(11-10-2016, 06:30 PM)Милослав Самарџић Пише: Ватра, прескочили сте оно моје питање: Колико видим, свих 5 дивизија попуњених немачким држављанима биле су на приморју?
А можете ли поновити оне немачке губитке код Книна?
(12-10-2016, 12:50 AM)Милослав Самарџић Пише: Мислио сам да има нешто ново, од овог ми је чудно да немачка дивизија има око 3.000 људи.То су непотпуни губици само за једну недељу. Још почетком новембра је разбијен један пук приликом повлачења из Шибеника.
За ово друго, није било питање против кога су се ангажовале немачке дивизије, већ да су биле на приморју, дакле они су увек чекали то искрцавање савезника.
(12-10-2016, 02:11 PM)Chicot Пише: Vatra, koji su ciljevi desanta na Korculu i Mljet?
I, ono sto je Nikolaj pitao, sta kazu nemacki dokumenti o gubicima?
(12-10-2016, 03:32 PM)ватхра Пише: Губитке из немачких извора немам, имам са партизанске стране:
(11-10-2016, 10:34 AM)ватхра Пише: Иначе, највећа четничка офанзива против Немаца је била управо против једног батаљона 359. пд. Ако сматрате да је било толико лоша, управо деградирате и ту офанзиву.Против једног батаљона 369. дивизије (плус муслиманске усташе и домобрани), који је потучен и добио појачање, па онда се офанзива наставља против тог батаљона, немачке жандармерије, 1. усташке бригаде, домобранског пука, муслиманских усташа (негде око 8.000 осовинских војника колико се сећам и њихов фронт су четници пробили), па пошто су дакле и ти потучени, онда у помоћ долази и један немачки ловачки пук; па пошто су опет потучени, онда у Сарајево долази и један моторизовани интервентни пук из Албаније.
Ако сматрате да су немачке јединице биле толико боље, онда су партизански успеси против 264. пд и 118. јд толико већи.
(12-10-2016, 04:45 PM)Милослав Самарџић Пише: Али овде је важније питање: зашто то тешко наоружање није послато на Сремски фронт, него је слата ненаоружана и необучена омладина из Србије? Или, зашто није послато на Јасеновац???
(12-10-2016, 03:32 PM)ватхра Пише: Шико,Има, најмање две у Бугарској у том периоду су дивизије доведене из Мађарске. У то нема сумње. Међутим, потребно је да се све прегледа и сагледа како би се објаснио и установио тачан контекст. А за то треба времена, а документе још нисам средио (хронолошки и тематски).
има ли вести из Бугарске?
(12-10-2016, 03:32 PM)ватхра Пише: Нападима 26. далматинске, у неким случајевима са командосима, на Корчулу, Шолту, Хвар, Брач итд. није био циљ да се острва ослободе, већ да се у препаду противнику нанесу губици, чиме су их натерали да ојачају своје гарнизоне и везали им снаге у одбрани.Са већине острва Немци су повукли пред савезницима без отпора.
Цитат:It is important for our plans to assist Tito that certain islands in Adriatic area should be held. Withouth these the Navy cannot operate effectively in lower Adriatic to ensure movement of stores to Tito by sea. Propose to employ dissident Yugoslav now in Middle East to hold these islands. I cannot afford to lock up British and American troops for that purpose.
Цитат:In promoting raids and Resistance, the prime minister (Churchill) had four objectives. The first, and least important, was to fulfil military purposes, wherein there were many fiascos such as Operation ‘Colossus’, a 1941 Combined Operations parachute drop to destroy a Calabrian rail viaduct, the August 1942 Dieppe raid, and some early sabotage attempts in Norway. The second purpose was to promote among British people and across the world a belief – ill-founded until at least late 1942 – that the war was being energetically and effectively carried on; what this author has elsewhere dubbed ‘military theatre’. A third objective was to oblige Hitler to expend resources on the internal security of his empire. The fourth, and most important, was to stimulate tension, recrimination, hatred between the Nazis and their subject peoples. Far from acknowledging that acts of repression should prompt a curb on Resistance activity, Churchill saw Nazi savagery as furthering his aims. ‘The blood of the martyrs,’ he told a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 2 August 1943, ‘was the seed of the Church.’ The fact that by the war ’s end most of Europe’s occupied peoples loathed the Germans was partly a consequence of policies Hitler anyway adopted; but it was also attributable to the insurgencies sponsored by Britain and later the US. The military achievements of Resistance were very modest, the moral ones immense.
