29-08-2014, 03:25 AM
Franco-British plans for intervention in the Winter War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Winter War
Talvisota Covering Force Isthmus.PNG
During the early stages of World War II, the British and French Allies made a series of proposals to send troops to assist Finland in the Winter War against the Soviet Union which started on 30 November 1939 (three months after the outbreak of World War II) and ending in March 1940. The war was a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The plans involved the transit of British and French troops and equipment through neutral Norway and Sweden. The initial plans were abandoned due to Norway and Sweden declining transit through their land, fearing their countries would be drawn into the war. The Moscow Peace Treaty ended the war in March 1940 precluding the possibility of intervention.
Contents
1 Background
2 Initial Allied approaches
3 Norwegian and Swedish reaction
4 Further Allied proposals and their effect on peace negotiations
5 See also
6 References
6.1 Citations
6.2 Bibliography
Background
In February 1940, a Soviet offensive broke through the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, exhausting Finnish defenses and forcing the country's government to accept peace negotiations on Soviet terms. At the news that Finland might be forced to cede its sovereignty to the USSR, public opinion in France and Britain, already favorable to Finland, swung in favor of military intervention. When rumors of an armistice reached governments in Paris and London, both decided to offer military support.
Initial Allied approaches
Franco-British support was offered on the condition their armed forces be given free passage through neutral Norway and Sweden instead of taking the difficult and Soviet-occupied passage from Petsamo.
The first intervention plan, approved on 4–5 February 1940 by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March under the condition of a formal request for assistance from the Finnish government (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped that Allied intervention would eventually bring the neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany—although Hitler had by December declared to the Swedish government that Franco-British troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.
Only a fraction of the Franco-British troops were intended for Finland. Harebrained French proposals to enter Finland directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, had been previously dismissed (as Petsamo was at that time already occupied by Soviet forces). Swedish diplomats saw through the Allied subterfuge, possibly aided by German sources, that the true objective of the whole operation was to occupy the Norwegian harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the north-Swedish iron ore fields, from which it was assumed that the Third Reich received a large share of its iron ore (actually 33% in 1938), regarded as critical to war production. If the governments of France and Britain later broke their pledge not to seize territory or assets in Norway and Sweden and Franco-British troops later moved to halt exports to Germany, the area could become a significant battleground between the Allies and the Germans. Such a development was particularly attractive to the French, as it would have moved the main area of military conflict away from French soil.
The Franco-British plan, as initially designed, proposed a defense of all of Scandinavia north of a line Stockholm–Gothenburg or Stockholm–Oslo, i.e. the British concept of the Lake line following the lakes of Mälaren, Hjälmaren, and Vänern, which would provide a good natural defense some 1,700–1,900 kilometres (1,000–1,200 miles) south of Narvik. The expected frontier, the Lake line, not only involved Sweden's two largest cities but could result in large amounts of Swedish territory being either occupied by a foreign army or becoming a war zone. The plan was revised to include only the northern half of Sweden and the narrow adjacent Norwegian coast.
Norwegian and Swedish reaction
The Norwegian government denied transit rights to the proposed Franco-British expedition. The Swedish government, headed by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, also declined to allow transit of armed troops through Swedish territory, in spite of the fact that Sweden had not declared itself neutral in the Winter War. The Swedish government argued that, since it had declared a policy of neutrality in the war between France, Britain and Germany, the granting of transit rights by Sweden to a Franco-British corps, even though it would not be used against Germany, was still an illegal departure from international laws on neutrality.
This strict interpretation appears to have been a pretext to avoid angering the Soviet and Nazi German governments, as it was abandoned after fifteen months. On 18 June 1941, the Swedish government quickly agreed to German demands for transit rights across Sweden for German troops on their way from occupied Norway to Finland, in order to join the German attack on the Soviet Union.[1] A total of 2,140,000 German soldiers and more than 100,000 German military railway carriages crossed neutral Swedish territory during the next three years.[2]
The Swedish Cabinet also decided to reject repeated Finnish pleas for regular Swedish troops to be deployed in Finland and the Swedes also made it clear that their present support in arms and munitions, could not be maintained for much longer. Diplomatically, Finland was squeezed between Allied hopes for a prolonged war and Swedish and Norwegian fears that the Allies and Germans might soon be fighting each other on Swedish and Norwegian soil. Norway and Sweden also feared an influx of Finnish refugees if Finland lost to the Soviets.
