID)

With the initial Italians selected in Canada heading to the US, it was important to continue to push efforts to recruit in Canada. Bailey then filed report No. SO/41 dated 29 April 1942, "We are now making arrangements for extending, subject to the consent of the Dominion authorities, our work in Canada. Whatever success we may have with the Italian recruits who have been investigated by G.408 and D/H 2, it seems clear to us that Canada, with its vast number of inhabitants of alien origin, presents a favourable terrain for our purposes." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. S.W.B. Report SO/41 (Bailey) 29 April 1942.)

In order to "extend" their recruiting scheme, SOE Cairo and BSC added Paul Phillips who was actually Ukrainian and the previously mentioned Kosta Todoroff, who was Bulgarian. He in turn recruited the help of Serbian Marko Shikitch, who has already been mentioned, whose real name was Kovacevich and Croatian Joseph Yardas. They were asked to enquire for men in their various "Progressive Movement" circles; in other words, radical Communist circles. The authority involved (S.O. London) was told that, "Their desire to help is unquestionable and they, having been engaged in subversive activities for many years, have a very clear impression of our needs." (IBID) Please note that the majority of the "subversive activities" referred to were actually conducted in North America against businesses and the Governments of the United States and Canada. For example, in one report found in the SOE record of Kovacevich, they were impressed by his ability to live illegally in the US and Canada by keeping one step ahead of the FBI and the RCMP. The three men were considered valuable to recruit Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Macedonians. It was felt that the most fruitful language groups would be Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin. It was thought that the more difficult recruits to find would be Bulgarians and Italians.

On 30 April Bailey further elaborated that his trip to Canada was also to, "contact the Yugoslav 'progressives' before their convention opens. They may be able to find people both for Yugoslavia and for Italy's eastern provinces. Get Verdi [Gnudi] to New York. If you wish to enlist 'progressives', they will do it only if Verdi tells them so." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. Daily Diary Report from Bailey on Trip to Canada, 30 April 1942.) This quote is telling as any future Communist intentions in Italy would be supported by Communists approaching from the East.

One of the Communists involved in finding recruits, the above mentioned Paul Phillips then replies to this request on 7 May 1942 stating that he has already contacted many of the groups requested and, "Everything we can do will be done to find the suitable "candidates" as speedily as possible. Yours for Victory." (NOTE:UKNA, HS8/75, SOE, America No.80, Balkan Recruiting in Canada, First Party (Shipwrecked), 7 May 1942.) Although it is not certain what kind of “victory” Phillips is referring to, the volunteering of Communists was not without conditions. Again, it is very odd that these conditions, meant for the Canadian Government, were sent direct to SOE's D/H Section. The author could not determine if it was actually sent to the Canadian government. This very revealing document requested, " a) An assurance that the work would be carried out with the knowledge and tacit approval of the Canadian authorities. The position of the progressive party [meaning the Communist Party] in Canada is still very delicate; and our friends wish at all costs to safeguard themselves against post-war reproaches on the ground that they had indulged in subversive operations behind the back of the Canadian Government. They had no desire at all to run the risk of being painted even blacker than they are at present. b) They desire that any man put forward by them, and accepted by us, should be taken on a purely business basis. No attempt should be made during his association with us to influence his political convictions, and the fact that he is a communist should not militate against him either during or after his period of service. c) They desire assurances that men who may be selected and who are already Canadian citizens will not be affected in their national status by reason of their work undertaken for us. d) They ask that all men so desiring shall be free to return to Canada at the conclusion of their service. e) In the case of men not yet qualified for naturalization the period of service shall count as years spent in residence in Canada. f) They ask that in the case of death or disability during and as a result of service, adequate compensation should be paid to dependents." (NOTE:UKNA, HS8/75, SOE, America No.80, Balkan Recruiting in Canada, First Party (Shipwrecked) Pt.1.G.400 to DH/2, 15 May 1942.) The statement hinting that their intended role was to have them indulge, "in subversive operations behind the back of the Canadian Government," dispels any claim that this information is somehow being misinterpreted. This document and the previous/following documents condemn many in the RCMP and External Affairs as being complicit in this illegal scheme. Many I would add that will also be investigated after the war for ties to Soviet Intelligence Services. As of May 1942, the date of the above correspondence from Phillips, the Canadian Government had NOT given it's tacit approval. At least two groups of men had already been recruited with one already trained and scheduled to move overseas. In fact Government approval was not received until the beginning of 1943. Even then, there was still no mention of Communists.

While the conditions of employment were being considered by Cairo, they were also holding their breath surrounding the above mentioned convention at which the outcome of a vote by Canadian Communists was crucial to their scheme. They were voting on whether to assist the western Allies. Those who did not want to assist argued against involvement making statements like, "If you vote “yes” you will be sending Canadian troops abroad to fight for the maintenance of the capitalist system. Canadian troops will never be used to help Russia directly. They are being retained in England so that they can be used to police Europe after Russia has defeated Germany, and thus deny Russia the opportunity of extending communistic government to Western Europe. In any case, the plebiscite is a political maneuver, designed to confirm Mackenzie King's dictatorship in Canada and his true intentions regarding the radicals as revealed by the fact that the communist party is still completely illegal there." (NOTE:NAUK, America Balkan Recruiting in Canada, First Party Shipwrecked Part 1, HS8/75 Recruiting in Canada From D/H2 to G.400 11 June 1942.) It is not surprising, with comments like this, that most of the governments of the Western Allies were concerned about Communism.

Despite knowledge of the scheme by some at the top of the RCMP, Paul Phillips admits himself that the scheme was being kept from other members of the RCMP who were likely more locally employed, as well as other authorities. He stated quite frankly that, "he considered that the only people from whom we might encounter opposition or impediment to our work were the R.C.M.P. and he suggested that a hint might be dropped to them from the Department of External Affairs. I am myself uncertain whether this is the wisest plan, or whether we should not rely on working as clandestinely as possible and avoid attracting police attention. This would have the disadvantage of slowing up the work of recruiting. We should discuss this point before G.406 [P/O Herbert M. Sichel] pays his next visit to Canada, so that he can take up with Pearson [in Washington] any steps considered expedient.” (NOTE: HS8/75 SOE America No.80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada- First Party (Shipwrecked) From D/H2 Cairo to G.400 11 June 1942. Recruiting in Canada.)

Phillips now implies that there are sympathizers or outright moles involved which included Lester Pearson, who as Minister Councillor of the Canadian Legation in Washington D.C., had the power to coerce the RCMP into helping them with the recruitment scheme. He also continues in his attempts to limit outside knowledge of the project. He then suggests to SOE Cairo that wireless training could be given privately to recruits by a man in Toronto to speed up training and their despatch overseas, "I will ask G.9,000 [Drew-Brook] to get a preliminary check on this man from the R.C.M.P. On my return I raised this question with Professor Bayly, [who oversaw signals work at STS 103] who agreed that if security could be adequately observed, it would be an excellent thing to arrange for private tuition. He gave the names of two schools in Toronto." (NOTE HS8/75 SOE America No.80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada- First Party (Shipwrecked) It must also be stated that the Communist recruits had to follow a process lifted right out of a spy novel in order to accomplish their journey to STS 103. This involved complicated instructions such as secret drop-off and pick up points aided by civilian disguises, passwords, various forms of signals and disguised vehicles. If there was nothing fishy going on, why did they not simply arrive in uniform to take part in their training program? The camp itself was not secret and the public was told that military training took place there. The only secret was the real purpose of that training. So why was there all the secrecy? It is the opinion of this author that it was not only to hide the communist recruits from the public but also to hide them from the local military and police authorities. This included members of the RCMP not taking part in the scheme. (NOTE: HS8/75 SOE America No.80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada- First Party (Shipwrecked) From D/H2 Cairo to G.400 11 June 1942. Recruiting in Canada.)

It was DH/2 who negotiated travel documents for the Communists they wanted to send to Egypt. This is made clear in this docume
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It was DH/2 who negotiated travel documents for the Communists they wanted to send to Egypt. This is made clear in this document dated 11 June 1942 to G.400 Aleksandr Halpern, “I shall visit Toronto on June 14th, to instruct Shikitch [alias for Nikolai Kovachevich] in the handling of recruits. I have accepted, and should return with sufficient information to enable us to open negotiations with the Canadian authorities for obtaining papers and exit permits for these men.” (IBID) The Canadian authorities were External Affairs under Dr. Norman Robertson and Tommy Stone who later arranged and signed off all the travel documents for these Communists to include identity papers, visas and passports once they were ready to travel overseas from the US and Canada

Meanwhile in Yugoslavia and Cairo the effort to discredit Mihailovic continued in earnest. However the tactic being used by SOE Cairo was not convincing the Foreign Office which initially did not seem alarmed at all regarding accusations of collaboration. They already understood that it was in the overall interest of the Communists to discredit Mihailovic in order to move into the Balkans, "From the beginning of June 1942, on the basis of information supplied by the Partisans, the Soviet government drew the attention of the Foreign Office to its belief that Mihailovic's forces were collaborating with Nedic [Croatian Fascist Leader] and the Italians. No doubt because Hudson had already made it, the Foreign Office was prepared to accept the charge insofar as it related to Nedic, and even to draw comfort from it: if true, it might indicate that Nedic was half-hearted in his support of the Axis. It dismissed the allegations of Cetnik collaboration with the Italians, distrusting their Partisan origins and being unable to suppress the suspicion that the Soviet government was sacrificing the immediate advantage of securing a united front among the guerrillas to its longer-term interest in establishing a Communist regime in Yugoslavia." The Foreign Office continued to instruct SOE Cairo to, "Renew its attempts to settle the differences between Cetniks and Partisans, and advised the Prime Minister and the CIGS that the existing policy of backing Mihailovic's efforts to curb 'the wilder elements' among the Partisans should be retained on military grounds."   (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 139.) Despite being sent in to work with Mihailovic, Hudson continued to report on collaboration and made many unsubstantiated claims that he was making private agreements with both the Italians and Germans. Hudson then states that he overheard Mihailovic state that he , "hoped to negotiate a settlement with the Italians and eventually to seize their arms." (IBID) This actually makes sense. It has to be remembered that Mihailovic simply did not have the weapons or supplies to directly confront the enemy on a sustained basis. Some collaboration had to occur either until the Western allies provided proper assistance or a seizure of Italian weapons could be arranged. It also has to be remembered that Mihailovic was left hanging regarding Allied policy towards a post war Yugoslavia. The Foreign Office completely understood this.  

In relation to what is stated above, during, “the spring of 1942, and again in August, the Foreign Office tried to get Russian support in reconciling the two groups. The Russians refused to have anything to do with General Mihailovic and accused him of collaboration with the Italians against the Partisans. The Yugoslav Government in London denied these charges of collaboration, but the Foreign Office had some evidence against them, though it was hard to assess and could be interpreted as part of General Mihailovic's tactics to get supplies and arms in order to keep his guerrilla forces in being.” (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.)

With the Communist attitude and tactics becoming more clear, in North America Bailey and Major R.F. Lethbridge (who replaced Captain Stuart) had previously selected, over 31 May to 6 June 1942, 8 Yugoslav Communists ( first Yugoslav civilian course). Their training course at STS 103 spanned from 23 July - 30 August. The training syllabus covered topics such as, “Objects and Methods of Irregular Warfare, Security and Security for W/T Operators.” Agent Management was also taught in two parts and included, “Recruiting, Handling and Types of Agent.” The training suggests that these men were to be inserted into various countries to organize Communist guerilla groups. The training in "Recruiting, Handling and Types of Agent” suggest that they were also to be handlers for Communist agents. What is odd is that the training report comments that, "This course was the first course for Yugoslav Nationals and was a combined para-military and finishing course. The students numbered eight and were held for six days after the conclusion of the course prior to their sailing for their overseas destination." This is odd because in fact this group of 8 men was the second group of Yugoslav Communists trained at STS103. It is also odd because the first group of 16 men were referred to as para-militaries while the second group of 8 men was labeled as a "civilian course". (See lists of recruits from BSC below) This despite the fact that the record states they also conducted para-military training. This implies that they were to be shipped immediately to Cairo for immediate deployment into the field. With SOE Cairo moving more towards their short term policy, it is possible they required these secret intelligence agents to travel in advance of the 16 strictly para-military trained men in order to set up their pro-Communist networks. (NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1. Report on Course 15 General SO Course 23 July to August 42.)

After successfully completing their course, the Balkan and Italian recruits had to sign a document titled Enlistment Instructions, stating that once training was completed at STS 103, they were to be immediately shipped to the British Mission in Cairo,  "You __________ of ___________ having been accepted for enlistment in OVERSEAS TECHNICAL SERVICES, are directed to present yourself to G ®, General Headquarters Middle East Command, Cairo, Egypt, for enlistment under conditions to be determined by Overseas Technical Services, Cairo. These instructions do not constitute a binding guarantee of enlistment, and Overseas Technical Services Cairo reserve the right to reject you without assigning reasons, after examination in Cairo. In these circumstances you are entitled to repatriation to the Dominion of Canada at the expense of His Britannic Majesty’s Government...Please signify your agreement to travel to Cairo on the above terms by signing the duplicate and triplicate attached."(NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1.Enlistment Instructions.)

Once these men were trained and attested they also received special identity and travel papers.  The original document had a photograph of the agent attached and was to be kept on their person while not on operations. The document was endorsed on behalf of the British Government by Lethbridge. The duplicate documents were to be held by his cohorts at the War Office and by BSC in New York. While also confusing, the title "Enlistment Instructions" did not refer to their enlistment in Canada but their enlistment in the British Army once they arrived in Egypt. After signing, they were to be sent from either Halifax or New York direct to Egypt. The entire system developed by Bailey ensured that only those complicit in SIS and SOE knew what was really going on. This gave those in Cairo complete control of these men. As we will see those complicit will do all in their power to make sure these men sailed direct to Cairo in order to preserve their cover. This was not to conceal them from the Germans, but their own authorities.

Meanwhile in Yugoslavia and Cairo the effort to discredit Mihailovic continued in earnest. However the tactic being used by SOE Cairo was not convincing the Foreign Office which initially did not seem alarmed at all regarding accusations of collaboration. They already understood that it was in the overall interest of the Communists to discredit Mihailovic in order to move into the Balkans, "From the beginning of June 1942, on the basis of information supplied by the Partisans, the Soviet government drew the attention of the Foreign Office to its belief that Mihailovic's forces were collaborating with Nedic [Croatian Fascist Leader] and the Italians. No doubt because Hudson had already made it, the Foreign Office was prepared to accept the charge insofar as it related to Nedic, and even to draw comfort from it: if true, it might indicate that Nedic was half-hearted in his support of the Axis. It dismissed the allegations of Cetnik collaboration with the Italians, distrusting their Partisan origins and being unable to suppress the suspicion that the Soviet government was sacrificing the immediate advantage of securing a united front among the guerrillas to its longer-term interest in establishing a Communist regime in Yugoslavia." The Foreign Office continued to instruct SOE Cairo to, "Renew its attempts to settle the differences between Cetniks and Partisans, and advised the Prime Minister and the CIGS that the existing policy of backing Mihailovic's efforts to curb 'the wilder elements' among the Partisans should be retained on military grounds."   (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 139.) Despite being sent in to work with Mihailovic, Hudson continued to report on collaboration and made many unsubstantiated claims that he was making private agreements with both the Italians and Germans. Hudson then states that he overheard Mihailovic state that he , "hoped to negotiate a settlement with the Italians and eventually to seize their arms." (IBID) This actually makes sense. It has to be remembered that Mihailovic simply did not have the weapons or supplies to directly confront the enemy on a sustained basis. Some collaboration had to occur either until the Western allies provided proper assistance or a seizure of Italian weapons could be arranged. It also has to be remembered that Mihailovic was left hanging regarding Allied policy towards a post war Yugoslavia. The Foreign Office completely understood this.

In relation to what is stated above, during, “the spring of 1942, and again in August, the Foreign Office tried to get Russian support in reconciling the two groups. The Russians refused to have anything to do with General Mihailovic and accused him of collaboration with the Italians against the Partisans. The Yugoslav Government in London denied these charges of collaboration, but the Foreign Office had some evidence against them, though it was hard to assess and could be interpreted as part of General Mihailovic's tactics to get supplies and arms in order to keep his guerrilla forces in being.” (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.)

With the Communist attitude and tactics becoming more clear, in North America Bailey and Major R.F. Lethbridge (who replaced Captain Stuart) had previously selected, over 31 May to 6 June 1942, 8 Yugoslav Communists ( first Yugoslav civilian course). Their training course at STS 103 spanned from 23 July - 30 August. The training syllabus covered topics such as, “Objects and Methods of Irregular Warfare, Security and Security for W/T Operators.” Agent Management was also taught in two parts and included, “Recruiting, Handling and Types of Agent.” The training suggests that these men were to be inserted into various countries to organize Communist guerilla groups. The training in "Recruiting, Handling and Types of Agent” suggest that they were also to be handlers for Communist agents. What is odd is that the training report comments that, "This course was the first course for Yugoslav Nationals and was a combined para-military and finishing course. The students numbered eight and were held for six days after the conclusion of the course prior to their sailing for their overseas destination." This is odd because in fact this group of 8 men was the second group of Yugoslav Communists trained at STS103. It is also odd because the first group of 16 men were referred to as para-militaries while the second group of 8 men was labeled as a "civilian course". (See lists of recruits from BSC below) This despite the fact that the record states they also conducted para-military training. This implies that they were to be shipped immediately to Cairo for immediate deployment into the field. With SOE Cairo moving more towards their short term policy, it is possible they required these secret intelligence agents to travel in advance of the 16 strictly para-military trained men in order to set up their pro-Communist networks. (NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1. Report on Course 15 General SO Course 23 July to August 42.)

After successfully completing their course, the Balkan and Italian recruits had to sign a document titled Enlistment Instructions, stating that once training was completed at STS 103, they were to be immediately shipped to the British Mission in Cairo,  "You __________ of ___________ having been accepted for enlistment in OVERSEAS TECHNICAL SERVICES, are directed to present yourself to G ®, General Headquarters Middle East Command, Cairo, Egypt, for enlistment under conditions to be determined by Overseas Technical Services, Cairo. These instructions do not constitute a binding guarantee of enlistment, and Overseas Technical Services Cairo reserve the right to reject you without assigning reasons, after examination in Cairo. In these circumstances you are entitled to repatriation to the Dominion of Canada at the expense of His Britannic Majesty’s Government...Please signify your agreement to travel to Cairo on the above terms by signing the duplicate and triplicate attached."(NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1.Enlistment Instructions.)

Once these men were trained and attested they also received special identity and travel papers.  The original document had a photograph of the agent attached and was to be kept on their person while not on operations. The document was endorsed on behalf of the British Government by Lethbridge. The duplicate documents were to be held by his cohorts at the War Office and by BSC in New York. While also confusing, the title "Enlistment Instructions" did not refer to their enlistment in Canada but their enlistment in the British Army once they arrived in Egypt. After signing, they were to be sent from either Halifax or New York direct to Egypt. The entire system developed by Bailey ensured that only those complicit in SIS and SOE knew what was really going on. This gave those in Cairo complete control of these men. As we will see those complicit will do all in their power to make sure these men sailed direct to Cairo in order to preserve their cover. This was not to conceal them from the Germans, but their own authorities.

By August with the Yugoslav scheme progressing, the recruiting of others was moving at a slow pace, "Position regarding Hungarians and Bulgarians continues most disappointing. No Hungarian interviewed meets required standards, but three more have been located, together with one Bulgarian. They will be interviewed by LETHBRIDGE within next ten days."(NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked Pt. 1. To S.O. London 9 August 1942.)

While the First Para-Military Group of 16 men continued to wait, the eight men in the First Course of Civilians were shipped to Cairo on 4 September 1942 onboard the SS Andreas. Those at D/H Section were happy to be receiving these recruits, “I should like to place on record appreciation of the great assistance rendered by Mr. Huband of the British Ministry of War Transport; Mr. Byk, his assistant: Mr. [Tommy] Stone, of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa; and of G9000 [Drew-Brook] and his [BSC] staff. Needless to say, the authorities at S.T.S. 103 were most helpful in every way.” (IBID) It was Major Lethbridge and Ingram Fraser (BSC) who coerced Mr. Huband into securing travel for this first group of 8 Civilian recruits direct to Egypt with an additional 9 in the pipeline. Unfortunately the ship carrying the 8 men was attacked by the Italian submarine Leonardo da Vinci on 4 November and sunk. Two of the men were killed and their designated leader Nickolai Kovachevich was badly wounded. After being rescued from their lifeboat, the remaining 5 men did not make it to Cairo until 6 February 1943. (NOTE; HS8/75 America No. 80 Balkan Recruiting in Canada. First Party Shipwrecked.)

With Bailey turning down Italian prospects put forward by Bersani, by the end of October his man Gnudi started to put forward names of more radical prospects in Canada. These were likely names he got from his Communist contacts in the US. Lethbridge (G.440) then comments to Herbert Sichel (G.406), "I interviewed Verdi [Gnudi] in Canada on the 28th of October. He has lined up several possible recruits, two in Toronto...four, or more, in Ottawa." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. G.440 to G.400, 31 October 1942.)

The day after the western allies invaded Vichy French North Africa, SOE policy towards the Balkans continued to be primarily about Turkey. They brought forward both a short term and long term policy, " ...B. Short Term Policy (Balkans). 3. This must be to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack on TURKEY, or, once concentrated, to render maintenance of his forces difficult if not impossible. This we could do by destroying communications, chiefly those running south from the DANUBE, although others, such as the CORINTH CANAL and shipping, should also receive attention. 4. To the above stated end, therefore, we must:- (a) Send in BRITISH Officers and W/T Operators to organize existing guerrilla bands and induce them now to take action. (b) Send in parties to demolish specific targets; these parties to be composed of BRITISH Officers and W/T Operators, together with nationals of the countries concerned who could act as guides and interpreters." So as part of short term policy SOE Cairo was concerned mainly with immediate sabotage action. Therefore they desired to make contact with those who were capable of immediate action. They felt that the Partisans in Yugoslavia were more able to accomplish this because they were more reckless and least concerned about the ramifications involved to themselves and the civilian population.

However there is no evidence that there was any planned effort by those at the very top of SOE to specifically recruit Communists, “C. Recruitment of Personnel for Short Term Policy 5. We must recruit suitable personnel with all speed, and Country Sections will be responsible for putting names of suitable BRITISH personnel to D.F.A. (PER) will, however, also make every effort to find suitable personnel and will inform Country Sections of men available. 6. Country Section must themselves recruit nationals of the countries concerned. 7. It is unlikely that sufficient BRITISH personnel with good language qualifications will be available; this disadvantage must not prevent recruiting and Country Sections will arrange to run language courses where necessary. 8. Whereas it is obviously advisable that personnel should be recruited with specific targets in view, this may not always be possible, and the fact that there is no specific target in view at the time should not prevent recruiting. 9. It was pointed out during discussion that we had no BRITISH officers who were destined for the BALKANS under training at the moment: this made it even more urgent to obtain recruits now." (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/145, Balkans No.1, Top Level Planning - Planning of Activities (Cairo H.Q.) -Minutes of a Meeting Held on 9 November 1942 to discuss SOE Future Policy regarding the BALKANS. )

So by November 1942, they were still short of recruits. This reflects on the desperate plea for recruits in the Americas. But it must be repeated that the above quote makes it clear that the recruiting process was to be handled by the country sections themselves. Therefore the Yugoslav Section was specifically searching for Communists to implement a private policy. If recruits were so desperately needed, why did they continue to reduce their pool of possibilities by selecting only Communists? Even if they had a plan to utilize Communists in Yugoslavia for short term sabotage, those operating on behalf of SOE did not have to be Communists. In fact, as previously stated, those recruited outside of SOE Cairo’s scheme that ultimately did operate with Tito's Partisans were not known Communists. The long term policy related more to the Royalists and the future government of Yugoslavia. However these policies were proposed across the board in Italy and the Balkans, "D. Long Term Policy. 10. Our object - which is to induce the people in the enemy occupied territories to resist the AXIS and eventually to revolt -remains the same, and to this end we must continue our preparations. These include :-( a) Passive resistance and 'Go Slow' movements. (b) Secret sabotage organizations. © 5th Column parties and the formation and supply of guerrilla bands and secret armies. Recruits are required for all these purposes...12. Our long term preparations should be complete by the Autumn of 1943 in so far as Italian occupied territory is concerned..."It is very likely the bulk of the civilians being recruited and trained in Canada were intended for these, “5th Column parties and the formation” of specifically Communist guerrilla bands. (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/145, Balkans No.1, Top Level Planning - Planning of Activities (Cairo H.Q.) -Minutes of a Meeting Held on 9 November 1942 to discuss SOE Future Policy regarding the BALKANS. )

The Foreign Office, in order to sum up their understanding and approach, “had also to consider British long term interests. It was not in British interests to put the Yugoslav Communists into a position which would enable them, after the war, to transform Yugoslavia into a Communist State under Russian influence. The fact that the communist party was in a small minority was hardly relevant in view of the possibilities open to them if they obtained control of the machinery of State and were free to liquidate their opponents. The British Government were also under an obligation towards King Peter and the Yugoslav Government in exile. There was no question of enforcing after the war the return of a monarchy associated with a dictatorial regime disliked by large numbers of the population. The point was that the question of the post war regime in Yugoslavia ought not to be prejudiced by handing over control in advance to the Communists. Long-term and short-term British policy therefore coincided at first in aiming at the reconciliation of Cetniks and Partisans alike realized that, whereas the war against the Axis could not be won in Yugoslavia, their own local struggle for political control of the country would be decided largely by the respective positions which they could secure for themselves in the hour of liberation.” (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.) The Communists, both in Moscow, Yugoslavia and the West, knew that their only chance was to discredit Mihailovic.