Robert Bruce Lockhart said, Enthusiasts sometimes forgot that local support must ebb and flow with the Allies’ perceived military success or failure. British prestige had been grievously damaged by years of defeats. Moreover, a ruthless occupier enjoyed great advantages over civilian Resisters.: ‘I don’t think much hope of stimulating resistance to a more active stage until there is some considerable measure of Anglo-American military success. Propaganda can’t replace military success … We should not try to promote a premature revolt which can be easily crushed.’ The German policy of repression was highly effective in stifling revolt among most of the occupied peoples. SOE’s chiefs attributed the slow growth of Resistance, especially in France, to lack of arms: the RAF declined to divert bombers in significant numbers to supply partisans until 1944, when Downing Street insisted. However, the only likely consequence of arming Resisters earlier in the war would have been that the Germans killed more of them. Untrained civilians given guns were capable of assassinations and nuisance attacks, but large-scale clashes with the Wehrmacht and SS could have only one outcome – bloody defeat – as was repeatedly proven as late as 1944–45. A British SHAEF intelligence officer said: ‘You could never make any military plan dependent on the participation of guerrillas, because you could never be sure they would turn up.’
Many local peoples in all occupied countries were more interested in their own factional struggles than in accepting orders from London about how to serve the Allied cause. Bold, brash young men and a few women from SOE and OSS arrived on their thresholds demanding that they should set aside local differences to pursue the supreme purpose of defeating the Axis. But many Frenchmen, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Italians, Albanians, Malays and Burmese spurned such arguments. It might suit foreigners’ interests to fight the Germans, Italians, Japanese to the exclusion of all else, but it did not suit many partisans. None of these British or US officers planned to live in their countries after the war; the visitors had no stake, beyond their own lives, which they held cheap as the young and unattached do, in the societies on which they so eagerly urged revolt. Nigel Clive of MI6 signalled a report from Greece in April 1944 which emphasised the popular expectation of liberation by mid-summer, and offered a shrewd forecast: ‘What matters most is what will happen thereafter. There is universal apprehension of the immediate aftermath of liberation when it looks as if the towns will become the battlefields of what is now a mountain civil war. Public clamour is for the following things in this order: food, freedom from the German occupation and a minimum of security so that a semblance of democratic life may begin again. No political movement in free Greece is capable of meeting the last requirement. All armed political mountain parties engender different degrees of mistrust.’ The same was true in Yugoslavia, where unorthodox local rules of the game prevailed: the Germans were infuriated to discover from a wireless intercept that an Italian general captured by Gen. Mihailović and his Cetniks had subsequently been freed in exchange for the surrender of a field gun and ammunition to the partisans.
Both at the time and since, some extravagant claims have been made about the ability of Resistance movements to influence the main course of the war. R. Harris Smith, an admiring chronicler of the American Office of Strategic Services, wrote: ‘Partisan warfare was a viable alternative to frontal assault, but SOE and OSS officers sent to establish links with the Resistance were hampered by antipartisan prejudice at Allied headquarters.’ British and American senior soldiers were indeed skeptical about the usefulness of guerrillas, but there were excellent reasons for their caution. Partisans made a marginal contribution to the war effort in several theatres, but even in Yugoslavia and Russia they could not provide a substitute for the might and mass of regular armies. Resistance in many societies, especially within the Balkans, had much more influence on post-war events than on the defeat of the Axis. There was lasting bitterness about the manner in which SOE transferred its support from the royalist Gen. Mihailović to the communist Tito in Yugoslavia, causing the incidental deaths of several British agents. Personalities powerfully influenced this outcome: the men operating with Mihailović were lacklustre reporters, while the dispatches of Churchill’s former historical researcher Major William Deakin, and later of Tory MP Col. Fitzroy Maclean, were drafted in scintillating and inspirational terms, tempered by a monumental naïveté about Tito’s character, political objectives and dalliances with the Germans. Deakin and Maclean became two of the most influential secret agents of the war; their reports were decisive in persuading the prime minister to throw British support, manifested in huge deliveries of arms and equipment, behind the communist cause.
As the story drew to an end, with the progressive 1944–45 liberation of German-occupied societies, there was fierce debate about whether the outcome of SOE’s activities justified their cost.
