http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/...-this-year
A year ago, the chances of new NATO admissions at the September 2014 summit in Cardiff, Wales, appeared rather small. The Alliance was focused on the future challenges after the end of its ISAF mission in Afghanistan, cyber threats, and on the growing “capabilities gap” between the US and Europe.
NATO’s open-door policy had slipped down the priority list. There was only one real candidate for membership - Montenegro - but it was considered too small to get an invitation alone.
Also, some NATO members were raising questions about Montenegro’s preparedness after five years of the Membership Action Plan, MAP, owing to the low level of public support in the country for membership and questions about the rule of law.
On the other hand, rule of law issues did not stop Albania from becoming a member, and, unlike Albania, Montenegro has already started the EU accession process, facing tough scrutiny on justice, corruption and fundamental rights under chapters 23 and 24 in the membership talks.
As for other Balkan aspirants, Macedonia remains blocked by the never-ending dispute with Greece over its name while Bosnia and Herzegovina is stalled by lack of progress in implementing political agreements on the registration of military property and other domestic issues.
Overall, NATO’s enlargement agenda in 2013 hinged on three things: the internal situation within the Alliance with a lack of American leadership; the continuous reluctance of Germany to expand further; and the credibility problems of the candidate(s).
The recent crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea has been a game changer. NATO is undergoing serious upgrade. Doing nothing on enlargement at the September summit is increasingly seen as inviting further aggression by Russia in the ex-Soviet region and growing assertiveness in the Balkans. The Americans are back in the driving seat, and Germany’s reluctance is gradually wearing out.
In the meantime, Montenegro has improved its credentials as a future ally. Public support for NATO accession seems to be growing after the government and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic started to be more vocal about it at home, as well as at international forums.
According to the Ipsos agency, support for NATO membership in the country has increased from 38 per cent in November 2013 to 46 per cent today. Secondly, Podgorica has successfully proceeded with reforms of the intelligence and defence sector.
At the same time, it has limited fiscal space to alter other important membership indicators, such as the relatively low percentage of GDP allocated for defence (1.2 per cent, or 1.6 per cent, including pensions). It is below the required level of 2 per cent but it is still above the level of some NATO member states.
Thirdly, Podgorica has played the geopolitical card, using the pretext of the Ukraine crisis to push for more US engagement in the Balkans to counter an intensified Russian efforts to undermine regional security architecture based on NATO. This was one of the softer messages that Prime Minister Djukanovic delivered during his April visit to Washington and at his May speech in the Globsec security forum in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Fourthly, more surprisingly, Montenegro went one step further in showing its ability to follow its own strategic priorities, even if they go against its strong bilateral relations with Russia. (According to the Russian embassy in Podgorica, 7,000 Russians are permanent residents, while 40 per cent of real estate at the coast is owned by Russian citizens and hundreds of thousands more come there every year for summer holidays.)
Its decision to follow EU sanctions against Russia, imposed for undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, contrasted with Serbia’s refusal to associate itself with the EU position, and it was subjected to harsh criticism from Moscow for taking this stand.
The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed “profound disappointment” and accused Montenegro of having a short memory, forgetting Russia’s support at the difficult time of the NATO air strikes in 1999.
In response, President Filip Vujanovic was quoted as saying that Russia must understand that Montenegro had “followed its interest to be part of the EU and NATO, in no way expressing an anti-Russian mood”.
This came on top of the earlier refusal of Montenegro in late 2013 to grant Russia permission to use its ports as logistical support for the Russian naval fleet in the Mediterranean (which could have been a calculated diplomatic manoeuvre by Moscow, testing Podgorica’s resolve and consistency).
If Russia is now testing the Balkan aspirants before the forthcoming NATO summit, one by one, the Serbian leadership has clearly demonstrated that it sees its current stage of engagement with the Alliance - focused on technical cooperation, with political relations still at the pre-MAP stage - as sufficient.
However, the critical issue of NATO’s enlargement policy nowadays is not in the Balkans. It is Georgia – a direct neighbour to Russia with a relatively recent legacy of open confrontation. As such, it is considered too sensitive for Germany and some other Europeans to even get to the initial MAP stage.
There is a compelling argument at NATO HQ that enlargement should not move ahead as an individual process. On the contrary, it should involve more countries and proceed in a package manner.
It is true that “package” solutions are more elegant and more politically viable within the Alliance. In other words, Montenegro’s case would be much stronger if other aspirants were considered as well.
It does not need to be membership alone, however. Granting the MAP to Georgia, and perhaps also to Bosnia, if there is more progress in place, could be sufficient for a package at the September summit.
This is also good news for Macedonia. If some diplomatic miracle over the summer produces a deal with Greece on the name issue, a membership invitation to Skopje could also be part of that package.
To conclude, Montenegro’s changes of being offered membership in Wales have intensified in recent weeks.
At the same time, it is still an ambiguous and open-ended diplomatic process. The government in Podgorica has no guarantees for September - but it has never been closer to NATO membership than it is today.
Milan Nič is the Executive Director of the Central European Policy Institute (CEPI), a Bratislava-based regional think tank. You can follow him on twitter: @milann_sk
Marian Majer is the Senior Fellow at CEPI and former Political Director at the Slovak Ministry of Defense. You can follow him on twitter: @MajerMarian
![[Слика: traktor.gif]](http://poljoinfo.com/images/smilies/traktor.gif)