The Communists also realized that they could not achieve this without operatives on the inside. Three days after Operation TORCH, a report from a G.440 (Lethbridge) to G.400 (Halpern) clarified that, "In addition to two recruits interviewed in Toronto earlier in month, five men were interviewed in Ottawa on November 10, and details are attached to this report. These men were found by VERDI [Gnudi], with the co-operation of one BARTOLLOTTI. This BARTOLLOTTI is employed at the [Hotel] Chateau Laurier and is a leading figure in Ottawa radical circles...Of the seven men, there are four I would consider would make excellent recruits, and there is a fifth who is possible." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. G.440 t G.400, 12 November 1942.) These were some of the last men to be selected and interviewed. The next day the SOE Director of USA/South America sent SO London, in reference to the MASSINGHAM Operation (SIS/SOE in North Africa) that, "A. Following four men from Calabria are recommended for training and infiltrations: Frank Valente, Francisco Misericordia, Peter Lizza, [censored]. B. Fifth man, George Rocca, is possibility. C. If you agree to engagement, suggest training these men urgently at STS 103, where they will be further vetted by G.440 [Lethbridge] and if satisfactory, sent by earliest possible transport to North Africa." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. From Director of SOE for USA/South America (AD/U) to GM at SO London, 13 November 1942.) While there are a few references to S.O. London, it is not made clear who exactly was receiving this correspondence

It is evident from the above quote that Churchill's aspirations to continue from North Africa over to Sardinia or Sicily meant that Italian agents were desperately required. However with Bailey being obsessed with locating specifically Communists, the numbers of men recruited or in the pipeline was dismal. Even the men they were ultimately forced to select were a mix of different political views. It is interesting that in November 1942 they seem to be seeking Italians from the Calabria area. This was the future invasion route across from Sicily which occurred in September almost a year later. However even by that time little had been accomplished by SIS/SOE to locate reliable resistance groups in Italy to which these men could be safely inserted. 

With the possibility of large scale operations against Italy, SO LONDON had little time to lose in locating and training agent prospects. On 19 November in a document from SOE, MT/W or Training, East and West Africa for D.C.D.O (presumably Deputy CD, Operations?) the future of those selected in Canada for British operations is related, "A. These students will start preliminary training at STS 103 on December 3rd. B. STS 103 is fully equipped to handle further training of these people should they prove suitable. C. Only exception is actual parachute jumping. Preliminary parachute training is already being handled at STS 103. D. Strongly recommend further training should be done at STS 103. Reasons: -1- This will make for better continuity in their training, and for follow-through by their recruiting officer. -2- In event any student proving unsuitable on completion of training only one school will have been exposed. E. Latest details on internal situation in ITALY and cover instruction could be given just prior to departure from U.K." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. From MT/W to D.C.D.O. 19 November 1942.)

A more detailed update on the 20th from Bailey's recruiter Lethbridge records that, "As a result of preliminary survey, nine Italians who appeared to be suitable have been given an interview, and five [Lizza, Misericordia, Valente, Rocca, last name censored] have been selected for a further final interview for the 23rd of November and will enter STS 103 for a preliminary course on the 3rd of December. The field has hardly been scratched, and I am hopeful of obtaining further recruits in the near future amongst the Canadian-Italian population."  (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. Extract from Memorandum from R.F.L. (Lethbridge) to R.F., 20 November 1942.)

With some Italians being selected, they arrived at STS 103 as earlier Yugoslavs were completing their training. On 25 November the mixing of the Italian and Yugoslav recruitment schemes is brought forward, "I [Lethbridge] have just returned from a trip to Canada for final selection of Italian recruits, and at the same time to organize recruiting of Jugoslavs in Canada in accordance with London's request for [a further] 50 recruits within the next 12 months. I was accompanied by T.S.F., representing S.I., as it is considered that a joint interview of various contacts would be of value, since many recruits unsuitable for S.I. might make admirable S.O. recruits. With this in view, we called a conference of my 'chief minorities' contact - PHILLIPS; the chief Jugoslav radical leader - YARDAS; and SIAUSH, who was injured while a student and who is the subject of a separate memorandum. This man I propose to use as chief recruiter resident in Canada." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. Document titled Recruiting in Canada from R.F.L. (Lethbridge)to L.F. and H.A.B., 25 November 1942.) The entire Communist recruiting scheme in North America was reduced to 100 recruits in total. Those from Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were included under the same Jugoslav Project “J” scheme.  

Back in Yugoslavia SOE Cairo was still battling it out with the Foreign Office regarding Mihailovics apparent collaboration, "At the end of the year those at SOE Cairo continued to provoke an anti-Royalist reaction in London. They, 'warned on 8 December that it had to be concluded that all Mihailovic's bands in Montenegro, Herzegovina and Dalmatia were 'legalized'  by the Italians on the understanding that they attacked the Partisans and left the Italians undisturbed.  The authorities in London did not dissent from this conclusion, but were not deflected by it. The SOE, which was then replacing Hudson with a more senior liaison officer, Colonel [ S.W.] Bailey, [former policy maker and recruiter in N. America] noted that Hudson had become so antipathetic to Mihailovic that he would be driven before long to recommend that all support should be directed to the Partisans". (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 140.)

Little did the Foreign Office know that Bailey likely had the same antipathetic attitude. This is brought forward in author Sebastian Ritchie's book Our Man in Yugoslavia which states that, "SIS were becoming unhappy with the intelligence reaching Britain from SOE's principal field officer in Yugoslavia, Colonel Bailey, who was based with Colonel Mihailovic and the Chetniks in Serbia." Their solution was to send in Bailey's old cohort Captain Stuart. However in a telling reaction, "SOE [Cairo] argued that Stuart should instead be sent to join the communist Partisans in Croatia."  (NOTE: Ritchie, Sebastian. Our Man in Yugoslavia: The Story of a Secret Service Operative. Frank Cass, 2004.)

In a book by author Miss J. Dawson titled Yugoslavia , found in the CAB series at the British National Archives Dawson states that during an SIS meeting to discuss policy on Yugoslavia, one of their representatives determined that, "While Bailey gives an admirable account of what Mihailovic thinks and wants, we do not think his reports can be taken as a basis on which to frame British policy towards Yugoslavia." (NOTE: NAUK, CAB101/126, Dawson, J. Yugoslavi. pgs 17-18.) Ritchie further states that on 9 February 1943, SIS tried to refuse sending Stuart into Tito's Headquarters stating that they still wanted their own liaison with Mihailovic regardless what SOE liaisons were already there. This is also very telling and completely reveals SIS suspicions surrounding SOE's position. (NOTE: Ritchie, Sebastian. Our Man in Yugoslavia: The Story of a Secret Service Operative. Frank Cass, 2004) That suspicion was likely due to Signals Intelligence still revealing that Mihailovic was a target of the Germans and that while Communist propaganda became more and more fierce, Mihailovic was still actively fighting the Germans.  In many cases victories claimed by the Partisans via their friends at SOE Cairo were actually being won by the Royalists. (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 193-140.) 

Back in Canada, despite the help of External Affairs and the RCMP, handwritten notations on a document dated 22 December 1942 clearly indicate that Canadian Government permission to proceed with SOE Cairo's recruiting scheme in Canada had not yet even been granted. While permission was received to set up a school, it clarifies that Lethbridge, "Spoke to Mr. Drew-brook and informed him that [Defence] Minister [Ralston] approves in principle on the understanding that personnel will be transferred to British Army on arrival overseas and that British authorities will assume financial responsibility." In another handwritten note in the left hand corner dated 14 January Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart (Chief of the General Staff) states that he, "Spoke to the Minister  this morning. He agreed in principle but would speak to the P.M. [Prime Minister King]." An attached British Memorandum also dated 22 December sent by BSC via Robertson at External Affairs to the Canadian Army's Vice Chief of Staff simply states that men from these countries were required for, “Parachute raiding parties for forward objectives, to stiffen guerrilla bands and to form new guerrilla bands.”  (NOTE: LAC RG24, Recruits and Training of Recruits in Canada, Paramilitary Duties, Under Secretary of State For External Affairs to the Vice Chief of Staff,  22 December 1942, C-8383)  It emphasizes that these Yugoslavs would operate in uniform. It states that the men do not require the training or the brains required for undercover work. They mention that this factor will open up a large field of recruits who have been considered unsuitable as high-grade organizer candidates. It states that many are already serving in the Canadian Army. 

What the document conveniently neglects to reveal is the fact that these volunteers were Communists, many civilians, being groomed to work specifically with Communist "guerrilla bands" when there was not yet any policy in Canada, Britain or the United States to work with Communist resistance groups.  It appears that at the beginning of 1943 permission to recruit and train in Canada still had not been formally given by the Canadian government. In a document dated 5 January 1943 from BSC New York to Drew-brook in Toronto, the sender requests that Drew-brook, "Please also inform PAUL [Phillips] that para-military Jugoslav recruiting is still being examined by Canadian authorities, and that we hope to receive green light shortly." (NOTE: NAUK, HS8/75, From BSC in New York to Drewbrook in Toronto, 5 January 1943) 

In an "Urgent" hand delivered message to the Vice Chief of the Canadian General Staff Major-General J.C. Murchie dated 9 January, which accompanied a memo outlining the proposed project to recruit the 100 Yugoslavs, External Affairs states, "In accordance with our agreed plan have asked the British Security Co-ordination to send a representative to Ottawa who will be qualified to discuss this matter in detail with one of your officers, without prejudice to whatever final decision may be made in the matter. I have told the BSC that at first glance the plan proposed appears to our Military authorities to be workable but that details will have to be further explored. T.G. Drew-brook from Toronto will be here on Monday as you suggested to discuss these." (NOTE: LAC, RG24, C-8383, From External Affairs Canada by urgent hand to Vice Chief of the Canadian General Staff Major-General J.C. Murchie dated 9 January 1943 and attached document dated 22 December 1942 (R.F.L.) Titled Recruiting and Training in Canada -Para-Military Duties.) What BSC, External Affairs, RCMP and SOE Cairo neglected to inform the Canadian Government was that they had already begun their recruitment scheme back in 1941 and that they had already trained dozens of men in Canada and that many were already on their way overseas! Again, nowhere does any of this correspondence with King's Government mention anything about Communists.

In another interesting development, a document originating from Lethbridge actually states that if permission is not forthcoming, they (SOE Cairo) had to take complete control of the project recruiting men directly into the British Army within Canada. The curious thing is that this document was in the hands of External Affairs and apparently sent to General John Murchie the Canadian Vice Chief of the General Staff. The documents state that without the direct involvement of Canada they could then,"...take candidates of any group, type, or nationality, to put them through a para-military course under close observation, without in anyway revealing the true reason for S.T.S. 103, so that if a man who has been put through this para-military training proves unsuitable for secret work, he may be passed on to the Canadian Army without ever having any inkling of the true nature of S.T.S.103. This fact has been greatly stressed by MT/W [Special Training Schools Section], and whether we can or not obtain the cooperation of the Canadian Authorities, we shall I think in future have para-military training for all recruits." (NOTE: LAC, RG24, C-8383, From External Affairs Canada by urgent hand to Vice Chief of the Canadian General Staff Major-General J.C. Murchie dated 9 January 1943 and attached document dated 22 December 1942 (R.F.L.) Titled Recruiting and Training in Canada -Para-Military Duties.) This answers the question why the initial 16 recruits in Project “J” were referred to as the “First Para-Military Group” while later groups were identified as being “Civilian.” Despite the fact that they too received para-military training, it was being used as a weeding out process for those they then considered able to do more covert operations.

Despite the worries of SOE Cairo and despite their planned action if the Canadian authorities refused their scheme, those same authorities ultimately did agree to cooperate in "special recruiting".  On 13 January 1943 permission was given and, because they were being told nothing about the existing recruiting scheme, put forward a list of prerequisites. This included that all candidates going to STS 103 must meet Canadian Army health standards, be recruited into the Canadian Army, be posted to Military District 2 (Toronto) while at the STS, sign an agreement stating that they volunteered for special military training and that if found suitable they will transfer to the British Army on arrival at a British Port.

Many of those that were recruited were neither attested into the Canadian Army or if they were attested into the Canadian Army were later discharged but were not attested into the British Army.  So in fact, many were indeed operating as what BSC called "civilian technicians." (NOTE: LAC RG24, Microfilm Reel C-8383, Memo Special Training School Whitby, Ontario from the VCGS 16 November 1941.)  This is extremely important because some of these men, once parachuted into the Balkans, simply walked away from SIS/SOE with permission from SOE Cairo/MO4 and disappeared into the ranks of the Communist Partisans/Jugoslav National Army of Liberation (JNAL). (NOTE: UKNA HS8/90, America. Recruiting – Paramilitary Recruits – Course 2. (Italians). Lists of Recruits for Project “J”.) A few would later show up with important positions within the Communist parties of these countries.

While the Communist recruiting scheme continued with the training of those selected, SOE Balkan policy was still uncertain. They still did not have the strength or influence to make a firm decision on whether to follow their short or long term policy or both. Again, SOE Cairo's obsession with locating only Communists affected future operations. The following policy statement made on 22 February also clearly indicates that SOE did not have the resources to effectively support Mihailovic. It stresses that apparently even short term support for immediate sabotage was stretching their resources. Yet they continue to bring up the reckless willingness of the Communist Partisans to mount immediate sabotage. It is obvious that they desired to abandon long term policy and shift their limited resources to the Partisans.

The following policy statement also makes it very clear that Bailey was the one responsible for these ideas. Most of what is stated below will ultimately be proven to be a lie, "We are working to the first Plan because we have insufficient aircraft for Plan 2, let alone Plan 3.Plan 1. does not pretend to do more than give skeleton moral support to the MIHAILOVIC Movement and minimum material support to small British Missions engaged in short term sabotage, chiefly of enemy lines of communication. With Plan 1. we may be able to some extent to forecast the turn of events in JUGOSLAVIA; we shall scarcely be able to influence them; we shall never be able to control them. Hitherto our plans have been based on the long-term consideration. The support of MIHAILOVIC, the sending of D/H.2 ( Bailey) the main calculation behind our planning, all lead to the conclusion that we are interested in long-term revolt and not in short time sabotage. It should be realized that, if this were not so, it would probably pay us better to establish sub-missions in CROATIA and SLOVENIA where the guerrillas (whether 'Partisans' or not) appear to be far more willing to carry out short-term sabotage than are MIHAILOVIC's commanders. If we are to switch to the short-term object, then this consideration must be taken into account. An impartial view of the evidence at our disposal shows conclusively that the guerrillas in CROATIA and SLOVENIA are far more dangerous to the enemy at the present time than the Serbian Chetniks. Furthermore, unless we know the measure of our activities, we cannot recruit efficiently. It seems in any case desirable to remove the element of duality in our present policy. We must aim either at short-term sabotage or at long term revolt; they are not always compatible and thus there ought to be a known priority." (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/145, Balkans No.1, Top Level Planning - Planning of Activities (Cairo H.Q.) -From DH/336 Stevenson and DH/18 to D.S.O. (B),  22 February 1943. ) In short, it was Bailey's desire to slowly edge out Mihailovic. If Bailey desired to help Mihailovic, then recruiting in the America's should have focused primarily on the majority of the Yugoslav immigrant population. They were not Communists but those in support of the King or other non-Communist political groups. This is evident in the numbers originally recruited to join the Exiled King’s military forces in Egypt.

In addition to this desire to shift operational policy, knowing that their collaboration angle was not swaying the Foreign Office, SOE Cairo and their Partisan friends changed tactics and now began to beg for supplies. They attempted to justify this by stating that, although the Royalists were still indeed fighting the Germans, Tito's forces were now holding down the bulk of the enemy. Again, Signals intelligence did not agree, "SOE Cairo had not yet suggested that aid to Mihailovic should be stopped -only that aid to Tito should begin- discussion in Whitehall was increasingly concerned from February 1943 with the question whether or not to break with Mihailovic completely..." The Foreign office did not want to switch support because Mihailovic still controlled Serbia, "SOE London argued that he should continue to receive supplies at least until there was a good and sufficient cause for extending support to other elements in Yugoslavia." (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 143.)  SOE Cairo now saw their chance, "... under the influence of further unfavorable reports from SOE missions in the Cetnik areas, SOE Cairo was coming to the conclusion that Mihailovic ought to be abandoned.  The outcome of this uncertainty was that by the end of March 1943 the government had decided to send officers from Cairo to contact the Partisans in Croatia and Slovenia and to defer the question whether to give support to Tito until they had reported." (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 144.)

With Signals Intelligence continually referring to fighting between the Royalists and the Germans, SOE Cairo now played its next hand. Realizing that the Foreign Office did not trust the information coming from the Soviets and the Partisans, they decided to allow SOE Cairo to send in what they thought were trustworthy teams to set up initial liaison with both Mihailovics' and Titos' Headquarters. Amongst the officers (some later to be revealed as Communists or actually working for the Soviets) being sent into the field from Cairo was a spattering of the Communist para-military NCO's and civilians located in North America. The total breakdown of those recruited and sent overseas from STS 103 is the First Group of Civilians (Yugoslav) arriving in Egypt in February 1943. The First Para-military group (Yugoslav) Second and Third Group of Civilians (Yugoslav) who made it to Egypt by June 1943.  The Second Para-military Group (Italians) made it overseas as well by June and the remaining Third (Hungarian), Fourth (Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian) and Fifth (Hungarian) Para-military Groups made it overseas between 14 September and 28 October 1943. (NOTE UKNA, HS8/90, SOE America, Recruiting, Para-military Elements Course 2 (Italians).)

The Yugoslavs were included in the following operations, FUNGUS (20 April 43), HOATHLEY I (21 April 43), TOFFEE (23 April 43), FUNGUS (18 May 43), KILWORTH (21 May 43), TYPICAL (22 May 43), LANGSIDE (12 June 43), HUNDON (5 July 43), SAVANAH (16 August 43) and JUDGE (12 October 43).  Included in these operations, as well as others, were those Communist Yugoslavs recruited in the US. It is what these missions reported to SOE Cairo and they in turn reported to the Middle East Defense Committee (MEDC) that began to seriously erode support for Mihailovic. While Bailey makes it clear that Mihailovic continued to actively fight the Germans, he now reported on 26 May 1943 that this fighting had severely weakened the Royalists. The MEDC then ordered the Royalists to withdrawal back into Serbia leaving the rest of the territory to the Partisans. (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 148-149.)

Noted British historian Nigel West breaks down what he knew about the Communist recruitment scheme. This quote is found in his series of books The Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence and reveals in a condensed form what was actually happening, “The campaign in Yugoslavia was one of contradictions. Most of the missions, particularly to Draza Mihailovic’s liaison officers, were dreadfully ill-equipped and ill prepared, and the choice of personnel was quite eccentric. When, for example, there was a determined effort to send in reinforcements during the spring of 1943, the majority of SOE’s Serbo-Croat speakers were Canadians and members of the Communist Party. Two of FUNGUS’s three agents had fought in the Spanish Civil War, and HOATHLEY I consisted entirely of miners from Quebec. About 28 Canadian or American immigrants returned to fight in their homeland; of whom, five disappeared, and at least three chose to remain in Yugoslavia after the war, taking jobs in the Communist regime, evidently undeterred by the appalling massacres that followed Tito’s take over. Several of those who fought with the Cheniks and partisans have written accounts of their experiences, with varying degrees of bitterness. Certainly many of the SOE personnel who managed to return to Bari held strong views on what was perceived to be mismanagement in Cairo, if not ruthless political manipulation. Occasionally, the high feelings reached Castellani, where Force 266 was accommodated, and sometimes those who had backed the Cetniks, and thought they had been betrayed, had to be separated from the rest.” (NOTE: West, Nigel – Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, Second Edition, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Pg 175 )

As we will soon see, it was indeed an eccentric choice of personnel being sent to Mihailovic and a deliberate attempt to make his command ineffectual. Another interesting point to be made is that the TYPICAL Mission under Captain F.W.D. Deakin was accompanied by Canadian Captain William Stuart of MI6.  It appears as though MI6's desire to send him to Mihailovic was conveniently changed to suit SOE Cairo's agenda in Yugoslavia. In author Keith Jefferies, The Secret History of MI6 he alludes to the fact that the man heading MI6 operations in Yugoslavia, James Millar also had left leaning sympathies as well as a bias hero worship of Tito. Jefferies states that Head of ISLD or MI6 in the Middle East Cuthbert Bowlby, "worried that Millar and his staff were 'far too Tito-conscious. He complained that 'pictures of Tito cover the walls' of Millar's office and he asked London to send out large photographs of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, 'to be hung in some prominent place' in the office. This, he felt, 'should have the desired effect of intimating to 35,000 (Millar) that there are limits to local partisanship.'" (Note: Jefferies, Keith. The Secret History of MI6, 1909-1949, Penguin, 2010. Chapter 16, Victory in Europe, pgs 559-560. ) Millar's obsession with Tito did not end with pin-ups in his office as Captain William Stuart was now sent in to Tito's Headquarters to report strictly on Partisan operations. It does not appear as though SIS had a mission with Mihailovic? Jefferies includes no mention in his book about any SIS Mihailovic liaison. Sadly though, Stuart was killed shortly after being dropped in during the German offensive to kill Tito dubbed Operation SCHWARZ. Deakin's group was later absorbed into Brigadier MacLean's MACMIS Headquarters established with the Partisans. 

Churchill himself comments on what transpired that summer, “I had followed these events amid other preoccupations so far as was possible. Except for a trickle of supplies dropped from aircraft, we were not able to help. Our headquarters in the Middle East was responsible for all operations in this theater and maintained a system of agents and liaison officers with the followers of Mihailovic. When in the summer of 1943, we broke into Sicily and Italy, the Balkans and especially Yugoslavia never left my thoughts. Up till this point our missioners had only gone to the bands of Mihailovic, who represented the official resistance to the Germans and the Yugoslav Government in Cairo.  In May 1943, we took a new departure. It was decided to send small parties of British officers and non-commissioned officers to establish contact with the Yugoslav partisans, in spite of the fact that cruel strife was proceeding between them and the Chetniks , and that Tito was waging war as a Communist, not only against the German invaders, but against the Serbian Monarchy and Mihailovic. At the end of that month, Captain Deakin, an Oxford don...was dropped by parachute from Cairo to set up a mission with Tito. Other British missions followed, and by June much evidence had accumulated." (Note: Closing the Ring, Marshall Tito and Yugoslavia, pg. 463)

The Foreign Office and SOE London strongly disagreed with much of this evidence bringing forward their statistics of Royalist strength. They also stressed that the Germans were poised to eliminate the Partisans.  However the MEDC brought forward the argument that the Allies did not have the luxury to pick and choose in Yugoslavia and whoever was fighting the most and holding down the majority of the enemy forces should be the one supported.  Military Intelligence (War Office) was impressed by the initial reports from the above mentioned missions, most of which were sent to the Partisans. They indicated that Mihailovic's authority was now largely restricted to Serbia. With SOE Cairo now successfully calling the shots, they began to return to their earlier tactic of reporting collaboration. This time the Chiefs of Staff fell into their trap.  Between June and July 1943 it was decided to begin supplying the Partisans. It was also decided in September to send in a mission with a ranking officer Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean to set up a joint HQ with Tito (MACMIS) while also sending in Brigadier Charles Armstrong to Mihailovic's HQ. 

With a quota not yet reached to recruit 100 Italian and Balkan Communist recruits, a severe setback occurred in the recruitment scheme. Some of those operating within British intelligence ,not swayed by Communist sympathies, noted in an MI5 operation covering the Communist Party of Great Britain that the head organizer of the party Douglas Frank Springhall (NOTE: UKNA, SIS Record KV2/1594) was operating as the middle man between Captain Ormond Uren of Hungarian Section SOE and Ray Milne of MI6's Section V and Soviet NKVD agents ( Milne was a Soviet mole operating under Soviet mole Kim Philby Deputy Head/ later Head of Counter Espionage at Section V).Springhall was arrested on 17 June 1943 which resulted in the later arrests of Uren and Milne in November 1943. In fact MI5 uncovered 57 Communists operating within the Government and Military that had access to secret information.  (NOTE: http://www.academia.edu/4435777/Communis..._retention and  U of Oxford 2005http://oxford.academia.edu/Roderick Bailey) With the heat being turned up that May, it is interesting that SOE Cairo ordered the Royal Yugoslav Government in London to inform Savitch's Military Mission in Windsor on 30 May 1943 to stop any further recruiting of men. Savitch was simply told to ship any of those already recruited directly to Cairo.