Further Allied proposals and their effect on peace negotiations[edit]
While Germany and Sweden pressured Finland to accept peace on unfavorable conditions, Britain and France had the opposite objective. Different plans and figures were presented for the Finns. France and Britain promised to send 20,000 men, who were to arrive by the end of February. By the end of that month, Finland's Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Mannerheim, was pessimistic about the military situation and on 29 February the government decided to start peace negotiations. That same day, the Soviets commenced an attack against Viipuri.
When France and Britain realized that Finland was considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer of 50,000 troops, if Finland asked for help before 12 March.
See also
Plan R 4
Operation Pike
Allied campaign in Norway
Foreign support in the Winter War
Swedish iron mining during World War II
References
Citations
Jump up ^ National Archives and Records Administration: State Department and Foreign Affairs Records – Sweden
Jump up ^ Scandinavian Press, Issue 3 1995) Article
This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (July 2009)
Bibliography
Andersson, Lennart B3 Junkers Ju86 i Sverige
Cox, Geoffrey (1941) The Red Army Moves (Victor Gollancz, London).
Engle, Eloise & Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939–1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-2433-6.
Jakobson, Max (1961). The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press.
Öhquist, Harald (1949). Talvisota minun näkökulmastani. Helsinki: WSOY. (in Finnish)
Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-08-033592-6.
Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and the Russo-Finnish War. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.
Tanner, Väinö (1957) The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939–1940 Stanford University Press, California; also London.
Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) [1991]. The Winter war: The Russo–Finno War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1-85410-881-6. "First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40"
Upton, Anthony F. (1974). Finland 1939–1940 (University of Delaware Press, Newark: part of series The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War) ISBN 0-87413-156-1
Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
"Finland i Krig 1939-1940" – multiple authors. ISBN 951-50-1182-5
Episode 7. Britain and France Planned to Assault Soviet Union in 1940
Wed, May 11, 2011Europe, Russia, The Episodes, Unknown WWIIBy Alexander TRUBITSYN (Russia)
Episode 7. Britain and France Planned to Assault Soviet Union in 1940
On March 23, 1940, a twin-engine civilian Lockheed-12A, registration code G-AGAR, took off from an airfield in the London suburb of Heston. British pilot Haig McLane was at the controls. The aircraft set course for Malta; then after an intermediate stop in Cairo, it flew on to the British military base in Baghdad. From there, it headed towards the Soviet border with two aerial photography specialists on board. After crossing the border unobserved at an altitude of 7000 m, the plane flew to Baku on an aerial photo-reconnaissance mission.
What was that all about?
The photos were sent to appropriate departments in England and France. They were used to draw up plans for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, English Ma-6 and French R.I.P. (Russia. Industry. Fuel). The attack was to begin with bombings of the cities of Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Maikop and Poti. The plan called for the use of 90-100 English Blenheim and American Glenn Martin bombers in the attack on Baku. The bombing was supposed to go on day and night, with pilots orienting on the fires. All of the oil fields, refineries and ports were supposed to go up in flames.
The USSR had completed refitting its oil refineries by the beginning of 1940. But large crude oil collectors—pits filled with oil—and a great number of wooden oil derricks were left over from the past. According to an assessment by American experts, the soil in those areas was so saturated with oil that fire would spread at a high rate of speed and move to other fields. It would take months to extinguish the fires and years before production could resume.
What we know of ecology today tells us that those bombings would have created an environmental disaster. Convection columns would have formed above the fires, and hot air would have pushed the products of combustion into the upper layers of the atmosphere. That would have produced acid rain, disrupted heat exchange in the atmosphere and contaminated the area with carcinogenic and mutagenic substances. Baku’s residents would have been left without water, of course, because the combustion products would have poisoned the wells. Fires at deep wells would have released “dead water” containing compounds of copper and nitrogen. The runoff of combustion products into the sea would have destroyed marine flora and fauna.
It’s horrible to imagine. It is incomprehensible that the ‘civilized’ West would coldly plan to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians even before the barbaric bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And they were civilians, because there were no significant military forces or facilities in Baku, Dresden, Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
The preparations were in earnest
French Foreign Ministry Secretary General Leger wrote US Ambassador Bullitt on January 11, 1940 that France would not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war against it; it would destroy the Soviet Union if possible, using cannons—if necessary.
