[Прст_у_ока_латиници]

The meeting was held in the residence of the governor of Croatia. Besides Prince Paul, the deputy prime minister V.Maček, Ban of Croatia I.Šubašić and commander of the Croatian divisions in Zagreb General August Marić were present. V. Maček considered that Prince must restore the previous order and not to compromise with the coup. General August Marić said that the situation in the Croatian military garrisons was stable and they gave their support to Prince Paul37. According to V. Maček, the mobilization of Croatian army units was to strengthen the position of regent against the conspirators in Serbia. However, Prince Paul gave up that idea. One of the reasons was Princess Olga and children’s stay in Belgrade38.
He addressed through the consul to the British government for permission to obtain refugee status in the British colony. Already at the noon on March 27 regent left Zagreb accompanied by the Ban of Croatia Ivan Šubašić. The objective of Šubašić was to evaluate the real situation in the capital and to negotiate about the conditions under which the Croatian ministers would serve in the new government. In the evening of the same day the royal train with Prince Paul and Ivan Šubašić arrived to Zemun. General D.Simović, who was waiting for them at the railway station, immediately escorted Prince Paul to the war ministry39. There Prince Paul, along with Radenko Stanković and Ivo Perović, royal governors of the minor King Peter II, signed the documents of abdication40. Around 10 p.m. Prince Paul and his family left to Greece. Not long after they conveyed across to Kenya and a few months later they were allowed to move to the Union of South Africa41.
The complex dilemma was set to V. Maček due to the coup. He was personally loyal and devoted to regent, who ended the persecution by the authorities in 1935 and worked tirelessly to overcome the hatred between Serbs and Croats. The leader of the Croatian Peasant Party had a fear that the coup plot was designed by the same circle of Serbian nationalists who opposed to the Concordat with the Vatican in 1937 and to the agreement in 1939.
The problem was that Prince Paul had gone back willingly to Belgrade. That gesture lent the coup legitimacy. The refusal to join the next cabinet created the risk of plunging the country into bloodshed. Also general D.Simović was reassuring V. Maček for long time in a telephone conversation to join the new government assuring him that the agreement of 1939 remains in force. Moreover, he was promising to extend the Croatian Banovina’s competences. V. Maček joined the government after the promise of a new Prime Minister to make a treaty with Germany42.
New cabinet with D. Simović as the Prime Minister was established on March 27. V. Maček became Deputy Prime Minister, Slobodan Jovanović – President of the Serbian Academy of Sciencies and Arts, General Bogoljub Ilić – war minister, and Srdjan Budisavljević, the leader of the Independent Democratic Party – minister of internal affairs43.
A choice of the candidate for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs has caused considerable debate. Due to the significant support of the leader of the Democratic Party Milan Grol, Momčilo Ninčić, Serbian radical, gained the post. Pro-Italian policy

favours helped him with this assignment which the government of D. Simović was planning to use to establish relations with Germany44.
After the formal nullification of the Tripartite Pact by the government, numerous demonstrations started gathering in Belgrade. They declaimed slogans in support to the United Kingdom. Mass meetings were held under the slogans “Bolje rat nego pakt!” and “Bolje grob nego rob!” (“Better the war than the pact!” “Better the grave than the slavery!”). Demonstrations in support of the coup also took place in Cetinje, Podgorica, Split, Skopje, Kragujevac and other major cities45.
Orthodox priests and officials in senior positions throughout the country also expressed their disagreement with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Even the police, whose job was to maintain the order, was favoured by people. In his memoirs, King Peter II said: “For every true Serb could be the only way out – the revolution, which took place on March 27”46.

On the day of the coup the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Gavrilo made in Belgrade the radio call to all Serbs of the Orthodox faith to reunify. Then the patriarch said: “Today the question was put again towards our nation. And this morning the question was answered. We choose the heavenly kingdom which is nationally strong and free – the kingdom of God’s truth and justice. This ideal is eternal in the hearts of all Serbs and preserved by our church”47.
The inauguration of King Peter II was held on March 28 with Patriarch Gavrilo’s presence. On the same day a conflict with the German travel agency which was at the same time the headquarters of the Gestapo occurred. The protesters broke windows and tore the swastika flag at the agency. Due to the conflict one German was injured48.
Official London reacted immediately and called it the first major political defeat on the Continent for Germans. In France, Marseille, strangers laid banks of flowers upon the scene of the assassination in 1934 of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister Barthous of France49.