This plan was questioned by the Canadian Adjutant General, Major General Letson on 8 June stating that the Canadian authorities could ship them to the UK, but there was no means to ship them direct to Cairo. Letson was not aware that he was being asked to arrange the shipment of Communist volunteers. Letson then stated that they had to be shipped from the US. In a letter from Squadron Leader R.A. Leforgeais at BSC, he tells Savitch that the Royal Yugoslav Government in London instructed him, "...to send your next contingent, and future contingents, direct to Cairo and not to the United Kingdom." Why is this? It looks as though BSC wanted to continue to hide the despatch of these men from the UK authorities. This so that those recruits remaining could be secretly shipped to Egypt while also shutting down the program possibly due to things getting hot in London.  (NOTE: RG24, Yugoslav Military Mission, File 8594-2, Vol.2848.) It is also apparent from this note that difficulties were encountered with transport due to "London Policy." Was this policy behind the legalities of transporting these men or was it Foreign Office Policy regarding the support of Communists in Yugoslavia?

Shortly after the Springhall matter was addressed, SO London spoke out on what he knew was a developing policy to stab the King of Yugoslavia in the back and to hand the Balkans to the Communists. He very directly states that those responsible were sitting at the helm of SOE Cairo, “The impression conveyed to my mind by the telegrams is that throughout the Balkans we are faced with a Communist organization whose aim will be to seize possession of Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the German collapse. We are in the dilemma of either refraining from using a very powerful tool with which to attack the Axis, or else double-crossing, or seeming to double-cross our Allies the Kings of Greece and Yugoslavia who have staked their shirts on British good faith. I was afraid at the beginning of this week that we had been jockeyed by Cairo into support of the Partisans without Foreign Office agreement, but I gather from C.D. [Charles Hambro] that Orme Sargent [Deputy Under-Secretary Foreign Office] is happy concerning these developments. I wish I was. It appears to me to be one thing for SOE to have a surreptitious contact with a ruffian somewhere, who will put a bomb under Hitler's chair, and quite another for British officers in uniform to be attached to organizations who make no disguise of their intention to cut their King's throat as soon as they get a chance.” (NOTE:UKNA, HS5/148, SO to Anthony Eden unsigned dated 4 June 1943) It is obvious from further related correspondence that SO was going against the grain.  He was obviously making many statements of concern because many of the documents were partially redacted.

The CD [Charles Hambro] then makes his displeasure known to SO, “If we could have discussed the terms of this letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs before sending it I would have been grateful because I feel that in making the statement that we ‘had been jockeyed by Cairo into support of the Partisans without Foreign Office agreement’ you were criticizing our own people to the Secretary of State, who is head of another department and I think this should have been thrashed out with me and the head of our Cairo Mission before any reference to it was made to outside parties. Moreover as I had the onus and responsibility for all the negotiations with Orme Sargent with regard to this matter I should at least have liked to express my views on what you say before the letter was despatched to Mr. Eden...I do not want to worry you over the week-end but I do want to talk to you on Monday so that we can be quite clear as to the attitude we should adopt with the Foreign Office who will no doubt approach me when the Secretary of State passes your letter to the department concerned.” (IBID From CD to SO 5 June 1943)

The CD then admits to his Vice CD Colin McVean Gubbins that, “From this report, which obviously has the acquiescence of Casey [Churchill Appointee as Minister Resident Middle East] as he himself forwarded it under his own signature, it is quite evident that the Middle East are carrying on a policy as regards Yugoslavia for which they have no authority, and which incidentally is quite contrary to the policy laid down for them by the Foreign Office and the COS [Chiefs of Staff]. It is in fact, according to [Desmond] Morton [Churchill's Personal Assistant], quite contrary to the policy of the Prime Minister."(IBID From CD to Vice CD 8 June 1943.)

However despite this shocking knowledge the missions sent in to Yugoslavia now began to report in earnest that Mihailovic was weakening and Tito's Partisans were getting steadily stronger. At this point, despite their desire to believe in Mihailovic, the Chiefs of Staff began to shift their opinion. It was their ultimate goal to draw as many forces as possible away from their future battlefront in the Calabria area of the toe of Italy as well as the Soviet front line. Now being told that it was the Partisans holding down more and more enemy formations, it began to look as though they had no choice but to throw King Peter and Mihailovic under the bus.  It was not easy for them to come to this realization because it has to be remembered that it was King Peter and his supporters that stood up against Hitler and the Fascists and in doing so delayed the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. It was Mihailovic who stood with his King not Tito.

After July 1943 no more Eastern European recruits were located or trained at STS 103. Despite the proceeding shake-up in British Intelligence in the UK, SOE Cairo's plans came full circle. With Churchill, Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff about to crack there was no further need of any Communists from the America's. The School's last major recruitment scheme began in August/September 1943 and involved the selection and training of French speaking officers in Canada who were considered redundant and too old for overseas operational service. These men were intended for SOE's "F" Section which apparently did not suffer from the same infection of Communist sympathies.  Despite dozens being selected, only four of these officers saw action.

In October Enigma continued to report on German efforts to destroy the Royalists in the Southern Sandjak. They also reported that Tito, now well stocked, was also inflicting heavy damage on the Royalists by attempting to wipe them out in Montenegro and the Sanjak in an attempt to push their way into Serbia. However the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) only took notice of the apparent effort being reflected in correspondence that the Partisans were doing the bulk of the fighting. He then mentioned to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that if the Partisans kept up that level of fighting, they should be the ones supplied.

The attitude coming from MACMIS, via Tito’s HQ, was that, “Their organization was overwhelmingly communist, though they were willing to cooperate with other resistance groups-except those of General Mihailovic. Brigadier Maclean thought that only armed intervention on a large scale would prevent them from taking power after the German withdrawal and that General Mihailovic, whose policy was pro-Serb and anti-Croat, would be unable, even in the most favourable circumstances, to unite the country.” (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.) In short, Maclean was trying to convince the Prime Minister and Foreign Office to pick sides. Believing all the correspondence passing through his hands, Maclean essentially dismisses Mihailovic. 

What made this difficult at this time for the Foreign Office was the fact that the only evidence discovered from Signals Intelligence pointing to any collaboration between the Royalists and the Germans was uncovered by Ultra in November 1943 and consisted of only two decrypts which were deemed inconclusive and in no way implicated Mihailovic himself. (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 150 note *.) However a decision had to be made. It was then decided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office that all hope of reconciling the two sides was completely lost. They were now just short of stopping all support for Mihailovic. Although no decision had yet been made to drop the Royalists completely, no further supplies ended up in Mihailovic's hands.

Despite the fact that they obviously already decided what path they would take and Mihailovic was aware of this, they proposed a test for him. Ultra information pointed towards a move by the 1st Panzer Division by rail through his territory to the Soviet front line. The British then ordered Mihailovic to attack the rail line. They stated that if he attacked the panzer division in transit, they would continue supporting him. The SOE mission with Mihailovic reported that he refused to conduct the sabotage. However one has to ask one's self, if you knew that your only source of succor was now being diverted to your domestic enemy and there was no plan for any future allied intervention to save your Government, would you bother? Add German reprisals against civilians to that and it makes it more unlikely that you would continue to do the bidding of those who did not trust you and were presently leaving you out to dry! Maclean's HQ with Tito then submitted their report whic
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Despite the fact that they obviously already decided what path they would take and Mihailovic was aware of this, they proposed a test for him. Ultra information pointed towards a move by the 1st Panzer Division by rail through his territory to the Soviet front line. The British then ordered Mihailovic to attack the rail line. They stated that if he attacked the panzer division in transit, they would continue supporting him. The SOE mission with Mihailovic reported that he refused to conduct the sabotage. However one has to ask one's self, if you knew that your only source of succor was now being diverted to your domestic enemy and there was no plan for any future allied intervention to save your Government, would you bother? Add German reprisals against civilians to that and it makes it more unlikely that you would continue to do the bidding of those who did not trust you and were presently leaving you out to dry! Maclean's HQ with Tito then submitted their report which recommended that the Royalists be dropped completely. The British ambassador (Sir Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson) to the Yugoslav Government further intimated that, "Cairo was still receiving reports of collaboration with the Axis from all areas except Serbia." (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 154.)

It was then agreed amongst the Allies at the Tehran Conference on 29 November 1943 that the bulk of supplies now go to Tito. Shortly after in December, "it was the subsequent development of Yugoslavia into a theater where Allied support to the Partisans could tie down substantial German forces which led to the decision formally to break with Mihailovic. The western allies and the Soviets now poured in weapons and supplies to Tito and began to mount significant operations along the coast and in the air." (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia, pg 154-155.)  This resulted in the creation of the Balkan Air Force and the takeover of Free Yugoslav forces by Tito’s Communists. One wonders what could have happened if Mihailovic was given this kind of support? However with nothing else to do, some of Mihailovic's Royalists turned to their enemies Nedic and the Germans to survive. Churchill was then forced to admit that Mihailovic was collaborating. Even at this point the Foreign Office still did not accept that evidence of collaboration by Mihailovic himself was conclusive.

Also that day in November, Tito decided that regardless of what anyone said, he was the future leader of Yugoslavia. He declared the creation of the, "Partisans' 'Anti-Fascist Council of National Defence and set up two bodies, a Supreme Legislative Council and an Executive National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia. The latter body was presided over by Tito, who was now given the title of 'Marshall of Yugoslavia.' In essence this was Tito's declaration of total power in Yugoslavia and broadcasts from the Soviets demanded formal recognition of Tito's Communists as sole rulers of the nation and denounced King Peter and his government in exile as traitors." (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.)

At the time the British were contemplating a complete break with Mihailovic, a document dated December 1943 found within SOE Balkan Policy papers explains the existing chain of command and how operations in the field were monitored, "Brigadier Stawell, Commander of Force 133 is responsible for directing the program of sustaining resistance movements in the Balkans, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria, and for subversive activities in the Arab world, in Turkey and in Greece...Since operational demands often conflict with long term political considerations a Special Operations Committee equates such problems under the direction of the Middle East Defense Committee, which is composed of State and/or Foreign Office representatives of the nations concerned, C-in-C, M.E. USAF IME [United States Armed Forces in the Middle East], and chiefs of the various special operations agencies. The main headquarters at CAIRO are in direct radio communication with missions in occupied countries of the BALKANS. Such links are provided by liaison officers who are mostly British but efforts are being made to infiltrate additional American officers. At the present time the communication centre at CAIRO had contact with approximately 150 clandestine sets...Furthermore many SOE operations start on a clandestine basis and develop into overt operations." This final statement is important because it clarifies that most SOE operations end up in the open and operate in uniform. However the document continues to clarify that, “Even though aid to the BALKANS is now overt from the dispatching end, communications from TITO spring from clandestine sources."  (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/145, Balkans No.1, Top Level Planning - Planning of Activities (Cairo H.Q.) - Allied Force Headquarters G-3 Section. Minutes of Meeting with Mideast Rep's, Organization and Functions of Force 133, 17-18 December, 1943. )

The direct involvement of SOE Cairo in the decision to oust Mihailovic and Tito’s growing power are explained by the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson. He writes to the Foreign Office, "... on purely military grounds we would be justified in going ahead with the break. They had agreed and had stated that they were prepared to put this up to the Cabinet for a decision, but had requested first some documentary proof of his collaboration. This was being collated by Force 133 and would be forwarded as soon as possible. Once they received this they would recommend ceasing support and withdrawing BLO's [British Liaison Officers] at the same time, but there were indications that they would suggest leaving a certain number of liaison officers behind with MIHAILOVIC. It was unlikely, however, that TITO would agree to this. The Foreign Office were also prepared for an approach to be made to the King to get rid of MIHAILOVIC. This was a policy which he had already suggested would be unreasonable to pursue in view of the fact that TITO's movement had declared itself to be openly revolutionary." In short, this statement proves that Force 133 (D/H Section etc.), and those at Force 133 alone, had the power to control all information and opinion getting back to the Cabinet.  The King made it clear that support of Tito was tantamount to his suicide.

The statements found in SOE's Balkan policy papers make it obvious they had no intention of maintaining support for the Royalists. Even when Mihailovic offered to negotiate, they refused to believe his sincerity. Remember that SOE policy papers indicate that Mihailovic never received enough support to ever maintain any level of continued action against the Germans, "As regards MIHAILOVIC' offer to negotiate, the Foreign Office had stated that this appeared to them to be merely a manoeuvre and they were not prepared to act as intermediaries between him and TITO. They had asked in addition whether, if MIHALOVIC actually carried out the operation proposed, we would ignore this fact and carry on with the break. [Referring to the previously mentioned demand that Mihailovic attack the movement by rail of the 1st Panzer Division passing through his territory.] His own views were as follows:; The Commander-in-Chief's message had been delivered by Brigadier ARMSTRONG on the 9th December and for two weeks MIHAILOVIC had done absolutely nothing and had even refused to see Brigadier ARMSTRONG. Eventually on the 23rd December he stated that he would be unable to carry out the operation by the 29th but he would carry it out sometime in the first half of January. Even so he was not prepared to do it in the way we wished. There was every indication that he was merely procrastinating and he [C-in-C] considered that we should make a decision on military grounds to withdrawal our support now and he had recommended this to the Foreign Office. Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson reported that the CGS had signalled to General WILSON informing him fully of the present position. (a) Took note of the situation regarding TITO and the KING. (b) Endorsed H.M. Ambassador's proposal that we should proceed with the break forthwith. © Instructed Force 133, in conjunction with H.M. Ambassador, to draft a signal to Brigadier Armstrong informing him that we are not prepared to act as intermediaries between MIHAILOVIC and TITO. (d) Took note that General WILSON had been fully informed position." (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/145, Balkans No.1, Top Level Planning - Planning of Activities (Cairo H.Q.) - Policy Planning & Organization of SOE Activities 1941-1944. Special Operations Committee 16th Meeting, 29-30 December 1943.)

Tito, now with the entire backing of the west and the Soviets in the bag, was bent on Mihailovic's destruction. In his book, The Rape of Serbia, The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944, ex British Liaison Officer Michael Lees, who parachuted into Yugoslavia at the beginning of June 1943 to Mihailovic's Royalists backs up this statement, "What was really happening was that Tito and his main force had moved from Bosnia down into Montenegro partly because of German pressure against them in Bosnia and partly by design: the move fitted into the framework of Tito’s ambition to conquer Mihailović’s territory in Montenegro and the Sandžak and eventually to turn east into the heart of Serbia and south into Macedonia. This was not an attack by Mihailović on Tito, as stated by Deakin. It was a move by the Partisans against Mihailović territory."  (NOTE: Michael Lee Rape of Serbia page 56.)

The fate of Mihailovic was finally sealed after Churchill and Eden visited Cairo after the Tehran Conference (28 November - 1 December) and discussed matters with Deakin and Maclean. They went away accepting that Mihailovic was collaborating. Both men had submitted reports in January, as requested in the quote above, largely based on Partisan and Soviet evidence.  Churchill told the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in Exile Božidar Purić, that he had, " 'irrefutable' evidence of General Mihailovic's collaboration with the enemy, and that in the future we might ask for his dismissal. M. Puric protested most strongly that we should be letting loose a communist regime on Yugoslavia which the peasants would resist in a long and devastating civil war. He blamed the British propaganda for the rise of the Partisans to power, and did not accept Mr. Churchill's estimate of the relative strength of the two Movements. When Mr. Churchill said that the Partisans were not held back by threats of reprisals, M. Puric answered that they did not care what happened to the civilian population." (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 332-337.) Although Churchill had already made up his mind, elements within the Foreign Office still did not believe what was presented by Deakin and Maclean. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean (SACMED) was opposed to dropping Mihailovic because it was his opinion that he was still holding down two Bulgarian Divisions in Serbia. Regardless, with pressure from the C-in-C Middle East and Tito's refusal to allow missions into his territory if Mihailovic was not dropped, SACMED relented. Churchill then applied pressure to the Foreign Office and the decision to finally drop Mihailovic was made on 17 February 1944.  Mihailovic was on his way out.

The overall decision was made due to the support that they required from the now supposedly strong Partisans to keep as many Axis formations out of the fighting now raging along the Winter Line in Italy. Just days before the 15th Army Group made its play for Rome, on 16 May King Peter II was forced to dismiss his Government. Brigadier Armstrong's HQ with King Peters Minister of War, General Mihailovic could not leave until the end of May 1944.

While an American OSS detachment with Mihailovic offered to take him out, he refused and stayed with this dwindling force knowing full well it likely meant his own death. With all the bravado expressed by SOE Cairo regarding the strength and effectiveness of the Partisans, a German offensive in May/June soon had Tito running away to Bari in Italy. He then moved to the Island of Vis in the Adriatic.  A change in the situation only occurred after increased Allied air power; something denied Mihailovic, which ultimately wiped out the German air force in Yugoslavia. Now, with complete control of the skies, Partisan operations resumed that July. At this point the Germans were concentrating on maintaining their control over islands in the Adriatic to prevent an allied landing, likely accompanied by Tito, along the Yugoslav coast. (NOTE: Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 1, Chapter 33, Developments in Yugoslavia.)

Soon Tito's Partisans met up with advancing Soviet forces barreling through Romania and Bulgaria. It has been proposed by Michael Lees, with substantial evidence, that missions into Bulgaria were mounted not to support the Bulgarian Royalists or proper democratic parties but to create another front by which Communists in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could destroy Mihailovic's Royalists.  The only Canadian recruited and trained at STS 103 to parachute into Bulgaria was actually a Croat named Nick Muvrin. He was inserted as part of the MULLIGATAWNY Mission. One of the key players in this espionage to utilize Bulgarian Communists to assist in the destruction of Mihailovic was a man named Klugmann. Lee explains, "It is clear that he [Cairo's Balkan expert Hugh Seton-Watson] and Klugmann played a substantial role in the planning. There were two preparatory missions involved, which appear in the operational log under the code names Mulligatawny and Monkey Wrench. The original mission [MONKEY WRENCH] dropped into Albania near Lake Ohrid in August or September 1943. It was officially scheduled to cross Macedonia and act as reception for Frank Thompson [another confirmed Communist in SOE], who was to make contact with Bulgarian communists and start a resistance movement there. The main preparatory mission, under Maj. Mostyn Davies [MULLIGATAWNY], a well-connected and brave officer, was top secret, and it was given absolutely overriding priority."  (NOTE Lees, Michael, Rape of Serbia. pg. 51)

Thompson was charged to set up a base of operations in Serbia where further supplies and personnel could be dropped. Michael Lees comments on how odd it was that these missions were getting the lion's share of supply drops and received top priority over all other missions, "The operational log shows that Mulligatawny and Monkey Wrench enjoyed such a priority from M04 [Cairo] that a substantial proportion of all drops to Yugoslavia in the last three months of 1943 were going to those missions. This was so extraordinary that I wonder whether Brigadier Maclean at Tito’s headquarters knew what was going on. I found no signals between M04 and the Maclean mission to indicate that he did. Whether or not Klugmann and Seton- Watson were operating with the knowledge of Maclean, the massive deliveries of arms into Macedonia had nothing to do with SOE's buildup of a [Liberal] Bulgarian resistance. That may have been the excuse for the priority given to Mostyn Davies’s mission, and it was certainly the excuse Cairo used when it fervently denied that the mission existed at all." However the existence of these missions to other missions in Serbia became known after Davies made contact with a BLO named Robert Purvis assigned to Mihailovic's forces near the Bulgarian border. This let the cat out of the bag.

In truth there was indeed a more sinister motive for the setting up of shop by SOE Cairo in Bulgaria, "The fact is that these massive drops were being made to enable [Svetovar] Vukmanović-Tempo [a Montenegrin Communist and Tito's personal representative in Macedonia] to recruit a Partisan force from the mixed population of Arnautis [Muslim Albanians living in Serbia] and disaffected Serbs in preparation for the planned conquest of Serbia. This force, in due course, drove up from the south. I believe that the exploitation of the proposed reconnaissance into Bulgaria by Frank Thompson was organized by Klugmann on his own initiative; no doubt he spun a good yarn to Brigadier [Cleveland Mervyn] Keble [Head SOE Cairo/M04]. It helped enormously in the communist war against the Loyalists [Royalists]in Serbia. Undoubtedly the involvement of Seton-Watson lent weight to the plan and facilitated the evident priority given to the Davies mission." Lees concludes that the amount of weapons and supplies sent in to Bulgaria could not have possibly been handled by these small missions. It is evident to him, that these supplies were actually meant for someone else, "The whole Claridges/Monkey Wrench/Mulligatawny affair provides added evidence of the freedom enjoyed by Klugmann, Seton-Watson, and others to operate their own private policies." (Note LEES pg. 51.)

It was these "private policies" that allowed Communists in and around Yugoslavia to help push the Germans out and to destroy the Royalists in Serbia between 14 September and 29 November 1944. The end of Mihailovic was nigh.

Under pressure from the western allies, Tito accepted the inclusion of members of the Yugoslav Government in Exile to be part of his “unified” government. However it soon became apparent that this was simply a ploy. Tito had no intentions of upholding his end of the principle agreement that established this temporary government. In a report dated 17 September 1945 to Canadian External Affairs a report received from Milan Grol of the Yugoslav Government in Exile who was made Vice Premier without portfolio under Prime Minister Tito, “called on me to-day at my request. Like the seasoned politician which he is, he seems to thrive on being in opposition…He is convinced that in the present circumstances fair and democratic elections in Yugoslavia are utterly impossible…In Bosnia regular civil war is being waged…The regime is making use of organized hooliganism to render insupportable the lives of its opponents.” He ultimately resigned due to the refusal by Tito to stand by his word to implement free elections.  (NOTE: RG 25-A-2, Volume 2960, File 22, Security Problem within Department of External Affairs. Cadieux Dispatch, 1946.) Further to this, a note from British Liaison Officer Lieutenant Colonel Frederick William Deakin (previously of the TYPICAL Mission into Yugoslavia) in Belgrade to the Labour Parties Foreign Secretary Earnest Bevin dated 24 September states that, “A member of my staff called on M. Misa Trifunnovic [Former member of Yugoslav Government in Exile] went on to elaborate the theme that elections under present conditions were completely impossible for the opposition…He maintained that the peasants were rapidly being beaten into a state of cowed submission, and that the only thing which could stop this process was a declaration by the western democracies that they intended to see free elections in Yugoslavia.” (NOTE: RG 25-A-2, Volume 2960, File 22, Security Problem within Department of External Affairs. Cadieux Dispatch, 1946.) This statement further clarifies that the “peasants” were not generally Communist supporters. This was wishful thinking on the part of Trifunnovic. The man now sitting in the White House, Democrat Harry Truman had no intention of intervening in the Balkans.

Lees makes it clear that Soviet mole and recruiter Major Norman John "James" Klugmann strongly influenced the actions of Colonel Keble at SOE Cairo MO4/Bari Force 266. Klugmann was known for, "preaching a moderate, literate, rather comforting-sounding Communism." (NOTE: Wylie, Neville, The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, Communist in SOE, Routledge, 2006, pg 67.) Born in England on 27 February 1912 to German-Jewish parents Klugmann first became interested in Communism in 1931 after receiving a scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge.  Like many others recruited in the UK, he joined the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1933 and after completing his studies in October 1934 soon found himself in Paris involved with the World Student Assembly.  This soon became the World Student Association for Peace and Culture. In 1938 he became their secretary. Over the next year he went on a tour attending various Communist conferences and hobnobbed with several European, Middle Eastern and Asian Communists. While in Cambridge he would meet up with future Soviet moles Anthony Blunt and Donald Maclean. Klugmann was apparently a strong influence on these future Soviet spies. (NOTE: IBID pg 68.) Many of Canada's Liberal appointed bureaucrats mentioned above also attended Oxford and Cambridge during Klugmann and Philby's recruiting in the 1930's and are in some manner implicated with leftist groups but the existence of any possible solid evidence is still closed and protected by the Ministry of Justice and CSIS. 

Just after the RAF's victory in the Battle of Britain, Klugmann was called up in November 1940 and thereafter was under secret investigation for his left wing activities. Remember that at this time Stalin and Hitler were still chums so he posed a double risk to the British authorities. Yet despite this knowledge, he is suspiciously requested by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Maunsell RNVR, Defence Security Officer and Head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), Cairo for "most secret work." MI5 advised strongly against this. SIME was responsible for counter intelligence work as well as the vetting and issuance of travel documents /passes for the British military.  Apparently after being attached to GHQ Middle East, Klugmann's talents were noted by his CO. He knew that he had achieved high standards at Cambridge and was also able to pass an Arabic language course while serving at GHQ. It was Klugmann’s CO that contacted SOE. SOE Cairo apparently interviewed him at the beginning of January 1942.  Author Neville Wylie suggests that the interviewers were likely SOE Cairo's Director of Special Operations Terence Airey and his 2i/c John Bennett. On learning of SOE's interest in Klugmann, enquiries were made by Maunsell two weeks later.  Despite continuing suspicions, on 2 February 1942 Private Klugmann of the Royal Army Service Corps is waiting at the Middle Eastern Commando Holding Squadron. He was being assigned to SOE Cairo/MO4. There Klugmann was made an Acting Lieutenant and given the position of Administration and Conducting Officer for the Yugoslav D/H Section on 16 June.