A problem besetting SOE until the 1944 eve of D-Day in France was that it lacked a clear, overarching strategic directive, setting out the ultimate purpose of stimulating Resistance. ‘Set Europeablaze’ did not amount to a coherent programme. Was Baker Street seeking to create guerrilla armies to conduct pitched battles with the Germans? To gather intelligence? To sabotage the Axis war effort? Colin Gubbins wrote about the difficulty ‘of carrying out two broad tasks simultaneously, which were themselves hardly compatible, that is action, day by day and week after week, in specific attacks against selected targets in occupied countries, and at the same time the creation of secret armies, equipped, organised and trained, ready to come into action as ordered when invasion should come. Every attack carried out naturally alerted the Gestapo.’ Churchill’s romantic vision never attracted his own service chiefs of staff, who disliked and even deplored the pirates of SOE. They were right, in a narrowly military sense, that the Continent would not have been freed from Nazi tyranny a single day later had Resistance never existed. But posterity may choose to see its sponsorship as a significant element in Churchill’s genius as a war leader, because he understood its immense moral value. As the story drew to an end, with the progressive 1944–45 liberation of German-occupied societies, there was fierce debate about whether the outcome of SOE’s activities justified their cost. The record shows that in many countries the weapons provided to Resistance by the Allies were used more energetically to promote factional interests – mostly communist – following liberation, than to fight the Axis during the occupation. An OSS major dropped into north-west Italy reported that the partisans were ‘20 per cent for Liberation and 80 per cent for Russia. We soon found that they were burying the German arms they had captured.’
Since 1945, many fanciful accounts have been published, which exaggerate the material damage inflicted on
Axis forces by Allied agents and Resistance, especially in the wake of D-Day. It is salutary to compare these with German war diaries, which show how relatively small were the casualties imposed by guerrillas: for instance, the 2nd SS Panzer Division, which travelled from Montauban to Normandy in June 1944, shedding rivers of innocent blood on its way, lost just thirty-five killed out of 15,000 men.Sabotage and local attacks often required acceptance of higher risks and losses than targets merited in narrowly military terms. Col. Dick Barry, Gubbins’s very able chief of staff at Baker Street, said long afterwards about its wartime contribution: ‘It was only just worth it.’ Yet SOE’s operations were important then, and seem justified now, by their moral impact and contribution to fomenting insecurity, tension, sometimes murderous hysteria among German occupying forces. It was chiefly thanks to the aid provided to local opposition movements by SOE and OSS that a legend of popular insurrection was created, which contributed immensely to reviving the self-respect of Europe’s occupied societies after 1945. Never could enemies of democracy claim that Britain and the United States had abandoned the occupied nations to their fate. Too much post-war attention and admiration has focused upon the deeds of the foreigners, SOE’s British agents, who hazarded only their own young lives in the cause of a great and indisputably romantic adventure; too little upon the peoples of Europe, of all ages and both sexes, who joined one of hundreds of Resistance networks. Moreover none of the follies, failures and embarrassments should be allowed to mask the towering historical reality that some hundreds of thousands of fine and brave people in the occupied countries risked everything in the cause of Resistance. Their contribution should be judged much more by the magnitude of their stakes and their sacrifices than by the military achievements, or lack of them. For all SOE’s extravagances and follies, it became the most effective British secret operations organisation of the war, and justified the Churchillian leap of imagination that inspired its creation.
Цитат:Непријатељ: Према сигурним изворима, око 3000 људи; према извиђању јединица, поред бандита било је црнаца а, наводно, и Американаца као и један униформисани и наоружани женски бат.
(12-10-2016, 05:07 PM)ватхра Пише:А све оно претходно прескочисте.(12-10-2016, 04:45 PM)Милослав Самарџић Пише: Али овде је важније питање: зашто то тешко наоружање није послато на Сремски фронт, него је слата ненаоружана и необучена омладина из Србије? Или, зашто није послато на Јасеновац???
Због чега лаки тенкови Стјуарт из Далмације, где су имали попуну и резервне делове из Италије, нису послати преко пола окупиране Југославије, куда су се повлачили Немци из Грчке, на Сремски фронт где је већ била 2. тенковска бригада наоружана одличним совјетским средњим тенковима Т-34/85? На Сремски фронт где би били неадекватни због слабог оклопа и наоружања?
Не знам како је могла да им промакне таква бриљантна идеја?
