02-01-2019, 09:03 PM
Интересантно је да Блечли до краја рата није успео да разбије радио мрежу Гестапоа (TGD). Њу су користили и други одсеци полиције (СИПО,КРИПО, СД..) за најтајније комуникације.
О полицијским и генерално low i medium grade кључевима:
Hinsley, F H. British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol II (HMSO Official Histories Book 2) . Appendix 5.
О полицијским и генерално low i medium grade кључевима:
Цитат:At GC and CS the Enigma traffic of the SS and the police was processed by the section responsible for the GAF and Army Enigmas, which sent the decrypts to Whitehall in English translation. The police and SS hand cyphers were handled by the Military Section; this sent the decrypts in German to Ml 14 but also produced a weekly summary in English of police operations behind the lines on the Russian front, of which 'C’ sent a copy to the Prime Minister.
Among the reasons why GC and CS maintained so large an effort against the police hand cyphers, some were technical. The most important of them was the fact that decrypts of the hand cyphers often provided a means of entry into Enigma keys, but there were others. In the first place, the German Army and the GAF used for their medium-grade field communications, and also as a stand-by substitute for the Enigma, hand cyphers which were based on the same system as the main police hand cypher. Although these reserve cyphers were rarely used before 1944, this fact, which had been established by their occasional employment in emergencies on the Russian front, made it all the more important to keep abreast of the police traffic. In the second place, it was recognised from the end of 1942 that work on the police traffic was
the best means of training additional staff for the exploitation of the medium-grade field communications of the German Army. Since the summer of 1940 little traffic of this kind had been intercepted from the European theatre, but Cairo had derived some benefit from its work on the medium-grade cypher of the German Army in north Africa and the Aegean, and Cairo’s experience (reinforced by the failure to take advantage of it during the early stages of the campaign in French north Africa)* prompted preparations to exploit similar cyphers in the field when the Allied armies invaded the Continent.
Army. For most of the war the bulk of the wireless traffic of both organisations was accordingly concerned with German suppression of resistance and subversion, especially in Poland and the Baltic States, in the Balkans, in Russia and, after the fall of Mussolini, in Italy. From 1942, as earlier limited and local anti-partisan operations grew into a bitter and specialised form of warfare, the increasing scale and effectiveness of the partisans evoking a correspondingly severe German response, the decrypts
acquired increasing value for the light they threw on the training, the tactics and the detailed operations of the SS and the police and of the resistance forces. Although MI 14’s appreciations do not refer specifically to information from the police cyphers this intelligence must have influenced its assessments of the situation in Russia.*
..We have been unable to trace what circulation in Whitehall was given to these and other police decrypts by MI 14.
Hinsley, F H. British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol II (HMSO Official Histories Book 2) . Appendix 5.