After being asked to submit a report on the behaviour of Klugmann on 12 January 1943, Colonel Keble, then Chief of Staff SOE Cairo/MO4, made the statement that he was, "absolutely trustworthy and secure". Maunsell's SIME then curiously clears Klugmann. He was promoted to Acting Captain on 22 May 1943 and made G3 (Operations and Plans) for Force 133. That August he was confirmed in that rank.  It then came to light via Roger Hollis at MI5 on 11 October 1943 that Klugmann was a member of the Communist Party. This came just as a shakeup in the ranks of British Intelligence occurred due to the Springhall investigation. Although Hollis tried to blow the whistle on Klugmann, he is also later suspected of working for the Soviets.  (NOTE  UKNA, HS9/1645, Special Operations Executive Personnel Records (PF Series), Norman John Klugmann.)

However suspiciously, despite this revelation from Hollis, nothing was done about Klugmann or many others. Instead, under the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick William Deakin and after being signed off by Major General William Stawell Commanding Force 133, Klugmann was made G2 (Intelligence) on 10 January 1944. At around the same time, the now Major Klugmann, was moved to Bari, Italy where he became 2i/c of Force 266. The information from Hollis was not dealt with, possibly deliberately, until 16 March 1944 when discussed between the CD and Stawell. They simply brushed it under the table after Klugmann denied it in a charming interview with Maunsell. He was completely taken in and due to Klugmann’s charm doubted that he had done anything wrong. He believed Klugmann when he said he no longer had any connections to the Communist Party.

It was not until later in the war that the truth finally started to seep out through various investigations and Soviet defections. One of the first revelations came via an MI5 investigation into the activities of the Communist Party of Great Britain. These investigations began to reveal Klugmann's true allegiances. Author Roderick Bailey, in his article Explaining James Klugmann's Recruitment and Retention, records the incredible facts MI5 uncovered which included a, “37-page verbatim report of a conversation Klugmann had, while on leave in London in August 1945, with Bob Stewart, a senior member of the Communist Party of Great Britain's (CPGB) Executive Committee and Controls Commission." In this document Stewart states that Klugmann, "...told Stewart...First, he was able to influence the selection and destination of British personnel, being careful to ensure the best ones went to Tito and that 'certain Fascist and really bad elements' were 'always sent to the Chetniks'. Second, once he was appointed 'Captain Regional Officer', he was able to brief agents before they left for the field.' That was particularly useful because everybody who went to the field had to go through me and I had to tell him what he would find, and you know that people often find what they expect'." (NOTE: http://www.academia.edu/4435777/Communis..._retention and  U of Oxford 2005http://oxford.academia.edu/Roderick Bailey) It was Klugmann who acted as Conducting Officer for the Communists recruited in the US and Canada. He is mentioned several times in documents found within the (UK National Archives HS9 Series) SOE service files of many of these men.

The MI5 investigation also revealed that Klugmann divulged to Stewart his step by step plans to discredit the Royalists and gain support for the Partisans, "The first political aim was to get our Yugoslav section to learn from Intelligence sources about Partisans, to show that there were Partisans as well as Chetniks. That took about three months - a fight with the Foreign Office and War Office, and GHQ Middle East. The second step was to get permission to send certain agents not only to the Chetniks but to the Partisans...that was another three months, fighting, persuading, documents organizing, every type of work. The next three months was to get permission to send arms to the people that were Partisans as well as arms to the Chetniks. The next three months, four months about, was to get permission to send people to support the Partisans in Serbia, which was the area where Mihailovic was strongest. Previously we'd only been allowed to send them to other areas. The next stage - again for four or five months - was ... skewing [and] building up reports we were getting from the Chetniks and...from the Partisans - [to show there was] no activity against the enemy on the Chetnik side, [but] first-class activity on the Partisan side - [in order] to recall the mission from the Chetniks, and to give all support to the Partisans. And the last stage ... was to fight inside the organization [for]...political recognition of the Partisans."  (NOTE: U of Oxford 005http://oxford.academia.edu/Roderick Bailey pgs. 76-77) Apart from detailing his subversion and espionage Klugmann also seems to suggest that he was not working alone.

In the same conversation he continues to illustrate how they were also able to manipulate intelligence to favour the Partisans, "...he sought to filter the intelligence coming back to help ensure that an overall picture emerged that was favourable to the Yugoslav Partisans. In Bari, to where SOE's Yugoslav Section had started to relocate by the end of 1943, he organized other 'pro-Partisan people' in SOE and its sister agencies 'to act as a sieve...to see that what got back was satisfactory ...to bring propaganda to aid arms; intelligence to aid propaganda'. Klugmann also admitted to passing information to the Partisans 'as guidance on general tactics vis-a-vis the British'. He had helped, too, a representative of Soviet intelligence who had, it seems, approached him in Cairo and said that he had my name from before the war and could I do certain things for him." (NOTE: U of Oxford 2005http://oxford.academia.edu/Roderick Bailey pg. 76.)

However despite the evidence, Roderick Bailey as well as other historians like David Stafford, continue to brush away the impact men like Klugmann and others operating on behalf of the Soviets had on Balkan and Italian operations. They do not understand that the Communist recruitment scheme was intended to reach far beyond Yugoslavia. It did not entirely succeed because of the developing situation on the ground and the fact that they simply could not find the men to do their bidding. Many continue to cite non-existent signals intelligence as being the main reason Eden and Churchill dropped Mihailovic. Hinsley and Sir Llewellyn Woodward, author of British Foreign Policy in the Second World War clearly stated that, contrary to Bailey's claims, the Cairo staff had a far greater role in changing MI and Foreign Office opinion of Mihailovic which basically resulted in switching support to Tito. This involved the decision to send in recruits to Yugoslavia via Cairo to determine the situation themselves. "The outcome of this uncertainty was that by the end of March 1943 the government had decided to send officers from Cairo to contact the Partisans in Croatia and Slovenia and to defer the question whether to give support to Tito until they had reported." (NOTE: Woodward, op cit, Vol. III, pg. 290.) The evidence clearly shows, contrary to popular opinion, that it was their opinion, and not Sigint, that resulted in the switch to Tito. (Hinsley pg. 144) Their recruitment, infiltration and resulting information and opinion were completely controlled by Cairo/Bari and the likes of Klugmann who by mid 1943 was Yugoslav Section Intelligence Officer. The Communist recruits held organizer, W/T and translator positions within both Royalist and Communist Headquarters which they effectively used to cook information being sent out of Yugoslavia to favour Tito's Partisans. This is now proven. 

In a document from the Acting CD to Deputy CE dated 31 August 1945, they continue to downplay the evidence against Klugmann and continue in their attempts to hush things up. This despite the admittance by Klugmann himself that even after being discovered he desired to continue in his pro-Soviet activities, "I am confining my observations to his work in S.O.E., but his work with U.N.R.R.A. [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] followed precisely the same pattern, while he makes it clear he had gone to China for S.O.E., he would, to use his own words, 'do...what he had been trying to do in Yugoslavia, which was to switch official support from Chiang to the special areas.'" (NOTE: UKNA HS9/1645, SOE Service Record of James Klugmann. Document from Acting CD to Deputy CE, 31 August 1945.) This now opens a huge can of worms with regard to policies developed for dealing with the Communists in Asia. 

Long after the war,  Klugmann is further implicated by Soviet mole and member of the Cambridge Five John Cairncross,  "[In] April 1964 Anthony Blunt denounced Cairncross who is interviewed by [Arthur] Martin [MI5 investigator] in Rome. He confesses confirming he had been recruited by James Klugmann at Cambridge. Cairncross agreed to return to Britain to confront Klugmann who denied everything and refused to be interviewed by MI5." (NOTE LAC: RG24, File: Sir Roger Hollis and Igor Gouzenko Research, Penetration of Canadian Counterintelligence. R13880.)

While Klugmann admitted his role in the scheme as far as operations mounted from Cairo and Bari into Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are concerned, we have less evidence regarding Communist intentions by the likes of Klugmann for proposed operations into Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. This part of the Communist recruiting scheme seems to have failed. This was primarily to do the situation that developed on the ground over time in those countries and the difficulty in locating committed Communists in the Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian communities in Canada. While Italian Communists were recruited in small numbers, allied war policy soon saw Italy as a potential second front extending from North Africa. This is actually first hinted in the Italian recruiting scheme on 24 May 1943 when BSC in New York states to those at STS 103 that, "As discussed with you, please brief, provisional estimate of character and qualifications of each Italian, and outline of appropriate training syllabus. Would like this soon, although you may wish to wait until any indications emerging from Second Front scheme can be included." (NOTE: UKNA, HS8/89, Report America No.94, Recruiting Italians in Canada. To MT/W from HAB, from KW, New York. 24 May 1943. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-t.../OSS.html)

It is likely that with so few Italians being available in general, those trying to coerce some sort of control over these men were put off. The majority of those found were not suited for the type of secret intelligence work under consideration by the Communist recruiters. Most of these men ended up with the Americans who were also looking for less covert personnel for commando operations. As stated most of these men were veterans of the Abraham Lincoln and Washington Battalions of the International Brigade. Those not involved strictly with Secret Intelligence work went on to join the 2677th OSS Regiment established in Caserta Italy on 15 July 1944. This unit was supported from the air by the 2641st Special Group. They mounted several missions in Italy such as GINNY I and II as well as EAGLE whose primary purpose was to sabotage railway tunnels in Italy. For example, EAGLE, created by demolitions expert Lieutenant Stephen Hall, proposed the destruction of rail tunnels running through the Brenner Pass. This mission required the expertise of several men including those who could act as interpreters and who knew the area in question. Two of these men were, “Lieutenant Jiminez and Company D’s (2677th OSS Regiment) Captain Vince Lossowski, described by an OSS agent as ‘a man of complete confidence,’ had both fought in Spain for the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a group of Americans who battled against fascist dictator Francisco Franco. While they were not necessarily card-carrying communists, many Lincoln Brigade vets were also, ‘some of OSS’s most dedicated’ operatives. Their specialty: working with communist partisan movements in northern Italy while running OSS agents. Because of their prior associations with communism and their perceived collaboration with communist partisans, Jiminez and Lossowski would later find themselves in front of a congressional committee.” (NOTE: O’Donnell, Patrick.  The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Spy Mission of World War II. De Capo Press. 25 August 2009.) So suspicions of those recruited by BSC also existed within the OSS. This is not a surprise due to the revelations of those at the top of Donovan’s organization later to be confirmed as working for the Soviets. There was also the odd Italian Communist from Canada who went to the OSS to operate as Operational Group (OG) Commandos (US version of the British Special Air Service) with the Communist Garibaldi Brigade in northern Italy.  It is typical to find, as in the quote above, some sort of denial by the volunteers themselves and authors alike, to attempt to diminish their Communism. Why is it necessary to state that,” While they were not necessarily card-carrying communists,” unless you want to diminish their connection. This hardly sounds definitive and is an obvious attempt to gloss over their possible political convictions. This is vital in getting to the truth of why these men were recruited and why they were operating with Italian Communist groups in northeastern Italy under the overall control of the Soviet Union and directly operating under Tito’s Partisans. It is obvious due to finding, “themselves in front of a congressional committee,” that there was suspicion of their recruitment, missions and their overall role within them.

In addition, it is doubtful that those overseeing the Communist recruitment scheme foresaw that the bulk of the political groups in Italy would decide to work together in a unified resistance. It is obvious that, like their US OSS counterparts, the Canadian Communist recruits were to harness the influence of Italian Communist groups in Northern Italy in order to link them with Communist forces that they predicted would ultimately be moving west out of Yugoslavia. Since most of the operational records of the Italian Canadian Communists recruited are still closed, we will not be able to look further into their exact role behind enemy lines once they got overseas. However even in the few records that are available, details of their specific role are either sparse or non-existent. In the known cases, their records simply state that they were sent into the Italian Partisans. However, unlike in Yugoslavia, the Italian Partisans were not strictly Communists. So it was necessary to dig further in SOE policy records for Italy to come to the conclusion that, like many of the OSS recruits above, they were sent specifically to units of the Italian Communist Garibaldi Brigade and other rogue Communist groups operating in Northern Italy.

In Greece there was the Communist EAM and its ELAS. Almost from the get go these groups made obvious their true colours and intent. On 13 October 1943, in response to the murder of British/New Zealand Liaison Officer Lt. Hubbard and the humiliation of a member of his team by members of the Evritanian ELAS band by General Wilson [C-in-C M.E.F.] who demanded justice by the execution of the man responsible also decreed that, “Any Greek molesting, attacking or harming any member of an Allied Mission or personnel under their immediate protection will be treated and dealt with after the war as war criminals. In the event of effective action not being taken to make such attacks impossible, Commanders themselves will be held personally responsible and dealt with in a similar manner." (NOTE HS5/148 Balkan Policy. 15 October 1943 from Wilson to General Sarafis, Commander ELAS Forces and EAM Central Committee.)

The situation was summed up in this October 1943 assessment sent to Churchill from his Middle East representative, "The political considerations are these. The only militant guerilla efforts of any consequence [based on Force 133/ SOE Cairo reports] in either Greece or Yugoslavia is Republican at best and Communist at worst. To stimulate and increase guerilla efforts in Greece and/or Yugoslavia we would have to arm and supply these left Wing guerilla forces to an extent that would enable them to dominate their respective countries militarily and so politically as soon as the Germans are thrown out or go out. If this happens, then on the present outlook there is but little chance of the monarchy surviving in either country, but there is a considerable chance of Communist Governments. Indeed, if the Germans walked out of the Balkans tomorrow there would be a good chance of successful left wing coup to seize power in both Greece and Yugoslavia. And so it appears to me that our military policy ( to exert the maximum possible pressure on the enemy ) and out political policy (to do nothing to jeopardize the return of the monarchies) are fundamentally opposed… So that I incline to believe that we should not let up our pressure on the enemy in the Balkans, but we should not increase it in the coming months to any substantial extent for formidable building up of the left wing guerillas. In meantime, we should endeavor to build up right wing elements by all means in our power. This policy will contain at least the present German strength in the Balkans and will not result in our being faced with an impossibly difficult political situation if the Germans are forced to evacuate the Balkans before we are ready." NOTE THAT PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE REDACTED. (NOTE: UKNA, HS5/148, for the Prime Minister from Minister of State. From Mideast to Air Ministry, 3 October 1943. ) So any assistance provided by rogue elements within British Intelligence to these leftist elements was very concerning. 

As for the others located under the Communist recruitment scheme, nine Hungarians were ultimately selected with eight inserted by MPH Section (Hungary) direct by parachute or by parachute and then by foot across the border from Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. One of these men Steve Mate was killed in a mysterious plane crash on 17 April 1944 over the English Channel before being sent on operations. He was lost along with a cavalcade of other top British, US, Czech and Polish Eastern European Intelligence personnel while travelling to Egypt aboard a Vickers Warwick aircraft BV.247 piloted by Canadian F/O Arthur Gavel. Initial reports stated it was a mid-air explosion while it was later (apparently) revealed as a mid-air collision with an enemy aircraft. One does not need too much of an imagination to arrive at the possibility that it may not have been enemy action or an accident. The enemy plane the Warwick supposedly collided with has never been found or recorded as missing in enemy records. (Note: Service Record of F/O Arthur Douglas Gavel RCAF Pilot of Warwick Aricraft killed in crash and http://www.rafcommands.com/forum/showthr...5-SQ/page3 ) This "accident" occurred only three months after Captain Ormond Uren of MPH Section was arrested for spying for the Soviets. 

A policy paper written by SOE’s Hungarian Section titled Current and Future Operations, clearly indicates that not only was the CO of D/H Section Major Basil Davidson suspected of being a Communist sympathizer, but the entire effort of the section was to empower the Communist Partisans in Yugoslavia and Hungary. (NOTE: Basil Davidson http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2010/07/14/jer...davidson/) It clarifies that Force 133 had supreme control over “direct attack” operations into Hungary but later alludes to a distrust developing between them and MPH Section HQ at SO London. Remember that a shakeup had just occurred within this HQ after the Springhall incident and the discovery that Captain Uren was working for the Soviets. While this drama was taking place in London,  “Since the summer of 1943 Force 133 has been trying to work into Hungary through Jugoslavia.”Establishing themselves among Tito’s communists the secret plan to engulf Eastern Europe in Communism took its next step. Force 133 now wanted to use MPH Section resources to being their Communist infiltration of Hungary. Initially an idea was put forward on 15 October 1943 to divert German forces from the Russian front line by causing a war between Hungary and Romania, “They would do this by dropping in eight parties along the border in Romania and, at the appointed time, have them open fire on Hungarian border guards. The plan was to be cleared with Moscow.”(NOTE:HS5/148 from D/Plans Mideast to Air Ministry, 15 October 1943. TOO 150835)

This did not happen and SOE had to come up with another plan. However friction between Force 133 and MPH Section developed over proposed operations in Hungary.  Davidson mainly sought the supply of Tito’s Partisans situated along the border with Hungary in order to get support in the form of supplies and men to mount ‘direct attack’ operations into Hungary, “Since December 1943, in accordance with C.D.’s directive, Force 133 has been solely entrusted with the ‘direct attack’ on Hungary, while ‘high level’ approaches were handled by SOE London. The occupation of Hungary, and the disintegration of the ‘Surrender Group’ without resistance, put an end to plans based on ‘high level approaches’. ‘Direct attack’ will in one sense be more difficult, owing to increased security precautions, but will in another sense be easier, owing to increased national hostility to the Germans and their Hungarian helpers. The operational party SAVANA has been in N.E. Jugoslavia since the autumn of 1943, and is led by Major [Basil] Davidson, who worked for SOE inside Hungary up to 1941, and knows the Hungarian background and language. In order that Major Davidson could make progress in the penetration of Hungary, it was necessary above all that supplies should be dropped on a generous scale to the Partisan HQ which was his base, both in order to win full cooperation of the Partisan leaders and to make feasible the occupation and holding of ‘free territory’ further north, as an advances base for SOE work. Inadequate aircraft were available, weather was bad, and SAVANA area was given a low priority in comparison with most parts of Yugoslavia. Repeated efforts by the Hungarian section in Cairo could not obtain sorties for SAVANA until February 1944. The replacement for Major Davidson did not arrive until March.” The men that Davidson hoped to recruit and train were to be found in Hungary itself, “When Hungary was occupied it was hoped that Hungarians might, individually or in small groups, desert across the Jugoslav frontier to join the Partisans. Such deserters would be useful for re-infiltration as SOE agents. There have, however, been no such desertions. It was felt that they might be encouraged if TITO could be persuaded to issue and appeal to Hungarians to join in his struggle against the common German enemy, stressing the presence with his forces of British officers. The same suggestion was put forward by Davidson. Before asking Brig. Maclean to take action, we referred the matter to SOE London, which has not answered our telegrams although a month has passed. When this HQ was reorganized in March, it was expected that Force 133 would continue to handle operations into Hungary from Jugoslavia and that the Hungarian Section in Cairo, which has most experience of this work, would be included under the Danubian Group of Force 133, maintaining a forward link in Bari to liaise with Force 266. It has now been decided, however, to take Hungarian work away from Force 133 altogether and to give it to Maryland [Mission], where it will be run by the former Hungarian Section from London, who formerly handled the ‘high level approaches.’” (NOTE: UKNA, HS4/86 Hungary Cairo Headquarters Reports and Appreciations of SOE Activities Political and Economic Situation. Hungary No. 4 . Current and Future Operations. 3 May 1944.) One has to wonder, if the appeal of Communism was apparently so great, how come no one opted to cross over from Hungary and fight with Tito and his British Liaison Officers? It is very likely any prospective resistance fighters saw through this scheme and realized that the effort was not to establish a safe base for a Hungarian resistance to fight the Nazi’s but to build a safe base to buildup Communist forces within Hungary to aid in their takeover of the country.

To aid in this endeavor, the remaining Canadian Communist Hungarian recruits trained at STS 103 were sent in. In addition to agents being parachuted in, three cross over bases were established in Yugoslavia, “ At the time of handing over to MARYLAND, it was intended that there should be three bases in Jugoslavia for penetration of Hungary: (a) Frushka Gora (b) Slavonia © Medjumurje The first of these areas is now served by Major Davidson, who has with him two Hungarians (Lt.Mark and Lt. Wood) [These are code names] and will probably shortly receive two more (Sgt. Durovecz and Sgt. Magyar) [Both Communist Hungarian Canadians trained at STS 103]. The second area has two BLO’s concerned solely with liaison duties with the Jugoslav Partisans, A party is being sent shortly by MARYLAND to this area to penetrate Hungary. The third area has at present no BLO, but it is expected that an officer from Force 266 will shortly be established at 10 Corps HQ of the Yugoslav Partisans from which base penetration via Medjumurje should be possible. It is still hoped that some work into Hungary may still be done from Istanbul, which will receive its directions from MARYLAND, while remaining administratively under Force 133.” (NOTE: UKNA, HS4/86 Hungary Cairo Headquarters Reports and Appreciations of SOE Activities Political and Economic Situation. Hungary No. 4 . Current and Future Operations. 3 May 1944.) The remainder of the Communist recruits from Canada followed Durovecz and Magyar, however all arrived in the field too late for them to change anything either way. Before long, all were captured. Those captured did not escape or were released until the Soviets were already battling for Budapest. In conclusion it must be stated that one of the Canadians, Sergeant Joseph Gelleny was not a Communist but volunteered simply to fight Fascism.

Then there was Romania and Bulgaria. With the influence of rogue members of British Intelligence already covered, Bulgaria and Romania also became a concern for British military leaders. They had their suspicions there as well. However the overall situation in Romania and the man placed in charge (de Chastelain) limited any Communist hanky-panky emanating from British Intelligence, "It is suggested, provided you agree, that control of SOE activities in Rumania and Bulgaria should be exercised by AFHQ by issue of policy and operation directives concerning their countries direct to Commander Force 133 situated in Cairo. The following are the reasons. It is felt here that operations including SOE activities in Rumania and Bulgaria are closely connected and will become increasingly so as Russian advance in S.E. Europe develops with those in Hungary. It would have been preferable therefore if control of SOE operations in these three countries could have been dealt with by the same HQ. Unfortunately for the following reasons this is not practicable. (a) Congestion of signals traffic to Bari rules out for the moment the transfer of the Rumanian and Bulgarian country sections of Force 133 to Bari. (b) Most of the intelligence coming from these two countries passes through Istanbul to Cairo. On the other hand, it seems likely that in the event of a major Russian offensive in SE Europe, urgent decisions of a far reaching nature may have to be made at short notice if Bulgaria and or Rumania make final attempts to get out of the war. These decisions will have to be made by me. It therefore would be simpler that control of operations in those countries should be exercised by me direct with Commander Force 133 rather than interposing C-in-C M.E.F. [General Sir Bernard Paget] and an extra link. For political advice Steel, political adviser Force 133, has under present arrangements a direct responsibility to the FO (Op) (?) for these two countries referring to Lord Moyne [Deputy and later Resident Minister of State in Cairo] for decisions that can be given locally. Under the new set-up he will become responsible to and receive local guidance from [Harold] MacMillan [UK High Commissioner for the Advisory Council for Italy]. MacMillan, Lord Moyne  and C-in-C M.E. F. have been consulted on this matter. All have agreed to the arrangements proposed and Moyne considers from a political viewpoint changeover can be made after conclusion of current Rumanian negotiations. Your authority is requested for the necessary changes. (NOTE: UKNA, SOE Policy Romania. Important from Freedom to Air Ministry Special Signals Office AMSSO ( For British Chiefs of Staff) Also to Mid East HQ and MAAF, 7 June 1944, signed General Wilson.) 

There was only one operation into Romania under Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Gardyne de Chastelain dubbed AUTONOMOUS. The three man team was sent on a diplomatic mission charged with linking pro-Allied political leader Luliu Maniu, a past Prime Minister, with SOE Cairo/MO4 Headquarters. However the mission soon morphed into a bid to get leader Ion Victor Antonescu on the side of the Allies and to rebuke Hitler. When this did not happen, they prompted King Michael to mount a coup. This occurred on 23 August 1944 and Romania joined the war against Germany. This particular operation was in no way linked to any hanky panky with Communists or the Soviets. In fact de Chastelain got himself into hot water at the end of the war due to his very frank radio communications regarding Soviet involvement in Romania. Although de Chastelain was one of the British recruiters working for BSC he was only able to locate three suitable men in Canada. However the AUTONOMOUS mission ultimately made any future operations in Romania redundant. None of these men were ever sent in on operations.