French Prime Minister Deladier offered to send a squadron into the Black Sea to block Soviet lines of communications and shell Batumi from the sea. On January 19, 1940, he sent a document about the attack on the Soviet Union to General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Deputy President of the Supreme War Council, as well as Admiral of the Fleet Darlan. Two copies of the document were addressed to General Koëltz, commander of the French ground forces, and General Vuillemin, French Chief of the Air Staff and Commander-in-Chief of its Air Force, respectively.
On January 24, 1940, the Chief of England’s Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, sent the War Cabinet a memorandum on “the main war strategy,” in which he stated his opinion that England could effectively assist Finland only if it attacked Russia on the largest possible number of axes and, most importantly, struck Baku—an oil production region—in order to cause a serious national crisis in Russia.
One more fact: at the January 31, 1940 meeting of the Chiefs of General Staff of England and France in Paris, French General Gamelin suggested that the British bomb targets in Russia’s interior; and England’s Marshal Pierce, the Deputy Chief of England’s Air Staff, supported the proposal.
As they say, the weak follow the strong. Iran’s War Minister Nakhjavan asked the British to provide 80 aircraft and coordinate plans for the war on Russia.
On February 3, 1940, the French General Staff ordered General Jaunaud, the French air commander in Syria, to study the possibility of an air attack on Baku. Three days later, the issue was discussed and approved at a meeting of England’s War Cabinet. In light of the assigned mission, the Chiefs of Staff Committee ordered preparation of a document.
On February 28, 1940, France’s Air Staff produced a document containing precise calculations of the assets required for the attack on Baku. The British approach to the matter was thorough and proposed attacking our country from three directions. In the end, all details were coordinated and negotiations were held with the Turkish General Staff in March—it was understood that Turkey would also participate in the attack on the Soviet Union. Even more intensive work to coordinate and finalize the aggressors’ plans took place in April. Reynaud, who succeeded Deladier as Prime Minister, was an even bigger hawk than his predecessor and demanded more action from the British.
The infernal machine preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union began to count down the last days and hours before the bombing of our country’s oil fields that was to occur on May 15, 1940. Stocks of aviation fuel and high explosive and incendiary bombs were increased at British and French airfields in the Middle East; navigators marked out directions of attack on maps; and pilots practiced night bombing. Reynaud telephoned Churchill on May 10, 1940 to say that France was ready for the attack on May 15.
British and French troops are evacuated from Dunkirk
What stopped them
But—the ironies of fate! On May 10, five days before England and France were to begin their war against the Soviet Union, Hitler gave the order to stop the “Phony War” with France that featured no military operations and launch a decisive attack. The Germans defeated the French within a matter of days, and for some reason a new Russian campaign held little appeal for Napoleon’s heirs. The Germans failed to destroy the British Expeditionary Force in France and allowed it to escape at Dunkirk.
Just five days—and history took a different path! History, of course, abhors the subjunctive mood, but we can be sure that the cost of the war would have been completely different. We would have repelled the attack by the British and French aggressors. The Soviet leadership knew about the plans for attacking Baku—and it was ready with a response. High-altitude MIG-3 fighters had been developed and put into service—they were capable of intercepting British, American and French bombers at high altitudes. English fighters armed only with machine guns were no threat to the armored Il-2 fighter-bombers, not to speak of the French fighters. So the “allied” air raid would not have caused the disasters, death and destruction that they were hoping for. Relations with Germany may have been different.
Sooner or later, Germany’s political system would have evolved; its excesses would have been in the past, like the fires of the Inquisition and the Crusades, the persecution of heretics and the burning of witches.
Of course, an attack on our country would have been worrisome. Germany would have figured out how to make common cause with England or France. Especially since England had its own Sir Oswald Mosley—the leader of British Fascists and a Member of Parliament and the government who personally knew both the English and Belgian kings, as well as Hitler and Goebbels. They would have found a common language. We should not forget: Hitler’s forces included 200,000 French volunteers that fought against our country. And here is another interesting detail: the last defenders of Hitler’s bunker were French SS troopers.