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British Prime Minister W. Churchill pointed that “Early this morning Yugoslavia found his soul”50. King of Great Britain George VI on the first anniversary of the coup d’état emphasized that ‘March 27 will remain inscribed by golden letters in the history of Yugoslavia and entire Europe’. Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King on July 10, 1942 told King Petar II in Canada that, ‘Before the war in Canada Yugoslavia was a geographic name. But she is today known to every child as the country which had shown the example to the entire world how one must defend his national freedom...”. British Ambassador to the Yugoslav government sir George Rendel in his book “The Sword and Olive”, wrote: ‘Young King Petar ... became the symbol of Yugoslavia’s desperate struggle to preserve her liberty ... The Serbs are among the most physically courage people in the world ... the coup d’état had shown a fine fighting spirit’.
Simultaneously, Moscow didn’t congratulate Yugoslav government with the coup d’état. On April 1, 1941 the most influential Soviet edition ‘Pravda’ stated that the Yugoslav people were distinguished by a glorious past and were deserving of congratulations. However, the USSR had not sent a message to that effect to the new Yugoslav regime51.
The coup in Belgrade on March 27, 1941 changed the course not only of Yugoslavian, but also of European history. There are still ongoing debates about the role of the British Intelligence Service in organizing events which took place on that March. Although there is no evidence of its funding on the part of Special Operations, the Secret Intelligence Service or other special services, the fact of organizing the coup was clearly known. The reason for its implementation was the signing of the Tripartite Pact on March 15, 1941. However, the reasons of it are much deeper and the chief aim of the coup was overthrowing of Prince Paul. One of the main reasons of Serbs attitude towards him and D. Cvetković’s government was the policy of reconciliation with the Croats, which caused aversion among Serbian generals and Serb nationalists in general. After the peaceful outcome, the revolution caused a wave of endorsement among the people not only in Belgrade but also in many other Yugoslavian cities. But Germany accepted it as a challenge and it led to the assault on Yugoslavia.
1 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. – 328 p. 2 Palmer A. Operation Punishment // History of the Second World War. – Part 14. – 1973. – P. 374–392. 3 Barker E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. – London: The Macmillan
Press LTD, 1976. – 320 p.
4 Stafford D. SOE and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’état of March 1941 // Slavic
Review. – Vol. 36. – 1977. – No. 3. – P. 399–419.
5 ИАБ, 2768. Легат Косте Ст. Павловића. Ђ. Переписка Р.Кнежевића са К.Повловићем,
професором Стафордом. – Радоє Кнежевић, 1979, No 7.
6 Knejevitch R. L., Stafford D. Letter // Slavic Review. – Vol. 38. – No.2 (Jun. 1979). – P. 361–362. 7 Tanner M. Croatia. A nation forged in war. – New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1997. –
384 p.
8 Kurapovna M. K. Shadows on the Mountain. The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries That
Doomed WWII Yugoslavia. – Hoboken, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2009. – 336 p.
9 Фомин В. Т. Подготовка немецко-фашистской агрессии против Югославии (1937–1941 годы) //
Вопросы истории. – Москва, 1957. – No 6. – С. 28–49.

10 Славин Г. М. Освободительная война в Югославии (1941–1945 гг.). – Москва: Наука, 1965. – 152 с.
11 Севьян Д. А. Из истории Союза коммунистов Югославии. 1919–1945. – Москва: Мысль, 1982. – 213 с.
12 Гиренко Ю. С. Советско-югославские отношения: Страницы истории. – Москва: Международные отношения, 1983. – 191 с.; Гиренко Ю. С. Сталин – Тито. – Москва: Политиздат, 1991. – 432 с.
13 ИАБ. 2768. Legat Kosty Stefana Pavlovića iz Londona.
14 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1955. – 214 p.
15 Ìемоари патријарха српског Гаврила. – Париз: Editions Richelieu, 1974. – Т. 1. – 609 ñ.
16 A Nation’s Fight for Survival: The 1941 Revolution and War in Yugoslavia as Reported by the American Press. – New York: The American Press, 1944. – 264 p
17 Službene novine, br. 1, 19 avgusta 1941.
18 Гиренко Ю. С. Сталин – Тито. – С. 87.
19 Palmer A. Operation Punishment. – P. 377.
20 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – P. 251.
21 From spring 1940 Tomas Masterson was an agent of SOE in Yugoslavia.
22 Knejevitch R.L., Stafford D. Letter // Slavic Review. – Vol. 38. – No.2 (Jun. 1979). – P. 361–362. 23 Palmer A. Operation Punishment. – P. 377; Barker E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the
Second World War. – P. 92.
24 Barker E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. – P. 92.
25 Stafford D. SOE and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941 // Slavic
Review. – Vol. 36. – No.3 (Sep. 1977). – P.415.
26 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – P. 254–255.
27 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – P. 65. 28 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – P. 256.
29 Palmer A. Operation Punishment. – P. 377.
30 Ibid. – P. 377.
31 Íèêîëèž Ê. Âëàäå Êðàšåâèíå £óãîñëàâè1⁄4å ó Äðóãîì Ñâåòñêîì Ðàòó. 1941–1945. – Ñ. 43.
32 Palmer A. Operation Punishment. – P. 378.
33 A Nation’s Fight for Survival: The 1941 Revolution and War in Yugoslavia as Reported by the
American Press. – P. 6.
34 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – P. 68–69;
Službene novine, br. 1, 19 avgusta 1941. C. 1.
35 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – P.259–260.
36 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – P. 65–66. 37 Ibid. – P. 67.
38 Tanner M. Croatia. A nation forged in war. – P. 138–139.
39 Hoptner J. B. Jugoslavia in Crisis. 1934–1941. – P. 261–266.
40 Službene novine, br. 1, 19 avgusta 1941. C. 1.
41 Kurapovna M. Shadow on the Mountain. – P. 108.
42 Tanner M. Croatia. A nation forged in war. – P. 139–140.
43 Službene novine, br. 1, 19 avgusta 1941. C. 1.
44 Tasovac I. American foreign policy and Yugoslavia. 1939–1941. – Texas: Texas A&M University
Press, 1999. – P. 132; Hehn P. A Low, Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe and the Origins of World War II, 1930–1941. – New York, London: Continuum, 2002. – P. 385.
45 Morrison K. Montenegro. A modern history. – London, New York: IB Tauris, 2009. – P. 50–51. 46 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – P. 64. 47 Мемоари патријарха српског Гаврила. – Т. 1. – С. 399.
48 Petar II Karađorđević. A King’s Heritage: the memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia. – P. 72.
49 A Nation’s Fight for Survival: The 1941 Revolution and War in Yugoslavia as Reported by the American Press. – P. 6.
50 A Nation’s Fight for Survival. – P. 27.
51 ИАБ, 2768. Легат Косте Ст. Павловића. Є. Переписка Живка Кнежевића са К. Павловићем, 1983. No 4.