With the conclusion of the war in sight, the true colours of the USSR were starkly revealed. It was now obvious that the wartime propaganda praising the USSR had to be recalled from the psyche of the western people. With Stalin now reneging on his promise of allowing the people of Eastern Europe to chose their own destiny, the British Ambassador to the USSR stated that, "We must show the Russians that we intended to defend our interests...Sir Archibald Clark Kerr [Ambassador to the Soviet Union] and M. F.K. Roberts [Charge d' affaires at Moscow] agreed that as a first step in defending our interests, we ought to stop the adulation of the Soviet Union which had been going on for the past three years in Great Britain, and which misled the Russians as well as our own people." (NOTE:  Woodward, LLewellyn Sir, History of the Second World War, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Chapter XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia from capitulation of the Yugoslav army to the formation of a United Yugoslav Government in March 1945, Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1962. pages 517) As stated Stalin and the USSR were over bloated in their victory. However without the strong backing of the United States, Churchill could do nothing." The Foreign Office was not aware of another possibility, though they did not regard it as likely; the Russians might have come to the conclusion that Great Britain would no longer be strong enough to defend British interests, and that, in view of the unwillingness of the Americans to commit themselves to further intervention in Europe, the balance of power would soon fall on the Russian side...He [Churchill] realized that Great Britain could not check the Russians without American support, and that any effective resistance would have to be made quickly, that is to say, while Anglo-American military strength was at its maximum...if the Russians failed to honour their agreements at Yalta, the Anglo-American armies would maintain their ground to the limit of their advance." (IBID pg 518) Unfortunately after Presidents Roosevelt's death, his Vice President Harry Truman was sworn in on 12 April 1945. Truman was a novice at diplomacy and his approach and policies dealing with Stalin and the Communist Chinese, known as the Truman Doctrine, basically handed Eastern Europe, China and large portions of S.E. Asia to the Communists. One begins to wonder about the sympathies of Roosevelt and Truman? Both Atom bomb and missile secrets were lost to the Soviets under their watch and they even allowed the USSR to reverse engineer B-29 Aircraft that had landed in Soviet territory which were impounded under the Soviet-Japanese Pact. This became the Tupolev 4. This becoming the only Soviet aircraft capable of carrying their first Atom Bomb. Remember it is confirmed that the Soviets had moles in all aspects of western Atomic projects as early as 1941. It is a known fact that both Presidents were told of Communist/Soviet moles operating within their governments and neither did anything about it until they were forced to. (Note: Andrew, Christopher and Mitrokhin, Vasili. The Sword and the Shield, The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books, 1999.) It was their ultimate actions that led directly to the Korean conflict and the wasteful war in Vietnam. The simple answer of continued support for Nationalist China could have prevented this waste.

Back in Canada, Sir William Stephenson wrote to Norman Robertson thanking his organization for all their help and praising their “sympathy” and “understanding” with regard to their operations in the America’s, "I think it very appropriate that my final duty as director of this organization, which is about to be disbanded, should be to express formal acknowledgement of the very deep obligations which we owe to you and the Department of External Affairs. The task with which British Security Co-Ordination was entrusted at the time of its foundation six years ago was not easy to fulfill. It would certainly have proved far harder had we not been able to rely at all times on your whole-hearted support. Indeed, there is no doubt in my mind that the generous and courageous assistance which you afforded us was the mainstay of our whole recruiting program in Canada and that without it little if anything in that important part of our work could have been accomplished. When I say this I have particularly in mind your action in assuming responsibility for allowing us to establish our secret training camp in Canada...we made no request in vain, and all the members of your Department with whom we had dealings went out of their way to help us and showed a consistent sympathy with, and understanding of, our problems, reflective of your own attitude..." (NOTE LAC RG 25, Volume 3212, File 5357-400, British Security Co-ordination Center, New York, Organization of. Letter from W.S. Stephenson Director BSC to the Honourable Norman A. Robertson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 13 June 1946.) 

However with the pile of evidence above, one can’t help but be suspicious of Stephenson’s organization. Like the RCMP, what was BSC being told about these arrangements? It is very doubtful that SOE Cairo could have coerced this recruitment scheme through BSC without them knowing all the fine details. Would they also not in turn tip off SOE and SIS Headquarters in London? It is hard to imagine Stephenson not knowing. However it is possible that part of the answer may be found in suspicions regarding his Deputy Colonel Charles Howard “Dick” Ellis. Like many others included in this SOE Cairo scheme, he is also suspected of working for the Soviets. Michael Lees brings forward allegations made against Ellis which are included in several published works, two in particular being Chapman Pincher's Their Trade is Treachery from Sidgwick & Jackson in 1981 and Peter Wright's Spy Catcher from Viking published in 1987. Ellis is accused of being a German spy who was blackmailed into working for the Soviets. It must also be included that Ellis temporarily worked with SOE in Cairo. It just so-happens that one of his bosses in London was Soviet mole Kim Philby. It has been suggested that Philby covered for Ellis.

During the investigations of the FLUENCY committee in 1966  which was set up in Britain to delve into Soviet penetration of their intelligence services it came to the conclusion that, “Ellis had been a paid agent of the Germans up to 1940, and that he might have served the Soviets from as early as 1920.” They interrogated Ellis and he admitted that he did spy for Germany and the USSR in 1939 but tried to cover up his meeting with Philby which some suggest was regarding his pre-knowledge of the defection of Vladimir Petrov in 1954. Ellis’s actions and movements during that time suggest that he was afraid that Petrov could finger him as working for the Soviets. The conclusion of the investigation stated that, “Ellis had been a Soviet agent for about 30 years – first for the GRU, later KGB and that he had spied for Germany.” (NOTE: Trahair, R.C.S. and Miller, Robert L. Enigma Books, Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Organizations. 18 October 2013.) Only after a review of the investigation did the CIA state some reservation about the outcome. However when pressed, the Thatcher Government could not deny his guilt. It is very possible that the CIA simply did not want their beginnings tarnished by such a revelation.

It was not as if Soviet penetration of British Intelligence was a big shock. Many working with them either had their own evidence or suspicions. For example Michael Lees records this comment during an interview with Tito's liaison officer to the British Vladimir Velebit who states that the recruiting of Canadian Communist Croats was by "leftist elements in the British Intelligence Service." (Note: Rape of Serbia pg. 41) In the autumn of 1981, Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko was interviewed by journalist and war correspondent William Stevenson. Gouzenko recalls that there was a Soviet agent working at the top of British Intelligence however he only knew him as ELLI. Was this an agent’s coded identification? Was it based on the name Ellis? Stevenson then records that during his interview, "Gouzenko asks [Stevenson] if Charles Ellis was married to a Russian, served in Russia and lived in Paris before the war, the answers are yes and Gouzenko says 'then it's possible that ELLI was Ellis’". (NOTE LAC: RG24, File: Sir Roger Hollis and Igor Gouzenko Research, Peter Worthington, Hollis and Ellis. R13880.) Also, in an article published in the New York Times on 22 January 1984 titled, On the Trail of a Mole by James Bamford it repeats that Gouzenko had hinted that Ellis was ELLI while he was holed up at the old STS 103 camp in Whitby, Ontario in 1945.  

The suspicions and infiltration of British Intelligence in the US did not end there. In addition to Ellis, there was also Cedric Henning Belfrage at BSC who states in Stafford’s book that they were, "looking out for possible recruits for parachute missions and were supposed to get acquainted with what we were recruiting for." (NOTE: Stafford, David. Camp X, Canada's School for Secret Agents 1941-1945. Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986. Chapter 7, pg195.) It would be revealed in 1946 that Belfrage was a Soviet mole during the war and was charged by the United States in 1953 with spying. He is directly implicated by the US Signals Intelligence Service findings as part of the VENONA Project. The records regarding Belfrage were not opened until 2015.

However in that same year author John Simkin, in his updated article titled The Problems of Appearing in a BBC Documentary dated 17 September 2015 published on Spartacus Educational, claims that Belfrage was not a Soviet mole but a British double agent.  This, he explains, is why Belfrage was giving information to the Soviets via a member of the Communist Party of the USA Victor Jerome. It was being done, “with a view to finding out what I could about Communists and Russian politics.” (NOTE: Simkin, John. Spartacus Blog, The Problems of Appearing in a BBC Documentary, September 1997, updated 17 September 2015.)

Belfrage said that in order to get this information he, “supplied him [Jerome] with information about Scotland Yard surveillances and also with some documents relative to the Vichy Government in France, which were of a highly confidential nature with respect to their origin but which contained information of no value whatsoever.”(IBID)

However after reading the article it is clear that Simkin is not aware of several vitally important facts. Firstly, BSC had a firm mandate and this neither involved Soviet espionage or the turning and running of double agents. A British Soviet counter-espionage unit did not exist until the formation of MI6 Section IX. This was not until April 1943. Once this section got going it was soon run by a Soviet mole named Kim Philby. As for double agents, this was the job of John Cecil Masterman
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25-08-2017, 03:26 PM (Последња измена: 25-08-2017 03:34 PM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
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RE: SOE
However after reading the article it is clear that Simkin is not aware of several vitally important facts. Firstly, BSC had a firm mandate and this neither involved Soviet espionage or the turning and running of double agents. A British Soviet counter-espionage unit did not exist until the formation of MI6 Section IX. This was not until April 1943. Once this section got going it was soon run by a Soviet mole named Kim Philby. As for double agents, this was the job of John Cecil Masterman at MI6 and his Double Cross (XX) Committee. Belfrage did not belong to either XX or Section IX. Simkin is actually confusing efforts in North America to run turned Axis agents as part of Section XX operations with the statement made by Belfrage. One famous example being GARBO, a Spaniard whose real name was Juan Pujol Garcia. After the Spanish Civil War he hated both fascism and communism. His German code name was Arabel and they thought so highly of his work he was awarded the Iron Cross. Masterman states himself, “ Agent No.4 [Gibraltarian code named CHAMILLUS], who up to the time of OVERLORD had been one of GARBO’s main sources of information and who had been compelled through his excess of zeal in the search for news to desert the N.A.A.F.I [Navy,  Army and Air Force Institute] , ultimately ‘escaped’ to Canada. Here he made contact with Agent No.5 [Venezuelan code named MOONBEAM] and set himself up as a wireless operator for Agent No.5’s network. With wireless facilities, the Canadian organization greatly appreciated in German eyes. They provided a highly complicated security plan for transmissions and a very high grade cipher. Wireless communications of the organization worked not only to London, but also directly between Canada and Madrid. Thus a weapon was prepared which could be used if required for deception against the Japanese or for counterespionage purposes against Germany in the New World, if a postwar Germany attempted to continue or inaugurate espionage activities there.” (NOTE: Masterman, John C. The Double-Cross System, In the War of 1939 to 1945. Page 173.  Yale University Press,  1972.) Obviously since these XX operations were within North America, BSC the FBI and RCMP had to be carefully briefed on agents, as well as nominal agents, to prevent misunderstandings. No such operations existed in relation to the Soviet Union.

Secondly, by 1942 there was no need for Soviet double agents as intelligence information was being shared between Britain and the USSR. If the British desired to hand misinformation to the Soviets, they could have handed it to them in official correspondence.  Thirdly, BSC, the RCMP and FBI, had already established a very cordial and I should say illegal relationship with all ethnic branches of the Comintern and their Communist Parties of the USA and Canada. They already employed several top members as recruiters and recruits as of 1941. While they may not have known the actual name, despite what NKVD dispatches state, it is very likely the Soviets were already well aware of the existence of a BSC type organization.

Thirdly, it is noted by Simkin and confirmed by Elizabeth Bentley and VENONA revelations that Belfrage handed a SIS or BSC manual on the handling of agents over to Jerome. This is not something a double agent would be given by BSC to entice the trust of Soviet agents. It is also very likely this was an actual BSC manual which Belfrage would have had access to. By 1944 BSC had produced and printed a library of their training material. If this is the case it also makes it likely that the Soviets were aware of BSC.

Unlike his colleagues who refused to comment during their interrogations, it appears as though Belfrage simply thought he could talk his way out of this predicament by simply stating something that was almost impossible to confirm. Obviously no member of BSC was asked to come forward to corroborate his claim. This is because they would likely never find anyone that had not already showed up on the lists of personnel singled out by defectors like Elizabeth Bentley.

Even Simkin’s attitude is odd. After berating those pointing to the guilt of Belfrage, he then goes on in an attempt to excuse Belfrages own admittance that he was a radical with pro-Communist and anti-Capitalist views. Apparently the Depression era was tough on Belfrage. I know my ancestors suffered as well during the Depression however none thought Communism was the answer. It is evident that most of the worlds population did not see Communism as the answer either.

Simkin then goes on to claim that the BBC is a defender of the “right wing” stating that they, “enjoy smearing socialists who bravely fought fascism before it was acceptable to do so.” (IBID) As a Canadian I can only think of one greater left wing propaganda outlet and that is the similarly tax payer funded CBC.  To quote KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, “Just listen with attention to the ideological nuances on Radio 4, BBC television, and the BBC World Service, and you will realize that communism is not a dying creed.” (NOTE: Gordievsky, Oleg. The Red Service, The Daily Telegraph, 3 August 2005.) To state that the BBC is “right wing” is where Simkin lost all credibility in his defense of Belfrage. The case put forward by Simkin that Belfrage was a double agent holds no water. 

Then, in order to keep your head spinning with the possible implications, there were also Belfrage's American colleagues Duncan Chaplin Lee who was confidential advisor to the head of the Coordinator of Information /Office of Strategic Services William Donovan and OSS staffer Donald Niven Wheeler. The evidence against Lee has also been disputed despite the fact that he was fingered by Elizabeth Bentley. It was also Bentley that identified Wheeler as passing information to her via the Victor Perlo group. However many, like William Remington, turned the tables and sued his accusers. Bentley was only exonerated after Remington divorced his wife and she provided the evidence needed to prove he was a member of the CPUSA. Remington was a top official in the War Production Board. Bentley's record remains impressive. 

It was the bombshell defections in 1945 of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and Elizabeth Bentley, an organizer of the Communist Party of the United States/GRU agent that struck terror into those being suspected. This resulted in shake downs within the US and Canadian Government as well as their police and intelligence services. However, while whistles were being blown, those implicated within top positions within Western Governments had the power to cover up these revelations. Sadly this is the information that remains inaccessible for that very reason. 

The implications to history as we know it and what we have been taught by like minded Socio-Communists overseeing our nations educational system and history  are tremendous. This article has not even scratched the surface of Soviet espionage in the west and its influences on the direction of our society and our politics. It is not a stretch to state that approx 90% or more of the records covering Communist espionage in the west remain closed. In particular to Canada, the actual evidence used in several Royal Commissions, RCMP investigations as well as corresponding Cabinet papers covering top permanent bureaucrats and other Liberal appointee's

British Secret intelligence of WW2
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26-08-2017, 01:31 AM (Последња измена: 26-08-2017 02:17 AM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #26
RE: SOE
На почетку другог светског рата популарни историју осврнути тај Британије и његов Комонвелт је имао само један непријатељ. Тај непријатељ је савез са силама Осовине. Међутим како се ретко спомиње чињеница да је комунизам био непријатеља од западне силе дуго пре него што Алијанса оса почела да се формирају и давно пре Мусолини и Хитлер постиже снагу. Безброј документараца, популарне филмове и друге медије намерно запоставља обавијестити своје потрошаче да комунистички манифест, у 1848 објавио Карл Маркс и Фридрих Енгелс, до више од 70 година старији од сваког осе жељу за потпуну глобалну контролу. У ствари, без овог објављени мандат комунистичке глобалне контроле, оси никада није би постојала. Стога популаран историчари треба да бити суочени са чињеницом да је једна од првих акција од сила осовине био да потпишу споразум против Коминтерне новембра 1936.

На почетку Другог светског рата популарна историја наводи да су Британија и њена Комонвелта имали само једног непријатеља. Тај непријатељ је био савез снаге Осовине. Међутим, оно што се ријетко помиње јесте чињеница да је комунизам био непријатељ западних сила дуго пре него што се Акис Алијанса почела формирати и дуго прије него што су Мусолини и Хитлер постигли власт. Бројни документарни филмови, популарни филмови и други медији намерно занемарују да информишу своје потрошаче да Комунистички манифесто, објављен 1848. године од стране Карл Марка и Фридрих Енгелса, предаје више од 70 година било какву жељу за осовином за потпуну глобалну контролу. Заправо, без овог објављеног мандата комунистичке глобалне контроле, Осовина никада не би постојала. Због тога се популарним историчарима треба суочити са чињеницом да је један од првих чинова овласти осовине био потписивање споразума против коминтерна из новембра 1936. године.

Стварањем прве комунистичке државе 1919, лидери руска Совјетска федеративна Социјалистичка Република Лењин и Троцки је одмах стављен у представи планове да се инфилтрирате западног друштва да укључите горњу заказаних обавеза у оквиру њихове владе, високог образовања, војном и индустријском комплексу. Ово се поклопила са Москве под контролом успостављање западне комунистичке странке.

Са формирањем прве комунистичке државе 1919. године, лидери Руске совјетске федеративне социјалистичке републике, Лењина и Троцког, одмах су уложили у планове да се инфилтрирају у западно друштво да укључе главне састанке у оквиру својих влада, високог образовања, војног и индустријског комплекса. То се поклопило са московским надзором западних комунистичких партија.

Изабрани агенти од Коминтерне појачани постојеће Социјалистичке и комунистичке групе широм света за успостављање ове комунистичке странке. Истовремено , са пуно остало нагиње политичке странке (рада у УК, демократи у сад и либералне у Канади) широм света, одлучују да препозна СССР као суверену државу, они одмах употребити и трговинске делегације, политички суседне и амбасаде као база за шпијунажу. Њихов примарни циљ је био двоструки. Први агенти ГРУ, НКВД, НКГБ, ОГПУ, КГБ-а итд., који се представља као чланови ове канцеларије, контактирао чланова те Коминтерне комунистичке странке и њихове симпатизере да бисте почели инфилтрирати се у горњој образовних институција. Они су тражили и слично малоуман ко има потенцијал да постане главни мислилаца који су имали способност да се инфилтрира у левом Наслањање политичких странака, трајно бирократског апарата и научних и индустријска истраживања. Ово није само укључене земље као што су Немачке, Велике Британије и Сједињених Држава али такође Канаде. У ствари Канаде од стране совјетске интелигенције се сматрала лака мета. Канадски пасоши су редовно некада совјетских агената у пратњи музицара већ као 1920-тим.

Одабрани агенти Коминтерне потакнули су постојеће социјалистичке и комунистичке групе широм света како би успоставили ове комунистичке партије. Истовремено, са многим левичарским политичким странкама (Лабор у Великој Британији, Демократској странци у САД-у и Либералу у Канади) широм света који су одлучили да признају СССР као суверену државу, одмах су искористили трговинске делегације, политичке легатације и амбасаде као Базе за шпијунажу. Њихов примарни циљ био је двоструки. Први заступници ГРУ-а, НКВД-а, НКГБ-а, ОГПУ-а, КГБ-а итд., Који су се представљали као чланови ових канцеларија, контактирали су чланове ових коминтерних партија и њихове симпатизере како би започели инфилтрирање врхунских образовних институција. Тражили су сличне особе које су имале потенцијал да постану врхунски мислиоци, који су такође имали могућност да се инфилтрирају у леве нагибане политичке партије, трајну бирократију и научна и индустријска истраживања. Ово нису обухватале само земље попут Немачке, Британије и Сједињених Држава, али и Канаде. У ствари, Совјетска обавештајна служба сматра да је Канада мекана мета. Совјетски агенти редовно користе канадске пасоше да прешу свијетле већ у 1920-тим.

Најуспешнији објеката за регрутовање аутохтоне агенти за СССР били универзитетима као Цамбридге, Оxфорд, Харвард и ни са Универзитета у Торонту. Већина људи имају чуо пет Цамбридге међутим то углавном нисам чуо ове људе, и њихове саучеснике, директно импактираних предратног и ратног политику и радње које су извршене од стране владајуће канадска либерална влада под Wиллиам Лyон Мацкензие Кинг.

Најуспешнија места за регрутовање аутохтоних агената за СССР су универзитети попут Кембриџа, Оксфорда, Харварда и чак Универзитета у Торонту. Већина људи је чула за Кембриџ пет, међутим већина људи није чуо да су ови људи и њихови саучесници директно утицали на предратну и ратну политику и радње које је владајућа канадска либерална влада имала под Виллиамом Лионом Мацкензие Кингом.

Са одређеном референцом прице да се споро одвијају, помогли су регрутујем комунистичких агената у Америку са стварањем од британску интелигенција посебну обуку школу у Канади, познатијем као камп X. У време када Британија и даље имао је назад уз зид и Сједињене Државе су биле и даље неутрална, Британска интелигенција нису смислили отварања посебну обуку у у Америци. Наведите неке ово је првобитно требало да буде повратак планирати Британци требали су бити окупиран како год да је тајминг тих разговора се да је ово мало вероватно.

Са посебним освртом на причу која ће се развијати, они су помогли регрутовању комунистичких агената у Америци са стварањем британске службе за специјалну обуку у Канади која се популарно назива "Камп Кс". У вријеме када је Британија и даље имала своју супругу на зиду и Сједињене Државе су и даље биле неутралне, Британска обавештајна служба је размишљала о отварању Специјалне школе за обуку у Америци. Неки тврде да је ово првобитно било намијењено плану повратка за Британце ако би их нападнули, али тај распоред ових дискусија то чини врло мало вјероватним.

До почетка 1941 Луфтвафе покушај да обезбеди ваздух супериорност пропао и Британија се борила-Кристоф бије подударање у Северној Африци. Такође су имали јаке силе у Грчкој и на Блиском истоку. Не , оригинални дискусије око изградње посебну обуку у Канади су скоро у потпуности на основу што се догађало, или како је предвидео да се деси, на Балкану. Није било до априла који је напао Југославију и у мају када Грецо-британске снаге су избачени из Грчке. Било је то прије ове британске пропустима који су озбиљни разговори је почео када је у питању успостављање школу за британске интелигенције у Канади. Главни циљ је био да бисте пронашли имиграната у у Америци је то могао бити тренирани и инфилтрирала натраг у њихове земље порекла. Њихов циљ је био да се придружи са локалним покретом отпора, изграде тај отпор и онда постави операције против окупатором.

У почетку, ово је била помоћи спречавању или успорити аванс оси преко Југославије и Грчке у Турској и на Блиском истоку. Један од главних људи у седишту специјалне операције извршни у Каиру додељена за развој политике о операцијама на Балкану је био пуковник Wиллиам „Билл” Баилеy. Направио је ову тачку која је одјека код Цхурцхилл у погледу будућих операција у Југославији, „... Шта је у ствари је потребно је цоунтербласт оса политику „завади па владај” и осе обећање о „Новом поретку” који це диктирати јединство циља између организације и фанатизам од стране појединаца. Након помне СОЕ специјалисти у балканским пословима стигао на закључак да концепт БАЛКАНСКЕ јединство може пружити такав један цоунтербласт”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС5/146, СОЕ Балкан број 2. Највиши ниво планирања - Истанбул ХQ - планирање и организацију активности СОЕ - опште 1940-41. СОЕ политике за ЈУГОИСТОЧНУ Европу, Д.П.А. папир бр. 2.

Прво је то било да помогне спречавању или успоравању напредовања Аке преко Југославије и Грчке у Турску и на Блиски исток. Један од главних људи у Извршном штабу специјалних операција у Каира који је задужен да развија политику о операцијама на Балкану био је пуковник Вилијам "Билл" Баилеи. Он је ставио ову тачку која је саслушала Черчила у погледу будућих операција у Југославији "... Оно што је заправо потребно јесте контраобласт на политику Осовине" подијелити и владати "и обећање Окса" новог реда "који ће Командовање јединство сврхе између организација и фанатизма од стране појединаца. После пажљивог разматрања стручњака СОЕ у балканским пословима дошло је до закључка да концепт БАЛКАНСКЕ УНИЈЕ може пружити такву контраобласту. "(НАПОМЕНА: УКНА, ХС5 / 146, СОЕ Балканс Но.2 Планирање на највишем нивоу - Организација ДП-а - Опште 1940-41. ПОЛИТИКА ДРУШТВА ЗА ЈУГОИСТОЧНО ЕВРОПУ, ДПА број 2.)

Док је наведено у претходним публикацијама на посебну обуку 103 да је бити промо за британске специјалне операције у у Америци, и за тренинг за чланове разних интелигенцију и полицијске организације из Сједињених Држава и Канаде, ово је била секундарна разматрања. У ствари, неки од ових људи били везу са регрутовање и обуку тих имиграната. Мислим да је заједничка савезничких шему која је имала потенцијал да се прошири на еxпатриате је од источне Европе које су претходно имигрирали широм централне и Јужне Америке.

Иако се наводи у претходним публикацијама о Специјалној школи за обуку 103 да је то био изложба британских специјалних операција у америчком и обуку за припаднике различитих обавештајних и полицијских организација из САД-а и Канаде, ово је било секундарно разматрање . Заправо, неки од ових људи су били укључени у регрутовање и обуку ових имиграната. Ово је требало да буде заједничка савезна шема која је имала потенцијал да се прошири на исељенике источноевропских земаља које су се претходно емигрирале кроз централну и јужну Америку.

Док ово звучи као потпуно легитимна план, шта је било у потпуности које не разуме историчари је чињеница да је ово био илегалац регрутује шема углавном контролише комунистичке младежи и симпатизера унутар западног слућбама. Не само чланови комунистичке партије Канаде и даље забрањена, али многи су регрутовани у Сједињене Државе и Канада су забрањени су. Сви људи које тражи били су бити комунисти и њихове тајне мисије је био да се уметне у источној Европи да помогне, како год је могуће, преузимање од стране комунистичких снага. Ово лети у лице атлантске повеље који је потписан од стране Совјетског Савеза у септембру 1941 мисле да све земље под окупацијом, једном ослободио, неће имати право на слободне изборе и Самоопредељење.