Five days, just five days—and history would have taken a different course…
Source: New Eastern Outlook
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Winter War
Talvisota Covering Force Isthmus.PNG
During the early stages of World War II, the British and French Allies made a series of proposals to send troops to assist Finland in the Winter War against the Soviet Union which started on 30 November 1939 (three months after the outbreak of World War II) and ending in March 1940. The war was a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The plans involved the transit of British and French troops and equipment through neutral Norway and Sweden. The initial plans were abandoned due to Norway and Sweden declining transit through their land, fearing their countries would be drawn into the war. The Moscow Peace Treaty ended the war in March 1940 precluding the possibility of intervention.
Contents
1 Background
2 Initial Allied approaches
3 Norwegian and Swedish reaction
4 Further Allied proposals and their effect on peace negotiations
5 See also
6 References
6.1 Citations
6.2 Bibliography
Background
In February 1940, a Soviet offensive broke through the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, exhausting Finnish defenses and forcing the country's government to accept peace negotiations on Soviet terms. At the news that Finland might be forced to cede its sovereignty to the USSR, public opinion in France and Britain, already favorable to Finland, swung in favor of military intervention. When rumors of an armistice reached governments in Paris and London, both decided to offer military support.
Initial Allied approaches
Franco-British support was offered on the condition their armed forces be given free passage through neutral Norway and Sweden instead of taking the difficult and Soviet-occupied passage from Petsamo.
The first intervention plan, approved on 4–5 February 1940 by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March under the condition of a formal request for assistance from the Finnish government (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped that Allied intervention would eventually bring the neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany—although Hitler had by December declared to the Swedish government that Franco-British troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.
Only a fraction of the Franco-British troops were intended for Finland. Harebrained French proposals to enter Finland directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, had been previously dismissed (as Petsamo was at that time already occupied by Soviet forces). Swedish diplomats saw through the Allied subterfuge, possibly aided by German sources, that the true objective of the whole operation was to occupy the Norwegian harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the north-Swedish iron ore fields, from which it was assumed that the Third Reich received a large share of its iron ore (actually 33% in 1938), regarded as critical to war production. If the governments of France and Britain later broke their pledge not to seize territory or assets in Norway and Sweden and Franco-British troops later moved to halt exports to Germany, the area could become a significant battleground between the Allies and the Germans. Such a development was particularly attractive to the French, as it would have moved the main area of military conflict away from French soil.
The Franco-British plan, as initially designed, proposed a defense of all of Scandinavia north of a line Stockholm–Gothenburg or Stockholm–Oslo, i.e. the British concept of the Lake line following the lakes of Mälaren, Hjälmaren, and Vänern, which would provide a good natural defense some 1,700–1,900 kilometres (1,000–1,200 miles) south of Narvik. The expected frontier, the Lake line, not only involved Sweden's two largest cities but could result in large amounts of Swedish territory being either occupied by a foreign army or becoming a war zone. The plan was revised to include only the northern half of Sweden and the narrow adjacent Norwegian coast.
Norwegian and Swedish reaction
The Norwegian government denied transit rights to the proposed Franco-British expedition. The Swedish government, headed by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, also declined to allow transit of armed troops through Swedish territory, in spite of the fact that Sweden had not declared itself neutral in the Winter War. The Swedish government argued that, since it had declared a policy of neutrality in the war between France, Britain and Germany, the granting of transit rights by Sweden to a Franco-British corps, even though it would not be used against Germany, was still an illegal departure from international laws on neutrality.
This strict interpretation appears to have been a pretext to avoid angering the Soviet and Nazi German governments, as it was abandoned after fifteen months. On 18 June 1941, the Swedish government quickly agreed to German demands for transit rights across Sweden for German troops on their way from occupied Norway to Finland, in order to join the German attack on the Soviet Union.[1] A total of 2,140,000 German soldiers and more than 100,000 German military railway carriages crossed neutral Swedish territory during the next three years.[2]
The Swedish Cabinet also decided to reject repeated Finnish pleas for regular Swedish troops to be deployed in Finland and the Swedes also made it clear that their present support in arms and munitions, could not be maintained for much longer. Diplomatically, Finland was squeezed between Allied hopes for a prolonged war and Swedish and Norwegian fears that the Allies and Germans might soon be fighting each other on Swedish and Norwegian soil. Norway and Sweden also feared an influx of Finnish refugees if Finland lost to the Soviets.
