[Chicot]

Пих..
Не знам како би се то борбени летови упоредили са онима "пре и после рата"?
Већ сам ти раније сликовито објаснио како стоје ствари са линеарним схватањима
http://www.pogledi.rs/forum/Thread-misij...g#pid26379

Не морам ваљда да се понављам?


Али ајде, да резимирамо (кад све морам да цртам):
Графикон који си поставио говори да је како је рат одмицао, обука америчких пилота добијала на квалитету, барем када се узме у обзир све већи број сати летења током обуке.

Табела неборбених губитака ловаца ( колона - удео неборбених губитака) говори следеће:

- 1942 60,87%
- 1943 44, 52%
- 1944 56,56%
- 1945 62,05%

Имамо приличан раст како је време одмицало - до тога да је у завршној години рата тај проценат највиши.

Треба узети у обзир и друге параметре: исправљене су грешке из претходних година у едукативном систему, усавршена продукција и отклоњени ранији технички недостаци авиона, веће искуство механичара и техничара у сервисирању и поправкама, све слабији отпор непријатељске авијације..што су све фактори чији је утицај у овим бројкама по природи ствари најнижи у 1945.

Kад смо код ловаца и искуства пилота, ево пригодног цитата

Experience Level:
Uncle Sam sent many of his sons to war with absolute minimums of training. Some fighter pilots entered combat in 1942 with less than one hour in their assigned aircraft.
The 357th Fighter Group (often known as The Yoxford Boys) went to England in late 1943 having trained on P-39s. The group never saw a Mustang until shortly before its first combat mission.

A high-time P-51 pilot had 30 hours in type. Many had fewer than five hours. Some had one hour.

With arrival of new aircraft, many combat units transitioned in combat. The attitude was, “They all have a stick and a throttle. Go fly `em.” When the famed 4th Fighter Group converted from P-47s to P-51s in February 1944, there was no time to stand down for an orderly transition. The Group commander, Col. Donald Blakeslee, said, “You can learn to fly `51s on the way to the target.

A future P-47 ace said, “I was sent to England to die.” He was not alone. Some fighter pilots tucked their wheels in the well on their first combat mission with one previous flight in the aircraft. Meanwhile, many bomber crews were still learning their trade: of Jimmy Doolittle’s 15 pilots on the April 1942 Tokyo raid, only five had won their wings before 1941. All but one of the 16 copilots were less than a year out of flight school.

In WWII flying safety took a back seat to combat. The AAF’s worst accident rate was recorded by the A-36 Invader version of the P-51: a staggering 274 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. Next worst were the P-39 at 245, the P-40 at 188, and the P-38 at 139. All were Allison powered.

Bomber wrecks were fewer but more expensive. The B-17 and B-24 averaged 30 and 35 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, respectively– a horrific figure considering that from 1980 to 2000 the Air Force’s major mishap rate was less than 2.

The B-29 was even worse at 40; the world’s most sophisticated, most capable and most expensive bomber was too urgently needed to stand down for mere safety reasons. The AAF set a reasonably high standard for B-29 pilots, but the desired figures were seldom attained.