Иако ово звучи као сасвим легитиман план, оно што у историчарима није у потпуности схватило јесте чињеница да је ово била незаконита регрутација, која је у великој мјери била под контролом комунистичких мола и симпатизера унутар западних обавештајних служби. Не само да су чланови Комунистичке партије Канаде и даље забрањени, али многи од оних који су регрутовани у САД и Канади били су незаконити. Сви мушкарци су тражили да буду комунисти и њихова тајна мисија требала би се убацити у источну Европу како би на било који могући начин помогла преузимање од стране комунистичких снага. Ово лети уочи Атлантске повеље коју је Совјетски Савез потписао у септембру 1941. године, сагласивши се да ће свим народима под окупацијом, некада ослобођеним, добити право на слободне изборе и самоопредељење.

У покушају да се противе Хитлеров аспирације на Балкану, Пол принц Регент пронацистичког Југославије је био поражен од стране анти-фаљиста, и некомунистичке државног удара 27 марта 1941 које укључују групу прозападни краљевски југословенско ваздух сила официра. Они онда постављена стара 17 година краљ Петар ИИ је велика Србија на трону и главни подстрекаи у преврат Слободан Јовановић премијер. Након оса инвазије у априлу, краљ и његова влада онда отишао у егзил у Британији. Ова влада је такође била потписница атлантске повеље. Стога је призната владар Југославије био владара није комуниста. Цхурцхилл се надао да упрегну ројалисти отпор, не да која можда постоји међу неколико комунисти у том тренутку.

У покушају да се супротстави Хитлеровим тежњама на Балкану, 27. марта 1941. године противафашистички и некомунистички државни пуч прождрђавог кнеза Регента Павла Југославије срушио је групу про-западних краљевских југословенских војних официра. Затим су на престо поставили 17-годишњег краља Петра ИИ Карађорђевића и направили једног од главних иницијатора у државном премијеру Слободана Јовановића. Након инвазије осовине у априлу, краљ и његова влада су затим отишли у егзилу у Британији. Ова влада је такође била потписница Атлантске повеље. Због тога је признати владар Југославије био монарх није комунист. Черчил се надао да ће искористити краљевски отпор, а не оно што би могло постојати међу онима који су били у то вријеме.

Међутим док се чини да су Цхурцхилл и министарству иностраних послова кренули у једном правцу, који се односи на Југославију, Баилеy и секција Д/Х (југословенске секције у Каиру СОЕ) наставили у другој, „политика СОЕ СЕ Европе је да припреми револт од балканских народа (Грка, Југословени, Бугари, Албанци, Румуна и Мађара) против силе осовине и локалне про-оси елемената сарадњу са њима (владама и присталице генерала ТСОЛАКОГЛУ [Грчка] Генерал НЕДИЋ [Србије], М.ПАВЕЛИЦ [Хрватска], краљ БОРИС [Бугарска], Маршал АНТОНЕСКУ [Румуније] и Адмирал ХОРТХY [Мађарске])... У светлу искуства стеченог у периоду пре осе окупације Балкана, а након разматрања информације накнадно примио, СОЕ-специјалиста у балканским пословима су мишљења да су масе сељака и индустријски радници представљају најприкладније потенцијално револуционарна елементе у различитим земљама Европе североистоиној... то сећати се да концепцију балканске јединство већ дуго познато да напреднији политички лидери посебно у Југославији и да је могућност да игра водећу улогу у налогу Балкан за нове и веће вероватно да апелујем на све имагинација али реакционарне нам присталица. На исти начин то може се тврдити да можда чињеница да наша политика првенствено заснива се на подршку аграрни и лево крило елементе отера потенцијалне савезнике међу бурћоазију. Ово је без сумње истина, али је то да се мора предузети ризика с обзиром на чињеницу да је најгоре врсте представљају неких 80% становништва Балканског полуострва и да са изузетком одређене буржоаске елементе у Србији и Грчкој, та већина нам симпатизера у средњој класи не сматрају се вероватно ће дати активни изразе да своје мишљење... Остаје Међутим могућност да ХМГ једног дана бити позван да спроведу ову декларацију и питање због тога настаје да ли Балкан јединство је у интересу Британске Империје. То је изван скала меморандума да размотри ово питање детаљно, али свакако су јаке аргументе у корист балканске јединство као британским интересима”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС5/146, СОЕ Балкан број 2. Највиши ниво планирања - Истанбул ХQ - планирање и организацију активности СОЕ - опште 1940-41. СОЕ политике за ЈУГОИСТОЧНУ Европу, Д.П.А. папир бр. 2.)

Међутим, док се чини да су Черчил и Министарство иностраних послова у једном смјеру према Југославији, Секција Баилеи и Д / Х (Југословенска секција у ДП Каиро) наставила је у другом, "Политика ДП у ЈИ Европи је да припреми побуну Балкански народи (Грци, Југословени, Бугари, Албанци, Румуни и Мађари) против сила осовине и локалних проксичних елемената који су сарађивали с њима (владе и присталице генерала ТСОЛАКОГЛУ [Грчка], генерал НЕДИЋ [Србија], М.ПАВЕЛИЋ [Хрватска], Краљ БОРИС [Бугарска], маршал АНТОНЕСУ [Румунија] и адмирал ХОРТХИ [Мађарска]) ... У свјетлу искуства стечених у периоду прије окупације Осовине на Балкану, и након дужног разматрања информација Накнадно добијени, стручњаци ДП-а из балканских послова сматрају да масе сељака и индустријских радника представљају најпогоднији потенцијално револуционарни елементи у различитим земљама ЈИ Европе ... то схо Уважавамо да је концепција балканског јединства одавно позната прогресивним политичким лидерима нарочито у Југославији и да ће изгледи да играју водећу улогу у новом и већем балканском поретку вероватно привлаче машту свих, Реакционара наших присталица. На исти начин може се тврдити да чињеница да се наша политика првенствено заснива на подршци аграрног и левог крила може отуђити потенцијалне савезнике међу буржоазијом. Ово је несумњиво тачно, али се сматра да се ризик мора узети с обзиром на чињеницу да сељачки народ чини око 80% становништва Балканског полуострва и да, са изузетком одређених буржоаских елемената у Србији и Грчкој, већина Наших симпатизера у средњим класама не сматрају се вероватним да дају активне изразе својим осјећањима ... Остаје, међутим, могућност да се ХМГ једног дана може позвати на примјену ове декларације и стога се поставља питање да ли је балканско јединство у интересу Британске империје. Између овог меморандума је детаљније размотрити ово питање, али сигурно су аргументи у прилог јединствености Балкана као британског интереса јаки. "(НАПОМЕНА: УКНА, ХС5 / 146, СОЕ Балканс Но.2 Планирање на највишем нивоу - Главни штаб у Истанбулу - Планирање и организација ДП-а - Опште 1940-41. ПОЛИТИКА ДРУШТВА ЗА ЈУГОИСТОЧНО ЕВРОПУ, ДПА ПАПИР број 2.)

Укратко , Баилеy мишљење је било да пошто сви сељаци/фармера и радника мора аутоматски бити левичара или комунисти само по прућило њихов број могао балканске јединство се осигурати. Д /Х секција наставља да изјавим да су ћелели да, „...гуарантее да су народи југоисточне Европе це бити постављен у складу са принципима демократије. (Политичка демократија)... Да гарантујем да богатство југоисточне Европе ће развијати у складу са интересима масе људи на Балкану. (Социјал-демократије)... Да гарантује балканских народа против спољних агресија до таква времена као што су, неко судити спремна да се сами боре”. (НАПОМЕНА : НЕПОКРЕТАН) Међутим очигледно до реакције народа ове нације је тај Бејли је био у праву. Чињеница да већина људи су заправо у сваком више умерено оставио или конзервативнији. Док комунисти обично претпоставити да пољопривредни и индустријски радници све мора да буде комуниста, уистину су били свесни с претњом комунизма да свој суверенитет. Ратног интелигенција статистике до знања да је комуниста заправо били у мањини у источној Европи. Питање је, Баилеy знао ово у овом тренутку и он јесте да спроведе своју политику?

Укратко, Баилеиово мишљење је да, пошто сви сељаци / пољопривредници и радници морају аутоматски бити љевичари или комунисти, једино би се обезбиједило Балканско јединство. Д / Х Одсјек наставља да наводи да је желео: "... гарантовати да ће се народи Југоисточне Европе управљати у складу са принципима демократије (политичка демократија) ... Да би се гарантовало да богатство југоисточне Европе Европа ће се развијати у складу са интересима масе балканских народа (социјална демократија) ... Да гарантују балканским народима од спољне агресије све док се не буду сматрали спремним да стоје сами. "(НАПОМЕНА: ИБИД ) Међутим, очигледно је реакцијама народа ових народа да је Баилеи погрешно погрешно. Заправо, већина људи је заправо била умерено остављена или конзервативна. Док комунисти обично претпостављају да аграрни и индустријски радници морају бити сви комунисти, Уистину, били су врло свесни претње комунизма на њихов суверенитет. Статистика ратних обавештајних података јасно ставља до знања да су комунисти заправо били у мањини у Источној Европи. Питање је, Да ли је Баилеи то знао у овом тренутку и да ли је он изврсио сопствену политику?

У циљу СОЕ-Д/Х секције и Баилеy је план да се почне, требала им је људе да га спроведу. Попут свих других СОЕ регрутује шеме, брзо утврђено да избеглица и имигрантска популација у Британији неће бити довољно. Изгледали су одмах да њихова Комонвелта, а више тајно земљама у остатак Америке да попуни своје потребе. Аутор камп X, СОЕ школе за уходе Давид Стаффорд објављени у 1986 државе која преписка је имао са Цхристопхер М. Wоодс, СОЕ саветник у иностраних послова и Комонвелта, указује да је имао идеју да регрутујем особље за британске интелигенције у Америци постојала уназад на почетак 1941, када СОЕ представник пуковник Јеффреy Вицкерс ВЦ отпутовао у Неw Yорк да упознам Wиллиам Степхенсон. Он је био богати канадски индустријалац који је постао шеф британске тајне обавештајна служба у у Америци. Формално послују под маском Пасспорт контролу канцеларије у Неw Yорку, је постала позната као британски координације сигурности или дипл. инг. Резултирајући директива је написао 15 фебруара наплаћује БСК-а да „успостави мрежа СОЕ у Латинској Америци, да регрутујемо вероватно СОЕ агената у Сједињеним Државама и у другим земљама амерички да помогне да се утиче на јавно мњење у Сједињеним Државама у правцу професионалац у савезу, да оствари контакт са разним европским избеглица и протера покрете у новом свету, а да би се креирала тајних порука канале за СОЕ мреже”. На идеју да изгради постројење за обуку у Канади су дошле и из тих разговора. (Напомена : Стафорд, Давид. Камп X СОЕ школе за уходе. Лестер и Орпен Деннyс, 1986. Директива , Хајд папире, 15 фебруара 1941. Поглавље 2. Задивити Американце, пгс. 28-29.)

Да би СОЕ-ов Д / Х одјељак и Баилеи-ов план започели, требали су му мушкарци да га спроведу. Као и све друге шеме за регрутовање СОЕ, брзо је утврђено да популација избјеглица и имиграната у Британији неће бити довољна. Они су одмах погледали у своје Комонвелте и прикривенији са земљама у остатку Америке да испуне своје потребе. Аутор кампа Кс, Школа за шпијуне ДП Давид Стаффорд, објављен 1986. године, наводи да кореспонденција коју је имао са Цхристопхером М. Воодсом, саветником СОЕ-а у Канцеларији за иностране и комонвелте, указује на то да је постојала идеја о регрутовању особља за британске обавештајне службе у Америци Још од почетка 1941. године када је представник СОЕ пуковник Јеффреи Вицкерс ВЦ отпутовао у Њујорк како би се упознао са Виллиамом Степхенсоном. Био је богат канадски индустријалац који је постао шеф Британске тајне обавештајне службе у Америци. Формално ради под шаком Канцеларије за контролу пасоша у Њујорку, постала је позната као британска безбедносна координација или БСЦ. Директива која је усвојена 15. фебруара наплатила је БСЦ-у да "успостави мрежу ДП-а широм Латинске Америке да би запослила вјероватноце ДП-а у Сједињеним Државама и другим америчким земљама како би утицали на јавно мњење у Сједињеним Државама у про-савезном правцу, Да ступи у контакт са различитим европским покретима избеглица и прогнаника у Новом Свету, и да помогне у стварању тајних комуникационих канала за мреже СОЕ-а ". Идеја о изградњи објекта за обуку у Канади такође је изашла из ових дискусија. (Напомена: Стаффорд, Давид, Цамп Кс СОЕ школа за шпијуне Лестер и Орпен Деннис, 1986. Директива, Хиде Паперс, 15. фебруар 1941. Поглавље 2. За импресионирање Американаца, стр. 28-29.)

Убрзо након што је ова директива је направљена значајну прекретницу у дошло до рата. Након успорено храбри преврат у Југославији, Хитлер и његови савезници осе сломио свој пакт са Стаљином и погазили совјетске одржан територија и гурнула у СССР, саме. Историја је изгледа да затвори врата кад овај тајни договор између Хитлера и Стаљина. У ствари највише потпуно занемарио споменути кад расправљамо о узроцима рата. То је очигледно да открију проницање овај необично тајни договор између жестоке непријатеље чињеница да упркос пропаганде, СССР није била савезник запада. Док су шпијунирање на западу и подстицање рада узрујаност и насиље, СССР села беспослено док Еуропе је утонуо у Хитлера. А не протеста ове радње, они се придружио са Хитлером у резбарија на турнеји по Европи. Након што је Хитлер предвидљиво укључено СССР, Стаљин одмах покреће тражећи акције из његове заклети непријатељи, да им помогне. То је евидентно да након што је Хитлер напао СССР, Стаљин је обавештајне службе и даље развијање своје напоре против запада. Насупрот томе, Британца коалициона влада потпуно искључити све обавештајне операције против СССР. (Напомена : види Дћефриз, Кеитх. Тајна историја МИ6 1909-1949. Пингвин групе. 2010 ) као произведених очигледан, наставак напора комунисти да поткопа страних влада ће ускоро резултирати ганц нову школу обука британске интелигенције у Канади.

Убрзо након што је ова директива направљена, дошло се до значајне прекретнице у рату. Након што је одложио храбри удар у Југославији, Хитлер и његови савезници ослободили су свој пакт са Стаљином и окупирали совјетску територију и гурнули у сам СССР. Изгледа да је историја затворила врата овог договора између Хитлера и Стаљина. У ствари, потпуно је занемарити да то помињемо када се расправља о узроцима рата. Очигледно је да се удварање у овај необичан договор између загрејаних непријатеља може открити чињеница да је, упркос пропаганди, СССР никада био савезник запада. Док је шпијунирао на западу и подстакао агитацију и насиље, СССР је полудела, док је Хитлер заробио Европу. Умјесто да протествују против ових акција, придружили су се Хитлеру у резбарењу Европе. Након што је Хитлер предвидљиво укључио СССР, Сталин одмах започиње захтевну акцију од својих заклетвених непријатеља како би им помогао. Очигледно је да је након Хитлера ушао у СССР, Стаљинове обавештајне службе наставиле су да шире своје напоре на западу. За разлику од тога, британска коалициона влада потпуно је затворила све обавјештајне операције против СССР-а. (Напомена: Види Јеффериес, Кеитх, Тајна историја МИ6 1909-1949, Пенгуин Гроуп, 2010.) Као што ће се показати, наставак напора комуниста да поткопају стране владе ускоро ће довести до потпуно нове британске школске обавештајне школе у Канада.

Покушај ”, регрут ће вероватно СОЕ агената у Сједињеним Државама и у другим земљама амерички” се савршено уклапа СОЕ Каиро планове. Осим тога, након што је напао Југославију и Хитлер је повукао свој потез на СССР, у тајном писму из канцеларије високог комесара за Канаду у Лондону, Тхе право цењеног Винцент Массеy да под секретара за спољне послове Норман Робертсон излазила са 4 јула 1941 појашњава то краљ и влада Југославије у егзилу желео послати војним мисијама у Канаду и Сједињене Државе да , „...раисе најмање једну бригаду у износу се око 5 000 људи”. (Напомена : РГ24, Вол. југословенских држављана од с.а.д.-а - објеката за обуку у Канади за - 5197) Ово је убрзо након што је предложила је посебну обуку у Канади. Давид Стаффорд оспорава везу. Међутим новонасталим документација потпуно попусти на Стаффорда тврдњу да је краљевска југословенска влада није познавао идеје о регрутовање интелигенција добровољце за у Америку. Међутим , шта је не наводно била дељена са ројалисти било да СОЕ Каиро је био тражи посебно предани комуниста. (Имајте на уму РГ24 волумен 2848, југословенске војне мисије датотеку ХQЦ 8594-2 и напомена РГ24, југословенских држављана од У.С.А. - објеката за обуку у Канади за - Вол. 5197 и РГ25, А-12, волумен 2116, дипл. инг сигурности Неw Yорк и датотеку АР418/2.)

Напор "да регрутује највероватније агенте ДП-а у Сједињеним Државама и другим америчким земљама" савршено се уклапа у планове ДП-а Каиро. Осим тога, након што је Југославија нападнута и Хитлер је направио свој потез у СССР-у, тајно писмо Уреда Високог комесарја за Канаду у Лондону, Поцасни Винцент Массеи државном државном секретару за спољне послове Норманом Робертсоном 4. јула 1941. објашњава да су краљ и влада Југославије у изгнанству желели да пошаљу војне мисије и Канади и САД-у, "... подигните бригаду која броји око 5.000 мушкараца." (НАПОМЕНА РГ24, југословенски грађани САД -Производи за обуку у Канади за - том 5197) Ово је убрзо након што је у Канади предложена специјална школа за обуку. Давид Стаффорд оспорава везу. Међутим, новооснована документација у потпуности попусти тврдњу Стафорда да Краљевска југословенска влада није знала за план запошљавања за волонтере обавјештајних послова у Америци. Међутим, оно што очигледно није подељено са краљевичима било је то што је СОЕ Каиро посебно тражио за почињене комунисте. (НАПОМЕНА РГ24, Записник 2848, Југословенска војна мисија ХКЦ 8594-2 и НОТЕ РГ24, Југословенски грађани САД -Траининг објеката у Канади за - Вол 5197 и РГ25, А-12, Том 2116, Сигурност БСЦ Нев Иорк, Филе АР418 / 2.)

Људи који су регруте ускоро радити под углавном се састојала од искусних припадника је тајна обавештајна служба која је деловала из балканских огранак секција „Д” у оквиру пуковник Јулиус Ханнау. Људи попут Баилеy, који је већ смо се упознали, и Дуане Тyрелл „Бил” Худсон постао интегрални прице. Након његове политике папире апсорбовао претпостављенима у Каиру СОЕ и главну Команду Блиског истока, Баилеy био изабран за имплементацију и заправо путују у Сједињене Државе да бисте пронашли ове потенцијалних волонтера. Након „његове” политике, било је Баилеy који је изричито потраћио комунисте у Америци

Мушкарци у којима ће ови регрути ускоро радити под углавном састављеним од бивших искусних чланова Тајне обавештајне службе који су дјеловали ван балканског одјела Одсека "Д" под пуковником Јулиусом Ханнауом. Мушкарци као што су Баилеи, које смо већ упознали, и Дуане Тирелл "Билл" Худсон постају интегрални причи. Након што су његове документе о политици апсорбирали његови надређени у СОЕ Каиро и ГХК Блиски Исток, Бејли је изабран да имплементира и заправо путује у Сједињене Државе да лоцира ове будуће волонтере. Пратећи "своју" политику, Баилеи је конкретно тражио комунисте у Америци.

У међувремену, са ситуацијом у Југославији и даље горе у ваздуху, Стаффорд државе која је коначна одлука у погледу на локацију за интелигенцију школу у Канади дошла на партију која је пуковник Ф.Т. „Томи” Давиес, врховни командант да СОЕ-главни директор, Франк Нелсон, присуствовао је Степхенсон Манхаттан стану, у Ст. Регис хотелу вечери од 6 септембра 1941. Са коначну локацију одлучио на и притисак из Каира СОЕ (Д/Х секција) да их регрути најкраћем, Тхомас Дру-Брук (Степхенсон је пријатељ и БСК-а представник у Торонту, Канада.) прослеђује следеће писмо да је канадски подсекретар за спољне послове Норман Робертсон 18 септембра 1941, „волео саветујем те да локација нам „специјални полицијски центар за обуку” напокон донесена је на. Изабрана локација је потпуно осамљена и лежи два и по миља истоино од Витбију, онда даље 2,5 миља јужно од аутопута [аутопут бр. 2] до обале језера. Ми смо нестрпљиви да крену у изградњи грађевинских објеката, и надам се да има све комплетно за окупацију до првог новембра. Прелиминарни планови су завршени, али радни цртежи ће бити готов за неколико дана”. (Напомена : ЛАЦ РГ 25, Филе2490-40, приоритет за материјале требовања за специјалне полиције центра за обуку, писмо из Торонта Т.Г. Дреwброок БСК-а да под – секретар за спољне послове, г. Норман Робертсон, Вол. 2913)

У међувремену, с ситуацијом у Југославији и даље у ваздуху, Стаффорд наводи да је коначна одлука о локацији школе обавештајне службе у Канади дошла на забаву коју је пуковник Ф.Т. "Томми" Давиес, начелник штаба генералног директора СОФ-а, Франк Нелсон, присуствовао је Степхенсоновом стану Манхаттан у хотелу Ст. Регис увече 6. септембра 1941. године. Са коначном локацијом одлучио се и притисак ДП СО Каиро (Д / Х Секција) како би им се што пре поновили, Томас Древ-Броок (Степхенсонов пријатељ и представник БСЦ-а у Торонту, Канада) упутили су сљедеће писмо Канадском подсекретару за спољне послове Норман Робертсон 18. септембра 1941. године, "Желим Да вас обавестимо да је на крају наш "Специјални центар за обуку полиције" коначно одлучено. Изабрана локација је у потпуности осамљена и лежи на два и пола миља источно од Вхитбиа, а затим још два и по миља јужно од аутопута [Аутоцеста бр. 2] до обале језера. Ми смо нестрпљиви да одмах почнемо са изградњом зграда и надамо се да ћемо све завршити за окупацију до првог новембра. Прелиминарни планови су завршени али радни цртежи неће бити спремани неколико дана. "(НАПОМЕНА: ЛАЦ РГ 25, Филе2490-40, Приоритетни рејтинг за материјале који се односе на Центар за обуку специјалних полицајаца, Писмо од ТГ Древброок БСЦ Торонто до Ундер- Секретар за спољне послове, г. Норман Робертсон, књига 2913)

Топ -приоритет даје се на завршетак школе разлика у јасно писмо из Робертсон на г. Беркинсхаw, генерални директор приоритете, одељење за муницију и залихе излазила са 20 септембра 1941, „...за разне разлоге, у сврху за коју ће тражити ове зграде могу бити написана апликацију за приоритете. Можете , међутим, уверавам вас да су хитно потребне у војне сврхе од неке важности, са којима комисија је у РЦМП и ја смо у потпуности упознат”. (Напомена : РГ25, датотека 2490-40 приоритет за материјал потребан за специјалне полиције центра за обуку, волумен 2193, 20 септембра 1941.) Тако од старта спољни афере, и у РЦМП су били у близини Међутим шта тачно су знали? Запамтите , ово је био британски и Наручи инсталација унутар Канаде. Хитност устајати ова школа и покренут гурнута је од стране СОЕ Каира који, у њиховим 29 септембра 1941 прогласио Меморандум о Балканска посла, тај, „А. Читаве БАЛКАНСКЕ план ће бити централизоване у Каиру. Б . СОЕ ће бити директно одговорна за све контакте који су направили са различитих БАЛКАНСКИХ колаборационисте. Ц . је одлучено да дам обуку у герилска тактика и циљ је да се тренира пратити људе од данас до 1 априла 1942, Наиме, 200 Грка 100 Југословена 25 Румуни 25 Бугари 25 Мађара

Врховни приоритет који се даје завршетку школе јасно је у писму Робертсон-а господину Беркинсхав-у, генералном директору за приоритете Одсјека за муницију и снабдијевање од 20. септембра 1941. године, "... из различитих разлога, сврха Које ће ти објекти бити потребни, не могу се навести у пријави за приоритете, али могу вам, међутим, уверити да су они хитно потребни у војне сврхе од неке важности, са чиме је комесар РЦМП и ја потпуно упознат. " (НАПОМЕНА: РГ25, Фајл 2490-40 Приоритетни критеријуми за материјале потребне за Центар за обуку специјалног полиције, том 2193, 20. септембар 1941. године). Дакле, из иностраних послова и РЦМП-а су знали шта тачно знају? Запамтите да је ово била британска компанија у власништву и управљала инсталацијом унутар Канаде

Ургентност уласка у ову школу потиснуо је ДП СО Каиро, који је у свом Меморандуму о раду на Балкану од 29. септембра 1941. изјавио: "А. Цијели план БАЛКАНА ће бити централизован у ЦАИРО-у. Директно одговорна за све контакте са свим разним сарадницима БАЛКАН-а Ц. Одлучено је да се обуче за герилску тактику и има за циљ да обуку следеће људе између 1. априла и 1. априла 1942. године,

200 Грка

100 Југословена

25 Румуна

25 Бугара

25 Мађара

Коначни циљ је да се инфилтрирате ове људе назад у разне земље пре 1. априла 1942. Представници у поље би требало да истражите и извештај методе инфилтрације од њихових крај и држава број људи су вероватно да пролазим поред њихове канале. Представник сваке БАЛКАНСКЕ земље ће размотрити овај меморандум и припремити меморандум о њиховим одређену државу, линијама ће бити усвојен дијелу њихове земље како би се осигурало максималну сарадњу из Х.М.Г. и из пропаганде људима, имајући у виду да све сугестије су важнији унутар Генералне политике је унесен овај меморандум. Сматрају да треба да посебно, најбољих метода се запошљавањем особља изнад”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС5/146, СОЕ Балкан број 2. Највиши ниво планирања - Истанбул ХQ - планирање и организацију активности СОЕ - опште 1940-41. Меморандум о балканским рад до Д/Х20, 29 септембра 1941.)