Further Allied proposals and their effect on peace negotiations[edit]
While Germany and Sweden pressured Finland to accept peace on unfavorable conditions, Britain and France had the opposite objective. Different plans and figures were presented for the Finns. France and Britain promised to send 20,000 men, who were to arrive by the end of February. By the end of that month, Finland's Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Mannerheim, was pessimistic about the military situation and on 29 February the government decided to start peace negotiations. That same day, the Soviets commenced an attack against Viipuri.
When France and Britain realized that Finland was considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer of 50,000 troops, if Finland asked for help before 12 March.
See also
Plan R 4
Operation Pike
Allied campaign in Norway
Foreign support in the Winter War
Swedish iron mining during World War II
References
Citations
Jump up ^ National Archives and Records Administration: State Department and Foreign Affairs Records – Sweden
Jump up ^ Scandinavian Press, Issue 3 1995) Article
This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (July 2009)
Bibliography
Andersson, Lennart B3 Junkers Ju86 i Sverige
Cox, Geoffrey (1941) The Red Army Moves (Victor Gollancz, London).
Engle, Eloise & Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939–1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-2433-6.
Jakobson, Max (1961). The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press.
Öhquist, Harald (1949). Talvisota minun näkökulmastani. Helsinki: WSOY. (in Finnish)
Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-08-033592-6.
Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and the Russo-Finnish War. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.
Tanner, Väinö (1957) The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939–1940 Stanford University Press, California; also London.
Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) [1991]. The Winter war: The Russo–Finno War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1-85410-881-6. "First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40"
Upton, Anthony F. (1974). Finland 1939–1940 (University of Delaware Press, Newark: part of series The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War) ISBN 0-87413-156-1
Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
"Finland i Krig 1939-1940" – multiple authors. ISBN 951-50-1182-5
Episode 7. Britain and France Planned to Assault Soviet Union in 1940
Wed, May 11, 2011Europe, Russia, The Episodes, Unknown WWIIBy Alexander TRUBITSYN (Russia)
Episode 7. Britain and France Planned to Assault Soviet Union in 1940
On March 23, 1940, a twin-engine civilian Lockheed-12A, registration code G-AGAR, took off from an airfield in the London suburb of Heston. British pilot Haig McLane was at the controls. The aircraft set course for Malta; then after an intermediate stop in Cairo, it flew on to the British military base in Baghdad. From there, it headed towards the Soviet border with two aerial photography specialists on board. After crossing the border unobserved at an altitude of 7000 m, the plane flew to Baku on an aerial photo-reconnaissance mission.
What was that all about?
The photos were sent to appropriate departments in England and France. They were used to draw up plans for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, English Ma-6 and French R.I.P. (Russia. Industry. Fuel). The attack was to begin with bombings of the cities of Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Maikop and Poti. The plan called for the use of 90-100 English Blenheim and American Glenn Martin bombers in the attack on Baku. The bombing was supposed to go on day and night, with pilots orienting on the fires. All of the oil fields, refineries and ports were supposed to go up in flames.
The USSR had completed refitting its oil refineries by the beginning of 1940. But large crude oil collectors—pits filled with oil—and a great number of wooden oil derricks were left over from the past. According to an assessment by American experts, the soil in those areas was so saturated with oil that fire would spread at a high rate of speed and move to other fields. It would take months to extinguish the fires and years before production could resume.
What we know of ecology today tells us that those bombings would have created an environmental disaster. Convection columns would have formed above the fires, and hot air would have pushed the products of combustion into the upper layers of the atmosphere. That would have produced acid rain, disrupted heat exchange in the atmosphere and contaminated the area with carcinogenic and mutagenic substances. Baku’s residents would have been left without water, of course, because the combustion products would have poisoned the wells. Fires at deep wells would have released “dead water” containing compounds of copper and nitrogen. The runoff of combustion products into the sea would have destroyed marine flora and fauna.
It’s horrible to imagine. It is incomprehensible that the ‘civilized’ West would coldly plan to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians even before the barbaric bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And they were civilians, because there were no significant military forces or facilities in Baku, Dresden, Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
The preparations were in earnest
French Foreign Ministry Secretary General Leger wrote US Ambassador Bullitt on January 11, 1940 that France would not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war against it; it would destroy the Soviet Union if possible, using cannons—if necessary.
French Prime Minister Deladier offered to send a squadron into the Black Sea to block Soviet lines of communications and shell Batumi from the sea. On January 19, 1940, he sent a document about the attack on the Soviet Union to General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Deputy President of the Supreme War Council, as well as Admiral of the Fleet Darlan. Two copies of the document were addressed to General Koëltz, commander of the French ground forces, and General Vuillemin, French Chief of the Air Staff and Commander-in-Chief of its Air Force, respectively.
On January 24, 1940, the Chief of England’s Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, sent the War Cabinet a memorandum on “the main war strategy,” in which he stated his opinion that England could effectively assist Finland only if it attacked Russia on the largest possible number of axes and, most importantly, struck Baku—an oil production region—in order to cause a serious national crisis in Russia.
One more fact: at the January 31, 1940 meeting of the Chiefs of General Staff of England and France in Paris, French General Gamelin suggested that the British bomb targets in Russia’s interior; and England’s Marshal Pierce, the Deputy Chief of England’s Air Staff, supported the proposal.
As they say, the weak follow the strong. Iran’s War Minister Nakhjavan asked the British to provide 80 aircraft and coordinate plans for the war on Russia.
On February 3, 1940, the French General Staff ordered General Jaunaud, the French air commander in Syria, to study the possibility of an air attack on Baku. Three days later, the issue was discussed and approved at a meeting of England’s War Cabinet. In light of the assigned mission, the Chiefs of Staff Committee ordered preparation of a document.
On February 28, 1940, France’s Air Staff produced a document containing precise calculations of the assets required for the attack on Baku. The British approach to the matter was thorough and proposed attacking our country from three directions. In the end, all details were coordinated and negotiations were held with the Turkish General Staff in March—it was understood that Turkey would also participate in the attack on the Soviet Union. Even more intensive work to coordinate and finalize the aggressors’ plans took place in April. Reynaud, who succeeded Deladier as Prime Minister, was an even bigger hawk than his predecessor and demanded more action from the British.
The infernal machine preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union began to count down the last days and hours before the bombing of our country’s oil fields that was to occur on May 15, 1940. Stocks of aviation fuel and high explosive and incendiary bombs were increased at British and French airfields in the Middle East; navigators marked out directions of attack on maps; and pilots practiced night bombing. Reynaud telephoned Churchill on May 10, 1940 to say that France was ready for the attack on May 15.
British and French troops are evacuated from Dunkirk
What stopped them
But—the ironies of fate! On May 10, five days before England and France were to begin their war against the Soviet Union, Hitler gave the order to stop the “Phony War” with France that featured no military operations and launch a decisive attack. The Germans defeated the French within a matter of days, and for some reason a new Russian campaign held little appeal for Napoleon’s heirs. The Germans failed to destroy the British Expeditionary Force in France and allowed it to escape at Dunkirk.
Just five days—and history took a different path! History, of course, abhors the subjunctive mood, but we can be sure that the cost of the war would have been completely different. We would have repelled the attack by the British and French aggressors. The Soviet leadership knew about the plans for attacking Baku—and it was ready with a response. High-altitude MIG-3 fighters had been developed and put into service—they were capable of intercepting British, American and French bombers at high altitudes. English fighters armed only with machine guns were no threat to the armored Il-2 fighter-bombers, not to speak of the French fighters. So the “allied” air raid would not have caused the disasters, death and destruction that they were hoping for. Relations with Germany may have been different.
Sooner or later, Germany’s political system would have evolved; its excesses would have been in the past, like the fires of the Inquisition and the Crusades, the persecution of heretics and the burning of witches.
Of course, an attack on our country would have been worrisome. Germany would have figured out how to make common cause with England or France. Especially since England had its own Sir Oswald Mosley—the leader of British Fascists and a Member of Parliament and the government who personally knew both the English and Belgian kings, as well as Hitler and Goebbels. They would have found a common language. We should not forget: Hitler’s forces included 200,000 French volunteers that fought against our country. And here is another interesting detail: the last defenders of Hitler’s bunker were French SS troopers.
Five days, just five days—and history would have taken a different course…
Source: New Eastern Outlook