Коначни циљ је да се инфилтрирате ове људе назад у разне земље пре 1. априла 1942. Представници у поље би требало да истражите и извештај методе инфилтрације од њихових крај и држава број људи су вероватно да пролазим поред њихове канале. Представник сваке БАЛКАН
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26-08-2017, 07:21 PM (Последња измена: 26-08-2017 07:32 PM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #27
RE: SOE
Коначни циљ је да се инфилтрирате ове људе назад у разне земље пре 1. априла 1942. Представници у поље би требало да истражите и извештај методе инфилтрације од њихових крај и држава број људи су вероватно да пролазим поред њихове канале. Представник сваке БАЛКАНСКЕ земље ће размотрити овај меморандум и припремити меморандум о њиховим одређену државу, линијама ће бити усвојен дијелу њихове земље како би се осигурало максималну сарадњу из Х.М.Г. и из пропаганде људима, имајући у виду да све сугестије су важнији унутар Генералне политике је унесен овај меморандум. Сматрају да треба да посебно, најбољих метода се запошљавањем особља изнад”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС5/146, СОЕ Балкан број 2. Највиши ниво планирања - Истанбул ХQ - планирање и организацију активности СОЕ - опште 1940-41. Меморандум о балканским рад до Д/Х20, 29 септембра 1941.)

Док је Баилеy, стављао сам точка на његов план за регрутацију у почетку контактирала сам такве као УС комунистичке Милтон Wолфф који је водио Абрахам Линколн батаљоном интернационалне Бригаде у грађански рат у Шпанији, СОЕ Каиро послао човека у Југославију да видим шта се дешава на терену. Мета БУЛЛСЕYЕ мисије је био краљев отпор под пуковник дража Михајловић. Како год да човек је послао, претходно поменуте Хадсон први пут сусрео са комунистима. Да ли је ово случајно или намерно?, „нити позицију много јасније када, усред октобра (1941), Британска влада прихватила Михајловић као водећи побуњеника и наредили Худсон, чији први наиђе је био са партизанима комуниста-ом, да се контакт са њим. Одлука је донета након што је Михаиловић успоставили W/Т везу са југословенском владом у Лондону и послали поруке, објавио је да покреће национални револт шефа „Тхе краљевске југословенске војске у пољу”; „али осим да краљ Петер показале ове премијеру, ситуација је остала нејасног”. (Напомена : Хинслеy, Ф.Х., унајмљен у другом светском рату, волумен 3, део 1, поглавље 33, догађаји у Југославији, Цамбридге универзитету новинаре, 1984. пг 137) Након што је Худсон је посла с комунистима добио је радије хладан пријем од Михајловића. Они присвојио његов радио апарату и Худсон је практично нестао. Првобитно СОЕ је мислио да је заробљен. Онда су послали у две додатне мисије у јануару и фебруару 1942, Кана и Хидра видјети што се догађало, али обоје нису успели за једног или другог разлога. Тек је Април 1942 да Худсон био у стању да направи контакт.

Иако је Баилеи постављао тоцке на свој нацин регрутовања тако сто је у почетку ступио у везу са америцким комунистицким Милтоном Волффом који је водио батаљон Абрахам Линцолн из Медјународне бригаде у шпанском градјанском рату, СОЕ Каиро послао цовека у Југославију да види ста се десава на Земља. Предвиђена мета мисије БУЛЛСЕИЕ била је отпор краљевства под пуковником Дражом Михаиловићем. Међутим, човек који је послао, претходно поменути Худсон први пут сусрео са комунистима. Да ли је то случајно или по дизајну? "Нити је била јаснија позиција када је средином октобра (1941.) британска влада прихватила Михаиловића као водећег побуњеника и упутила Худсон, чији су први сусрети били са комунистичким вођством Партизани су ступили у контакт са њим. Ова одлука је донета након што је Михаиловић успоставио везу са југословенском владом у Лондону и послао поруке најављујући да покреће националну побуну као шеф "Краљевске југословенске војске на терену ', Али осим што је краљ Петар то показао премијеру, ситуација је остала нејасна. " (НАПОМЕНА: Хинслеи, ФХ, Британска обавештајна служба у Другом светском рату, Књига 3, Део 1, Поглавље 33, Развој у Југославији, Цамбридге Университи Пресс, 1984. пг 137) Након Худсоновог хобнобирања са комунистима, добио је прилично хладан пријем Михаиловић. Они су командовали његовим радио апаратом, а Худсон практично нестао. Првобитно СОЕ је мислио да је заробљен. Затим су послали у две додатне мисије у јануару и фебруару 1942. године, ХЕННА и ХИДРА да виде шта се дешавало, али обоје су пропале из једног или другог разлога. Тек априла 1942. године Худсон је могао контактирати.

Ф.Х. Хинслеy британске интелигенције у другом светском рату је наведено да је откривено у извештајима сада долази из Худсон то Михајловић је идеја била да уједини све покрета отпора у Југославији против сила осовине, „Wхитехалл прихватио Михајловић је тврдњу у уверењу да све герилске групе буду приведени заједно у један покрет. Министарство спољних послова одговорили разумевања совјетске предлог да се најбољи начин креирања диверзија у Југославији је било да одобри подршку свим групама без обзира на њихову политичку боју. Серије састанака између Михајловић и Тито и њихово особље одржан је у новембру 1941. Али Худсон је извештај о томе [откривена то] борбе избио је између две групе у Србији, дао је сада први од многих упозорења да Титове партизане сумња се да је Михајловић Иетници су били сарађивање са Недић је [фашистичке групе Хрвата под Немцима] владе у Србији, као и са другим елементима про-осе против њих. "(Напомена : Хинслеy, Ф.Х., унајмљен у другом светском рату, волумен 3, Парт 1, поглавље 33, догађаји у Југославији, Цамбридге универзитету новинаре, 1984. ПГ 138.) Шта је Министарство спољних послова јасно и Худсон не да ли је чињеница да Михајловић је скупљао је сво време док је истовремено смањење сваки ризик да његова снага за остати близу фашиста. На крају крајева, ројалисти су и даље младе снаге и и даље имао није обезбеђен од стране Британаца. Као покрет отпора у Француској, било је СОЕ смернице за ове групе да, рука и припремити, а не ризик сви напољу истребљење преурањено акцијом. Постоји и могућност да Михаиловицс' жеља да се ради са сав отпор заправо мислио и могућност добијања Недић није офсајд, ни комунисти.

У ФХ Хинслеиовој британској обавештајци у Другом светском рату наводи се да је у извештајима који сада долазе из Хадсона откривена да је Михаиловићева идеја да унифира сваки отпор у Југославији против моћи осовине ", Вајтхол је прихватио Михаиловићеву тврдњу уверењем да све Герилске групе могле су се спојити у јединственом покрету отпора. Министарство иностраних послова саосећајно је одговорило на совјетски предлог да је најбољи начин стварања диверзије у Југославији био пружање подршке свим групама, без обзира на њихову политичку боју. Михаиловић и Тито и њихови службеници одржани су у новембру 1941. године. Међутим, Худсонов извештај о томе [открио је] да је избила борба између ове две групе у Србији, сада је дао први од многих упозорења да су Титови партизани сумњали да су четници Михаиловића сарађивали са Недићеву [Хрватску фашистичку групу под немачком] владом у Србији и другим елементима против осе Их. "(НАПОМЕНА: Хинслеи, ФХ, Британска обавештајна служба у Другом светском рату, Књига 3, Део 1, Поглавље 33, Развој у Југославији, Цамбридге Университи Пресс, 1984. стр. 138.) Шта је Министарство вањских послова схватило и Худсон није Чињеница да је Михаиловић био бидинг своје вријеме, а истовремено смањивши сваки ризик за своју силу тако што је остао близу фашистима. На крају крајева, краљевичари су и даље били млада сила, а Британци их још нису снабдевали. Француска је била политика ОЕ да ове групе обучавају, рукују и припремају се, а не да ризикују истребљење преурањеним радњама. Такође постоји могућност да је жеља Михаиловича за рад са свим отпором заправо значила могућност да Недић добије поред себе, а не Комунисти.

Док су Британци били покушавамо сазнати шта се дешава на терену, у Југославији, ултимативни дозволу да наставим са плановима за изградњу школе за обуку у Канади био потребан из министром Националне одбране, Тхе пуковник дусо. Ј.Л. Ралстон и премијер од Канаде W.Л. Мацкензие краља. Ралстон је био врло ентузијастични у погледу помагао Британце, а добила је одобрење од стране премијера да помогне у шта год је било потребно за устајање у школу и растућег. Ово није било одобрења да регрутујемо комунисти. Ово је стриктно одобрења да помогне Британце у стварне зграде и одржавања кампа. Ништа још је било договорено за регрутовање. Опет , није познато тачно какав краљ и Ралстон били рекли су Британци. Кореспонденција изгледа да показују да су мислили да је камп био да строго тренирати правно регрутовао оружаних снага личне за командоса/пара-војни рад иза непријатељских линија. (Напомена : ЛАЦ РГ24, микрофилм ролни Ц-8383, Мемо посебну обуку Витбију, Онтарио из ВЦГС 16 новембра 1941.)

Док су Британци покушавали да схвате шта се дешава на терену у Југославији, коначно одобрење за наставак планова за изградњу школе за обуку у Канади захтевало је министар за националну одбрану, пуковник Хон. Ј.Л. Ралстон и премијер Канаде В.Л. Мацкензие Кинг. Ралстон је био веома ентузијастичан што је помогао Британцима и добио одобрење од премијера да помогне у ономе што је било потребно да се Школа успостави. Ово није одобрење да се регрутују комунисти. Ово је било стриктно одобрење да помогне Британцима у стварном изградњи и одржавању кампа. Ништа још није договорено о регрутовању. Опет, није познато тачно шта су Британци и краљ и Ралстон рекли. Изгледа да кореспонденција изгледа да су мислили да је камп стриктно обучавао легално регрутоване оружане снаге личне за командос / пара-војни рад иза непријатељских линија. (НАПОМЕНА: ЛАЦ РГ24, Мицрофилм Реел Ц-8383, Специјална школа за мемо Вхитби, Онтарио из ВЦГС 16. новембра 1941.)

Комунистичке партије Канаде је забрањена у 1941 на основу одбране од Канаде прописа акта мере рат. Ово је било углавном због све веће хапшења њихови чланови за бунтовно понашање. Занимљиво либералне странке одбиле да забрани комунистичке партије заједно са фашиста 1939. Побуна је морао да задњи његова ружна глава на суду, пре него што су били подстакнути да урадим нешто опозиција.

Комунистичка партија Канаде забрањена је 1941. године у складу са Законом о одбрани канада у складу са Законом о ратним мјерама. Ово је углавном последица све веће хапшења њихових чланова због седативног понашања. Занимљиво је да је Либерална странка одбила да забрани Комунистичку партију заједно са фашистима 1939. Седиција је морала да стави ружну главу на суд, пре него што су позвани да нешто уради од стране опозиције.
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27-08-2017, 11:50 PM (Последња измена: 28-08-2017 12:47 AM од Прст_у_ока_латиници.)
Порука: #28
RE: SOE
Ту тако одвратно у комунистичке партије подршка за пакт Молотов-Рибентроп и интензивне кампању од рада са циљем да се ремети виталне производње узрујаност и штрајкове. Док комунистички апологистс као да цитирам раније била инфлација савет да оправда многе од тих штрајкова, они никад присетити настојањима владе да се плате повећавале на разуман ниво Нити да су присетити стварни исказ субверзиван и оних обавезујући за контрашпијунажу који су били припадници ове западне комунистичке странке. Све глобалне комунистичке странке изван СССР су биле под контролом комунистичке Интернатионал у Москви. Сви имали директних контаката са Совјетски НКВД, НКГБ, ОГПУ и ГРУ. Они тако да не говорим о њихов одштампани и објављени догма дистрибуира их у време итемизинг њихове милитантан, анти-демократске, анти-религиозни и анти-запад тирада кулминирала жељу да виде насилно свргавање владе. (Напомена ЛАЦ РГ24-Ц-1, 8885-2 датотеке, тајни и поверљиви тему датотеку, војску, посебну обуку 1941-1946, писмо бригадног Стеwарт (за ЦГС) да је министар, 21 октобра 1941, Ц-8383.)

Ту такво одвратно у комунистичкој партији подршке за пакт Молотов-Рибентроп и интензивних кампања од рад са циљем да се упознају са виталном производњом ужитка и штрајкова. Док комунистички апологисти као да цитирају раније била је инфлација, да би се изјаснила многим од тих страјкова, они никад нису знали да постоје власници да плати поведу на разумном нивоу Нити да су приметили стварне изјаве субверзиване и они обавезујуће за контраспијању које су били припадници овог западне комунистичке странке. Све глобалне комунистичке стране изашле из СССР су биле под контролом комунистичког Интернатиона у Москви. Сви су имали непосредне контакте са Совјетским НКВД, НКГБ, ОГПУ и ГРУ. Они такво да не говорим о нихову одштампаним и објављеним догма дистрибуира их у вријеме симулације њихових милитантних, анти-демократских, анти-религиозних и анти-западних тирарова кулминирала жељу да види насилно чврсто владање. (Напомена ЛАЦ РГ24-Ц-1, 8885-2 фајлова, тајни и повјерљиви тематски фајл, војску, посебну обуку 1941-1946,

Упркос шта је навео претходно пуковник Вицкерс и другима који тврде да школа првенствено нисам хтела промо британске интелигенције код Американаца, први регрути су нашли у Унитед Статес преко Милтон Wолфф и Канади преко њихове одговарајућих комунистичке подземни под-групе за операције на Балкану и у Италији. БСК је сада под називом шему пројекта „Ј” (британски преписке обично написала Југославије са „Ј” а не „Y”...). Ово је откривено у кореспонденција између Мајор-Генерал Цхарлес Францис Константина и на директора од особља дужности (ДСД) излазила са 17 октобар 1941., „Како би се сачувала тајност, имамо по имену ове афере - пројекта Ј - и бројевима, посебно 21-1-1”.. (Напомена : РГ24-Ц-1 датотека 8885, г. Ц-8383, тајни и поверљиви тема датотеке, посебну обуку 1941-1946. Особље дужности 3 дужности директора особља, процену и финансијске импликације, специјална школа „Ј” у Витбију, Онтарио, 17 октобар 1941 такође Мајор-Генерал Цхарлес Францис Константин, ЦО од војног округа 2 до директора од особља дужности пуковника W.Х.С. Мацклин, 7 децембар 1941.)

Упркос ономе што је раније нагласио пуковник Вицкерс и други који тврде да је школа првенствено представљала изложбу британске обавештајне службе Американцима, први регрути били су они који су пронађени у Сједињеним Државама преко Милтон Волффа и Канаде преко њиховог комунистичког подземног суба -групе за операције на Балкану и Италији. БСЦ је сада назвао шему ПРОЈЕЦТ "Ј" (британска кореспонденција обично наводи Југославију са "Ј" а не "И" ...). Ово се открива у кореспонденцији између генерал-мајора Цхарлеса Франциса Константина и директора дужности особља (ДСД) од 17. октобра 1941. године, "Да бисмо сачували тајност, назвали смо ову ствар - пројекат Ј - и бројали га, специјални 21-1 -1. ". (НАПОМЕНА: РГ24-Ц-1, Фајл 8885, МР Ц-8383, Тајни и повјерљиви предметни фајлови, Специјална школа за школовање 1941.-1946. Дужности особља 3 Директору особља, процјена и финансијских импликација, Специјална школа "Ј" Вхитби, Онтарио, 17. октобар 1941. такође генерал-мајор Цхарлес Францис Цонстантине, војни дистрикт 2 Директор штаба особља пуковник ВХС Мацклин, 7. децембар 1941.)

У другом документу од Цонстантине, који је био командант војне 2 округа, да ДСД 24 октобра 1941 спомиње се договорио да постављање овог пројекта, „командант биће је пуковник Лyндсаy британске војске, а он ће дати упутства особља и студената (16 у број). Он ће се покренути низ курсева”. (Напомена : ЛАЦ, РГ24, фајл 8885, Ц-8383, Мајор-Генерал Цхарлес Францис Цонстантине МД 2, да Дирекције за особље дужности пуковника W.Х.С. Меклин, 24 октобар 1941.) То је додатно изјавио да школа требало да раде до 15 новембра 1941. Званични британски ознаку за школу, користе за њихов међународни систем интелигенција школа, је посебну обуку 103 (СТС 103). Нема званични документ те врсте зовем сколу „Камп X”. Једина референца бити медицински извештај у вези смрти студент на СТС 103 1943. То се претпоставља да је једноставно њиме да бисте означили школа не користећи било који званични терминологија. До данас нема објављених извора је схватила да ти оригинални 16 „студенти” били су иницијални у групи комунистичке Југославије пара-војни. (Напомена : РГ24-Ц-1 датотека 8885, г. Ц-8383, тајни и поверљиви тема датотеке, посебну обуку 1941-1946. Пороци начелник генералштаба да Т.Г. Дру-Брук, 16 новембра 1941.)

У другом документу од Константина, који је био заповједник војног округа 2, ДСД-у 24. октобра 1941. године спомиње се аранжман који је направљен за успостављање овог пројекта: "Командант ће бити пуковник Линдсаи из британске војске и он ће Обезбеди особље за упуте и студенте (број 16), водит ће низ курсева. " (НАПОМЕНА: ЛАЦ, РГ24, Фајл 8885, Ц-8383, генерал-мајор Цхарлес Францис Цонстантине МД 2, Дирекцији за запошљавање пуковника ВХС Мацклин, 24. октобар 1941.) Даље је наведено да школа треба да ради и ради до 15. новембра 1941. Званична британска ознака за школу, која се користи за њихов међународни систем интелигенционих школа, била је Специјална школа за школу 103 (СТС 103). Ниједан званични документ не постоји у којем се зове Школа "Камп Кс". Једина референца је докторски извештај о смрти ученика на СТС 103 у 1943. Претпоставља се да се једноставно користи за означавање школе без употребе званичне терминологије. До сада ниједан објављен извор није схватио да су ови првобитни 16 "ученици" били почетна група југословенских комунистичких паравојних регрута. (НАПОМЕНА: РГ24-Ц-1, Фајл 8885, МР Ц-8383, Тајни и повјерљиви предметни фајлови, Специјална школа за школовање 1941-1946.године, замјеник начелника Генералштаба Т.Г. Древ-Броок, 16. новембар 1941.)

Двојица главних грешке направљене од стране историчари у односу на СТС 103 је уверење да горе наведену документацију били мислећи на рани приправник изложених до Канаде и Сједињених Држава полиције и обавештајне службе за рад у у Америци као агенти. Друга грешка је не Схватајуци да Балкан регрутовања шему активно почели као рани као септембра 1941, а можда и раније.

Две главне грешке историчара у вези с СТС 103 је увјерење да наведени документи односе на рану праксу канадске и америчке полиције и обавештајних служби за рад у Америци као агенте. Друга грешка није схватила да је схема запошљавања на Балкану активно започела већ у септембру 1941. године, а можда чак и раније.

Првобитно људи регрутовали су били под земљом рада агитатори или уредници и радници у разним новинама комунистичке пропаганде. Сви су били припадници етничких гране комунистичке партије Сједињених Држава или Канаде, а многи су били ни АМЕРИЧКИ или канадски грађани са неке живе у Северној Америци илегално. Неке су такође активно тражиле полицију за ствари које нису у вези са имиграције или рада узрујаност.

Првобитно је већина људи регрутовала подземне радне агитаторе или уреднике и раднике у различитим комунистичким пропагандним новинама. Сви су били припадници етничких огранака Комунистичке партије Сједињених Држава или Канаде, а многи нису били ни амерички или канадски грађани са неким који живе у Сјеверној Америци илегално. Неколико полицајаца је активно тражило и питања која нису везана за имиграцију или агитацију рада.

У у документу од 30 октобра стварне британски особље послао обуку тих људи у Канади се назива 207 војне мисије. Ово је нацрт документа који је био не дистрибуира али открива ко је изнуда ову шему за регрутовање директно са Канадом, „јесмо утврдили да СОЕ треба да се договоримо са канадским властима за постављање у Канади специјални тренинг школе познат као 207 војне мисије. Школа је у сврху обуке агенти и организатори из разних држава у Јужној Америци и централној Америци и по могућности УСА [где велике југословенске имигрантске групе није постојао] са врхунским предметом слања држављана тих земаља да непријатељ је окупирана територија. Упутства за састоји се од пара-војне обуке и с. с. [тајна служба] рад. Је ли могуће молба да је одвезу Генерал МцНаугхтон? Природа посла је таква да је очигледно пожељно да само неколико особа треба да зна за то”. (Напомена : НА УК, WО193/631 војне операције 1 рат Оффице СОЕ 9 војна мисија 207, СТС-Цанада, 30 октобар 1941.) Очигледно одлучено је да информације које се налазе у овом документу је преосетљив за слање. Да ли је ово зато што је то нешто што може изазвати сумњу о томе на прави мотиви који стоје иза овог регрутовања шема је открио? То је врло необично да СОЕ директно преговарао сету се овог пројекта са канадским властима. Изгледа да нема додатних умешаност британске владе и без даљих заступање министарству иностраних послова. Ово је врло неуобицајено и импликације ова изјава постати јасније као се прича развија.

У документу од 30. октобра, стварно британско особље послато да обучава ове људе у Канади названо је као војна мисија. Ово је био нацрт документа који се није дистрибуирао, али открива ко је примјенио ову шему за запошљавање директно са Канадом. "Утврдили смо да је ДП дошао до аранжмана са канадском владом за успостављање посебне школе за школовање у Канади. Позната као војна мисија 207. Школа је у циљу обуке агената и организатора из различитих држава у Јужној Америци и Централној Америци и евентуално САД [у којима постоје велике југословенске имигрантске групе] са крајњим циљем слања држављана ових држава непријатељу Окупирана територија, инструкција се састоји од пара-војне обуке и рада СС [Тајне службе] Да ли је могуће да се такав захтев просљеђује генералу МцНаугхтону? Природа посла је таква да је очигледно пожељно да само неколико особа Знате то. " (НАПОМЕНА: НА УК, ВО193 / 631 Војна операција 1 Ратни уред СОЕ 9 Војна мисија 207, СТС Канада, 30. октобар 1941,) Очигледно је одлучено да су информације садржане у овом документу сувише осетљиве за слање. Да ли је то било зато што је открило нешто што би могло изазвати сумњу у правим мотивима иза ове шеме регрутације? Веома је необично да је ДП директно преговарао о постављању овог пројекта са канадском владом. Изгледа да не постоји додатна ангажованост Британске владе и без даљег заступања од стране Министарства иностраних послова. Ово је веома необично и импликације ове изјаве постају јасније док се прича развија.

Усамљени документ из је бригадир у министарству Националне одбране у Отави да канадска спољних послова понавља да је оствареног контакта директно са британским интелигенцију и не представницима британске владе, „г. Норман Робертсон је телефонирао јутрос у којем се наводи да је Линдсаy пуковник [оригинална предложени британски заповедник школа] британске војске био у Отави, у вези са постављање посебну обуку у Канади. Прелиминарни разговори су се догодиле између британске обавештајаца и комесар дрвета, Р.Ц.М.П. „Имали сте одлуку да бисте подесили школи у Канади и пуковник Ралстон, министром одбране, су обећали да ће помоћи”. (Напомена : РГ24, датотека СТС, МС, увуци Ц-8383. Из чина бригадира за ВЦГС Мајор-Генерал Ј.Ц. Мурцхие, ДНД, 16 новембра 1941) је занимљиво да се Лyндсаy на крају одбио те заповједништва школе. Разлог зашто се и даље сматра мистерија. Видео је кроз у обмани?

Један документ бригадира на Одељењу за националну одбрану у Канадским спољним пословима поновио је да је контакт био директно са британским обавјештајним службама, а не представницима британске владе ", господин Норман Робертсон телефонирао је јутрос у којем се наводи да је пуковник Линдсаи [оригинал који је предложио Британски командант школе Британске војске био је у Отави у вези са успостављањем Специјалне школе за школовање у Канади. Прелиминарне расправе су се водиле између британских обавештајних службеника и комесара Воода РЦМП-а. Одлучено је да се установи Школа у Канади и пуковник Ралстон, министар одбране, обећао је да ће помоћи. " (НАПОМЕНА: РГ24, Филе СТС, МС, Реел Ц-8383. Од бригадира за мајор ВЦГС-а Ј.Ц. Мурцхие, ДНД, 16. новембра 1941.) Занимљиво је да је Линдсаи на крају одбио да преузме команду над школом. Разлог зашто се и даље сматра мистеријом. Да ли је видео превару?

Осветљен је затим предложио спољних послова 16 децембра 1941 генералног конзула Југославије у Монтреалу да југословенске војне мисије могао сада да се придружи пољски војну мисију у Wиндсор и једно од његових подесити на Овен звук, Онтарио. (Напомена : РГ24, Вол. југословенских држављана од с.а.д.-а - објеката за обуку у Канади за - 5197) Ова мисија је предводио П. Савитцх за превлачење пуковник који није био пресретан са му премељтај у Канаду из Каира. Није познато оно што зна о пројекту како год да то је била његова мисија која би многе од ових регрути кућу пре него што су били послати преко океана.

Тада је 16. децембра 1941. године Министарство вањских послова предложило Генералном конзулату Југославије у Монтреалу да се југословенска војна мисија сада придружила Пољској војној мисији у Виндзору и поставила један од својих у Овен Соунд-у, Онтарио. (НАПОМЕНА РГ24, југословенски држављани САД-а - обучавање у Канади за - том 5197) Ова мисија је водио пуковник Драг П. Савич који није био пресрећан што је био премештен у Канаду из Каира. Није познато тачно шта је знао о пројекту, али је његова мисија била да ће многи од ових регрута бити смештени пре него што су послати у иностранство.

У канадској јавности несвестан утврђених комунистичке субверзије и шпијунажу заправо одржава у у Америци (упркос неколико сензационалне наслове између 1938 и 1941 покрива пребег совјетских агената који послују у Британији, сад и Канада), анкете у то време је показао неке млаки канадске јавности антикомуниста сентиментална када припадници комунистичких група гласно изразили своју вољу да се бори. Шта је медијима пригодно заборавио споменути канадске јавности је да су имали намеру да се бори за Канаду. Тиме , имали су подршку владиним званичницима сада директно уплетен у припреми СТС 103 и регрутовање. На крају лето 1941 покушаји били су од стране ових људи”, тешњу сарадњу са комунистима у Канади. У ствари, подршку за легализације ЦПЦ [комунистичке партије Канаде] и отпуштајући, овај, интернирце окупило се пару. Лестер Пеарсон и Норман Робертсон осетио да комунисти треба да се у потпуности покорити ратне напоре”, (Напомена: „Званични репресије”, пгс. 148-149; Витакер , „Увод”, 17. Који је изведен из http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/Hist...m#_ftn104) било је таквих као премијер краљеву секретар Јацк Пицкерсгилл, Пеарсон, Робертсон и друге либерали и Либерално постављен за трајно бирократа који је гурнуо краља да препознате комунистичке партије Канаде и да га врате као напредна странка рада. (Једини Посланик који представља ова странка у парламенту Фред Росе ће бити осуђен за шпијунажу у име СССР.)

Са општом канадском јавношћу која очигледно није свесна уграђене комунистичке субверзије и шпијунаже која се стварно дешава у Америци (упркос неколико сензационалних наслова између 1938. и 1941. који покривају опадање совјетских агената који послују у Британији, САД и Канади), анкете су тада показале Неке омекшавање антикомунистичког осећаја канадске јавности када су чланови комунистичких група гласно изразили своју вољу да се боре. Оно што је медији лако заборавити да помене канадској јавности јесте да нису имали намеру да се боре за Канаду. Уз то, имали су подршку државних службеника који су сада директно укључени у успостављање СТС 103 и регрутовање. Крајем љета 1941. године ови људи су покушали да "ближе сарађују са комунистима у Канади, а подршка за легализацију ЗКП-а [Комунистичка партија Канаде] и пуштање интернираних лица окупила је пар." Лестер Пеарсон и Норман Робертсон је сматрао да комунисти морају бити у потпуности искориштени за ратне напоре "(НАПОМЕНА:" Службена репресија ", стр. 148-149; Вхитакер," Увод ", 17. Изведено из хттп://ввв.социалистхистори.ца/ Доцс / Хист ... м # _фтн104) Било је онако као и министар премијера Кинг-а Јацк Пицкерсгилл, Пеарсон, Робертсон и други Либерали и Либерали именовани стални бирократи који су гурали Кинг-а да призна комунистичку партију Канаде и да је поново обнови као рад Прогрессиве Парти. (Једини представник ове странке у парламенту Фред Росе ће бити осуђен за шпијунажу у име СССР-а).

Међутим 1942 долазио би и одлазио без промене да одбране Канаде прописа, „у РЦМП и Министарство правде је инсистирао да стварни комунистички циљ био „победа за СССР преко демократије”, и да ' збацити канадске оружане снаге у том циљу”. (Напомена : бла-пг 151.) Стварни Налози по комунистима у њиховим састанцима и њихово стање снимљени плебисцит, да је то у ствари став многих водећих комуниста и њихови следбеници у Канади. Како је већ наведено, ови људи имао намеру да се бори за Канаду. Шта је углавном заборављен од стране многих комунистичке апологистс је да је велики број активне радне снаге агитатори и заклети комуниста који послују у Сједињеним Државама и Канади нису били гангстери. Многи су били послати по њиховим одговарајућим страним комунистичких партија и група намерно шири комунистичке субверзије. Записе у британске комунистичке регрутује шему у у Америци направи врло јасна. У ствари ово је већина ових комунисти регрутовао отворено признати. (Напомена : ХС/9 СОЕ досијее.)

Међутим, 1942. године би дошло и отишло без промјене у Правилима одбране Канаде ", РЦМП и Одсјек за правосуђе су инсистирали да је стварни комунистички циљ" побједа Совјетског Савеза над демократијом "и" поткопати канадске оружане снаге на то крај." (Напомена: Дитто пг 151.) Стварни рачуни комуниста на њиховим састанцима и њихов забележени плебисцит наводе да је то заправо био став многих водећих комуниста и њихових следбеника у Канади. Као што је већ речено, ови људи нису имали намеру да се боре за Канаду. Оно што у многим комунистичким апологистима већином заборавља јесте да велики број активних агитатора и заклетих комуниста који послују у Сједињеним Државама и Канади нису били ни грађани. Многи су послали њихове стране комунистичке партије и групе да намерно шире комунистичку субверзију. Записници британске комунистичке шеме за запошљавање у Америци чине то врло јасно. У ствари, већина ових комуниста регрутовала је то отворено. (НАПОМЕНА: Записи особља ХС / 9 СОЕ.)

Као чланови СЕКО и СОЕ наставили са својим планом да регрутујемо комуниста и рада агитатори на западу, Сједињене Државе се нашла у рату против Јапана. Након низа напада на територији сад у Пацифику и североистоиној Азији, рат је објављен на 8 децембар 1941. Немачка онда објавио рат Америци. Али шеме да регрутујемо људе у Сједињеним Државама и у Америци је постојало много пре њихов улазак у рат. Ово је било нелегално. То је такође била против британске владине политике да регрутујемо чланова комунистичке партије Канаде и комунистичке странке Сједињених Држава. У Канади, на основу одбране од Канаде прописа, да је такође забрањено да регрутујемо познати комунисти у канадској војсци. Док су неки, вероватно непознато да РЦМП, да ли у војску тек је 1943 да ограничења били опуштен. И тада, били су да се пажљиво пратити до у РЦМП. Ово је променио чињеница да га је строго забрањена за познате комунисте да ради унутар свих на западне обавештајне службе. (Напомена : http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/Hist...m#_ftn104)

Како су чланови СИС-а и СОЕ наставили са својим планом да регрутују комунисте и раднике на западу, Сједињене Државе су се нашле у рату са Јапаном. Након серије напада на територију САД у Пацифику и С.Е. Азија, рат је проглашен 8. децембра 1941. године. Њемачка је тада објавила рат против САД. Међутим, шеме за запошљавање мушкараца унутар Сједињених Држава и Америке постојале су много прије њиховог уласка у рат. Ово је било нелегално. Такође је била против политике британске владе за регрутовање чланова Комунистичке партије Канаде и Комунистичке партије Сједињених Држава. У Канади, у складу са уредбама о одбрани Канаде, такође је било незаконито регрутовати познате комунисте у канадску војску. Иако су неки, вјероватно непознати РЦМП-у, приступили војсци, до 1943. године ограничења су опуштена. Чак и тада, они су требали пажљиво пратити РЦМП. Ништа од овога није променило чињеницу да је за познате комунисте стриктно забрањено дјеловати у било којој од западних обавештајних служби. (НАПОМЕНА: хттп://ввв.социалистхистори.ца/Доцс/Хист...м#_фтн104)

Рат је сада води се између СОЕ Каиро и министарству иностраних послова пребацити подршку од краља Југославије и Михајловић да на очигледном југословенска комунистичка који се зове Јосип Броз или Тито, „међу њима је стајао па надаље, надмоћна и ускоро доминантна. Тито , како се зове, био Совјетски тренираног комуниста који, док Русија обузео га је Хитлер, и након што је био напао Југославију, имала побуна политички штрајкови дуж далматинској обали, у складу са Генералне политике Коминтерне”. (Напомена : затвара прстен, Маршал Тито и Југославија, хорор 462) Не само ово требао уништавање оса освајаии, него и уништавање свих других опозиције. Цхурцхилл себе је изјавио, „било је неминовно да се партизански покрет такође треба да уђеш у дивље свађе са њиховим партијци, који су били опирање ради реда или прављење погодбама за имунитет са заједничким непријатељем. Партизани намерно прекршила никакав споразум са непријатељем извршио Цетникс - као присталице генерала Михајловић је позвана. Немци онда убио Цетник таоце и у освети Цетникс дао Немци информације о партизанима. Све се десило у овој дивљих планинских области спорадично и неконтролисано. Била је то трагедија у оквиру трагедија”. (Напомена : затвара прстен, Маршал Тито и Југославија, хорор 462-463)


Сада се водио рат између СО Каиро и Министарства иностраних послова да се подршка краља Југославије и Михаиловића помери очигледном југословенском комунистичком именом Јосип Броз или Титом, "Међу њима је истакнуто, истакнуто и ускоро доминантно. Он се назвао, био комунистички обучен у совјетској сфери, који је, док је Русија нападнула Хитлер, а након што је Југославија нападнута, подстакла политичке штрајкове дуж далматинске обале, у складу са општом политиком Коминтерна. " (Напомена: Затварање Прстена, Маршала Тита и Југославије, стр. 462) Ово није значило само уништавање освајача Оса, већ и уништење свих других опозиција. Черчил је цитиран: "Било је неизбежно да би партизански покрет такође требао доћи у дивље свађе са својим сународницима, који су се полудерно одупирали или правили имунитет са заједничким непријатељем. Партизани су намјерно прекршили све споразуме са Непријатељ Цетника - пошто су позвани следбеници генерала Михаиловића, а онда су Немци тада убили Цетника заробљенике, а Цетникс је осудио Немцима информације о партизанима. Све ово се десило спорадично и неконтролисано у овим дивљим планинским подручјима. Трагедија. " (Напомена: Затварање прстена, Маршал Тито и Југославија, стр. 462-463)

Черчил наводи а касније изгледа заборавља, је чињеница да су партизани имали активну подршку и подршку Совјетског Савеза. Док једна страна историје ознаке Михајловић као сарадник на оси, многи грађани Југославије, Тито је у ствари совјетске колаборациониста. Чињеница о ситуацији у Југославији је да СССР и Тито никада није имао намеру да се рад са ројалисти. Ако Немци добили Михајловић, Тито био је савијен под убија њега самог. Од самог почетка Совјети, заједно са Тито и његове симпатизере комуниста у британском интелигенцију, је имао три фази план. 1 . дискредитује ројалисти 2. Пребацимо сву подршку са западним савезницима на партизане. 3 . уништи Михајловић. Сличне позорница догађаја је то планирано као и за целом региону Балкана и Северну Италију. Мора да ме памте да сукоба који је развила између Тито и Стаљин не почиње до краја рата.

Оно што Черчил наводи, а касније изгледа да заборави, је чињеница да су партизани имали активну подршку и подршку Совјетског Савеза. Док једна страна историје означава Михаиловића као сарадника осовине, многим грађанима Југославије, Тито је заправо био совјетски сарадник. Обична чињеница о ситуацији у Југославији је да СССР и Тито никада нису имали намеру да раде са краљевичима. Ако Немци нису добили Михаиловића, Тито је био уперен да га убије. Од самог почетка Совјети су заједно са Титом и његовим комунистичким симпатизерима у британској обавештајној служби имали тродимензионални план. 1. Дискредитовати краљевине 2. Померити СВИ подршку западних савезника партизанцима. 3. Уништи Михаиловић. Слична фаза догађаја била је у раду и на читавом подручју Балкана и северној Италији. Треба запамтити да се сукоб између Титова и Стаљина није почео до краја рата.

СОЕ Каиро сада је почела да испита за регрутовање од Италијана. Детаље које постоје које окружују овај покушај јасно указују на принуда од стране Баилеy. Ово је направио очигледан када БСК је иницијални регрутер рад унутар у РЦМП је разрешио дужности на папиру Баилеy у корист једног који је изричито регрутовао познати

ДП Каиро је сада почео да разматра регрутовање Италијана. Детаље који постоје око овог напора јасно указују на принуду Баилеиа. Ово је очигледно када је Билејеви почетни регрутатор који ради у РЦМП-у био одбачен на папиру од стране Бејли у корист оног ко је конкретно регрутовао познате комунисте.

Следећи документ излазила са 7 фебруара 1942 под називом Меморандум слободан италијанске регрута је написао извјесног Берсани (Агент 942). Он је био први који је пришли БСК-а да регрутујемо италијанске Канађани. Берсани је радио у РЦМП провере италијанских имиграната у Канаду. Документ је најраније на Масонску италијанске регрутовање шему, „...на 10 новембра 1941 прво речено ми је да се брину о ономе у којем сам непрестано ангажован је током протекла три месеца, сам је изјавила да је вредело труда да остваре... У извјешће од 1. децембра 1941. сам предложио да се антифашистички папира бити промовисана као ово је понудио средство за успоставља контакте... предлог да „Слободно ИТАЛИЈЕ КРЕТАЊЕ” треба да се организује за потребе за регрутовање основа за типове 1, 2 и 3. Обе ове предлоге одбијени”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС8/89, пријавио је Америка Но.94, регрутовање Италијани, у Канади.) Шта Берсани значи по разним „типовима” регрут, је класификација систем користи СЕКО и СОЕ да идентификујете изгледи бољи за тип 1 тајна интелигенције, тип 2 Пара-војни или тип 3 командос операције.

Следећи документ од 7. фебруара 1942. под називом Меморандум Фрее Италиан Рецруитс је написао човек по имену Берсани (Агент 942). Био је први човек којем је БСЦ приступио да запосли Италијане Канаде. Берсани је радио у РЦМП-у да проверава италијанске имигранте у Канади. Документ даје најранију референцу на италијански програм запошљавања: "... 10. новембра 1941. године сам први пут дао инструкцију да извршим посао у којем сам се стално ангажовао у последња три месеца, изјавио сам да је вредно постићи ... У мом Извештај од 1. децембра 1941. године предложио сам да се промовише антифашистички рад, јер је то понудило средство за стварање контаката ... приједлог да се организује "БЕСПЛАТНО ИТАЛИЈАНСКО КРЕТАЊЕ" у сврху пружања регрутног мјеста за Врсте 1, 2 И 3. Оба ова предлога су одбачена. "(НАПОМЕНА: УКНА, ХС8 / 89, Известај Америке бр.94, регрутовање Италијана у Канади.) Оно што Берсани значи по различитим" типовима "регрута, је класификациони систем који користе СИС и СОЕ да идентификују изгледе који су погоднији за било који тип тајне интелигенције типа 1, типа 2 Пара-војне или тип 3 Коммандо.

Берсани је била једноставно антифашистички, он није био комуниста. То је занимљиво да Баилеy није био захвалан резултате рада Берсани је као да је хтео да га „укинути”. Онда је направио аранжмане за познатог комунисту да га замени, „припреме када је у питању Антонио Верди псеудоним Еннио Гнуди [Шифра В-1] иду напред”. Навео је разлог је да „ова канцеларија неповољно је импресиониран са радом у извођењу 942 [Берсани]”. Онда пусти мацка из вреце кад он наводи да, „од десет имена [сви канадски или ванземаљац] предао постоји само једна особа може бити корисна за поклон сврху, а и он је под знаком питања. Осталима , наравно, доћи ће треба да развијемо је ситуација у другом правцу”. Ово је зато што ниједан од ових људи су били комунисти осим једног који је само сумњало да комуниста. Баилеy се наставља, „Док је сваког напора који су уложени да дам 942 јасна и концизна шта смо жељену слику, он је изгледа да ниси схватио и је занела свој ентузијазам и жељу да се више уско повезан са стварним стављање”. Баилеy је онда покушава да користите атентата знакова да бисте добили Берсани смењен. У његов стан, он наводи да, „препоручује се да се плати рачун и од сада па надаље, смо Испробавајте Гнуди”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС8/89, пријавио је Америка Но.94, регрутовање Италијани, у Канади. Из ДТ-секција А.1 (за везу са СЕСТРИЦОМ) да УТ (УСА Јужне Америке /Траининг) 14 фебруара 1942.

Берсани је био једноставно анти-фашистички, он није био комунист. Интересантно је да Баилеи није ценила резултате Берсанијевог рада јер је он желео да се "прекине". Потом се договорио за познатог комуниста који би га заменио, "Направиће се аранжман који се односи на Антонио Вердија али Еннио Гнуди [Код В-1]". Он је изјавио разлог због којег "Ова канцеларија је неповољно импресионирана радом који је извршио 942 [Берсани]. "Он онда пусти мачку из вреће када каже:" Од десет имена [сви канадски или ванземаљци] који су поднети ту је само један који може бити корисан за ову сврху, па чак и он Упитно. Други, наравно, могу ући ако се ситуација развије у другом правцу: "То је зато што ниједан од ових људи није био комунист, осим оног за кога се сумњало да је комунист. Чини јасну и концизну слику о ономе што смо желели, изгледа да је пропустио ту ствар и одузео га је сопственим ентузијазмом и жељи да се ближе повеже са стварним стављањем. "Баилеи затим покушава да користи атентат карактера да би добио Берсани Он је изјавио да "препоручује се да се рачун плати и од сада експериментисамо са Гнудијем". (НАПОМЕНА: УКНА, ХС8 / 89, Известај Америке бр.94, регрутовање Италијана у Канади. ДТ-Одељак А.1 (Везе са СИС) у УТ (САД Јужна Америка / Обука) 14. фебруара 1942.)

Док комунистички Гнуди је унајмила Баилеy, следећи документ излазила са 9 априла 1942 из Г.400 (Алеxандре Халперн СОЕ шеф мањине под-секција у БСК-у) и бивши члан владе Керенског у пред-Бољљевиике Русије да ДСЦ потврђује да је Д/Х секције у Каиру СОЕ послују на своју одговорност. У систему који је требало да ми јави узбуну медју канадске власти, није било Британска влада ради ове деликатна детаље. СОЕ Каиро је оперисао један на један са канадске власти, војске и РЦМП. Баилеy је онда пита за, „твој ауторитет [спољних послова Канада] да продужи рад мој одељак у Канаду. Разумем да су особе у Доминион влади који су заинтересовани за проблем мањина РОБЕРТСОН, ПЕАРСОН и Саул РАЕ. Знам да је Робертсон је радије скептични око било какве позитивне резултате да би се остварио. Не потцењујем ове могуцности, али они постоје. Има 50 000 Аустријанци 30 000 Чеси, 40 000 Мађара, 100 000 Италијана, 150 000 Пољака, 30 000 Роуманианс, 20 000 Југославс, 4 000 Бугара у Канади. Канада има велики број представника лидера различитих националности. Он има огранке такозваног слободног кретања. Они би требало да буде гледао, дојила и контактирао. С. п. и С.И.С. регрути пронађена тамо ако им се приступа разним расних скупина кроз њихове препознатог лидера. Сваки регрут, морамо наћи и овде тренирати ће имати предност да треба да будемо зависна од Американаца, сто се тице тренинга или што се тиче сједињења и управљање од регрута. Ако колико сам схватио да ти се слажу у начелу најбоље би било да разговарамо са Робертсон, или неки од његових људи у Канади, и ако нема приговора да ступа одмах почети са радом. Стуарт или Баилеy могао с времена на време у Канаду да се бави Јужни Словени и ја или Сицхел [Др.Херберт] [дипл. инг статистииар] могла лако да поднесе Немаца, Аустријанци и Талијани”. (Напомена : УКНА, ХС8/75, СОЕ, Америка Но.80, балкански регрутовање у Канади, прва журка (бродоломаца) Пт.1.Г.400 да ДСЦ, 9 априла 1942.)

Док је комунистицки Гнуди ангажован од стране Бејлија, следећи документ од Г.400 од 9. априла 1942. године (Секретар Халперна СОЕ шеф одељења за мањине у БСЦ-у и бивши члан Владе Керенског у пре-Болсхевик Русија) ДСЦ-у потврђује да Д / Х Одсек у СОЕ Каиро је радио по сопственој вољи. У систему који би требао имати звоно аларма између канадских власти, британска влада није радила на овим деликатним детаљима. ДП Каиро је руководио једним од канадских влада, војске и РЦМП-а. Бејли онда затражи: "ваш ауторитет [Вањске послове Канада] да продужи рад моје секције у Канаду. Разумем да су РОБЕРТСОН, ПЕАРСОН и [Саул] РАЕ особе у Влади Доминиона заинтересоване за проблем мањина. Знам да је Робертсон прилично скептичан у погледу било каквих позитивних резултата које треба постићи. Ја не прецењују ове могућности, већ постоје. Постоји 50.000 Аустријанаца, 30.000 Чеха, 40.000 Мађара, 100.000 Италијана, 150.000 Пољака, 30.000 Румуна, 20.000 Југославија, 4.000 Бугара у Канади. Канада сада има велики број представника лидера различитих националности. Има гране такозваних Слободних покрета. Треба их посматрати, неговати и контактирати. ТАКО. И С.И.С. Регрути могу бити пронађени тамо, ако приступимо разним расним групама преко својих признатих лидера. Било који регрут који нађемо и обучемо тамо имаће предност да нећемо зависити од Американаца нити у вези са обуком, нити у вези са укључивањем и управљањем регрута. Ако схватим да се у начелу слажете да је најбољи начин да разговарате са Робертсоном или неким од његових људи у Канади и ако нема приговора да одмах почнете посао. Стуарт или Баилеи могли су повремено ићи у Канаду да би се суочили с јужнословенима и ја или [Др.Херберт] Сицхел [Статистичар БСЦ] могао би лако да се носи са Немцима, Аустријанцима и Италијанима. "(НАПОМЕНА: УКНА, ХС8 / 75, СОЕ, Америка бр. 80, Запошљавање Балкана у Канади, Прва странка (бродолом) Пт.1.Г.400 до ДСЦ, 9. април 1942.)

Осим Баилеy потврђује учешће Норман Роберсон, Лестер Пеарсон и Саул Рае, овај цитат је поново поставља питање; Ако постоје хиљаде могуће регруте, заљто посебно су бити комунисти? То би требало да се започне да спољних послова био обавестајну слузбу Канаде у овом тренутку. Канада је Либерално постављен за трајно бирократе ће бринути о томе, упркос молбе за супротно из војске и опозиције, да ово остаје случај док се не канадске интелигенција сервис безбедности (ЦСИС) 1984. Зашто је то било? Нешто за скривање? Иако многи од ови комунисти су претходно војно искуство борбе Шпанији са независним бригадом на страни републиканаца, чињеница да је њихов предложени улогу унутар СОЕ је једноставно да будем преводилаца, бежични оператери, инструктори и саботери не прави резервне копије било предуслов да буду комунисти. Да је једноставно војно искуство су јурили, већина оних који подржавају ројалисти у Америци такође има војно искуство због чињенице да предратне краљевска југословенска војска је ојаиало обавезни војни рок. Исто се може рећи и за италијанске регруте. У ствари, онолико колико то може бити оцењена као питање владине политике, британских и америчких особља које је измислио мисијама послао у на Балкану и у Италији су се састоји од-фашиста и некомунистичке лични као ствар политике. Нема друге комунистичке регрутовања шеме за рат у Европи је постојао унутар западног слућбама.

Осим Баилеи-а који потврђује укључивање Нормана Роберсона, Лестер Пеарсон и Саула Рае, овај цитат поново поставља питање; Да ли је било хиљада могућих регрута, зашто су они конкретно морали бити комунисти? Треба напоменути да су Вањске послове у то вријеме била канадска инострана обавештајна служба. Канадски либерални именовани трајни бирократи ће се, упркос разлозима против војске и опозиције, уверити да је то остало до формирањ
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