29-11-2015, 08:21 PM
РАФ плус Пољаци у РАФ-у, и мени се чини да су то били најбољи пилоти.
(30-11-2015, 01:22 PM)ватхра Пише: имаш опис обуке бомбардерских група везан за табелу коју сам поставио
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/...ml#page684
(30-11-2015, 01:22 PM)ватхра Пише: по завршетку основне обуке, посаде су настављале обуку и вежбу, и то је трајало период колико је наведено у графикону.
Цитат: Flying Training Command began the year (1943) with a huge backlog of men awaiting entry into pretlight training. This, in turn, created morale problems. As a solution, in the spring of 1943.the Army Air Forces introduced a three- to tlvemonth college training program for aviation cadets. Initially, these men went to college before undergoing aptitude testing. Unforlunately, the Army Air Forces found many ot the students were poorly equipped for flying. Rather than waste the government's money and the individual's time, the AAF decided to establish prccollege testing, beginning in the fall of 1943.
(30-11-2015, 01:22 PM)ватхра Пише: Нисам нашао ниједног да је провео мање од две године у службиОчекујеш да пилот "изјави у МАЦР" да није прошао темељну обуку и да није врхунски пилот?
(30-11-2015, 01:22 PM)ватхра Пише: Ни у ком случају се не може говорити о неискусним посадама. Поготово јер је већина бомб. група дошла у Италију почетком 1944, кад је прошла највећа криза за посадама авиона.
Цитат:Throughout 1942, the need for combat crew personnel far exceeded the current and contemplated production of the command's flying training schools. The rate of expansion of housing and training facilities, instructors, as well as the procurement of aircraft and other equipment, though at a breakneck pace, constrained the rate of increase of production. Facilities were used to their maximum capacity as quickly as they could be stood up. Some schools were expanded while they were still under construction.
Because of the rapid expansion and then the almost equally rapid program, its quality varied considerably, but given the numerous problems with facilities, qualified instructors, changes in curriculum, and the like, the centers made as much of a contribution to the war effort as could be expected under the circumstances.
Includnig fatatalities, almost 40 percent of students who entered primary pilot training from 1939 to the end of the war failed to earn their wings. The reasons for this high attrition rate were numerous, including low aptitude on the part of those who were eliminated. Though higher headquarters never established a fixed elimination rate, the operational demand for pilots primarily determined the elimination rate. During 1943. when the demand for pilots was greatest, the elimination rate declined.
During 1944, when a surplus of pilots was in sight, eliminations rose as standards increased
(30-11-2015, 01:22 PM)ватхра Пише: А ти изволи покажи ми пример неког пилота који је пао код нас, који је провео годину дана у служби и имао мало мисија, да ли је обарање зависило од искуства посаде и колики је то проценат оборених авиона - ако већ хоћеш да заступаш тезу да су код нас падале неискусне посаде.
Подаци за то постоје.
(30-11-2015, 09:38 PM)Chicot Пише: Нећу да кажем да су несреће изазвале само грешке пилота или других чланова посаде, али неборбени губици су забрињавајуће високи.
(30-11-2015, 09:57 PM)Милослав Самарџић Пише: Шико, јел ''на Медитерану'' значи и у Југославији?
Ако је тако, би ли написао на српском основне податке: колико авиона и када.
(01-12-2015, 12:44 AM)ватхра Пише: Ајаој, ја тек сад капирам глупост коју покушаваш да докажеш.Лоше си скапирао.
Тврдиш да је до неборбених губитака и несрећа долазило углавном због неискусности посада? На основу чега?
(01-12-2015, 12:44 AM)ватхра Пише: Да ли си видео иједну изјаву чланова посаде која се срушила због неборбеног губитка?Видео сам примере да су се авиони скршили у Јадран тако што су омашили писту на Вису за неких пар стотина метара.
(01-12-2015, 12:44 AM)ватхра Пише: У изјави евакуисаних пилота се углавном наводе околности пада, на основу чега се може лако закључити да ли је у питању грешка пилота или нешто друго. Ја сам прочитао изјаве за преко 350 бомбардера који су пали код нас. Јако мали број би се могао водити као грешка пилота - онако из главе можда десетак случајева, а и то можда. У огромној већини случајева искуство пилота није имало утицаја на пад авиона.Како ћеш ти то закључити? Са којим стручним знањем?
(01-12-2015, 12:44 AM)ватхра Пише: Оно што је занимљиво је да је код нас пао вероватно велик број авиона који се воде као неборбени губици. Сигурно се ради о већем проценту него што се наводи у табели коју си поставио.
Цитат:Experience Level:
Uncle Sam sent many of his sons to war with absolute minimums of training. Some fighter pilots entered combat in 1942 with less than one hour in their assigned aircraft.
The 357th Fighter Group (often known as The Yoxford Boys) went to England in late 1943 having trained on P-39s. The group never saw a Mustang until shortly before its first combat mission.
A high-time P-51 pilot had 30 hours in type. Many had fewer than five hours. Some had one hour.
With arrival of new aircraft, many combat units transitioned in combat. The attitude was, “They all have a stick and a throttle. Go fly `em.” When the famed 4th Fighter Group converted from P-47s to P-51s in February 1944, there was no time to stand down for an orderly transition. The Group commander, Col. Donald Blakeslee, said, “You can learn to fly `51s on the way to the target.
A future P-47 ace said, “I was sent to England to die.” He was not alone. Some fighter pilots tucked their wheels in the well on their first combat mission with one previous flight in the aircraft. Meanwhile, many bomber crews were still learning their trade: of Jimmy Doolittle’s 15 pilots on the April 1942 Tokyo raid, only five had won their wings before 1941. All but one of the 16 copilots were less than a year out of flight school.
In WWII flying safety took a back seat to combat. The AAF’s worst accident rate was recorded by the A-36 Invader version of the P-51: a staggering 274 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. Next worst were the P-39 at 245, the P-40 at 188, and the P-38 at 139. All were Allison powered.
Bomber wrecks were fewer but more expensive. The B-17 and B-24 averaged 30 and 35 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, respectively– a horrific figure considering that from 1980 to 2000 the Air Force’s major mishap rate was less than 2.
The B-29 was even worse at 40; the world’s most sophisticated, most capable and most expensive bomber was too urgently needed to stand down for mere safety reasons. The AAF set a reasonably high standard for B-29 pilots, but the desired figures were seldom attained.
(24-12-2015, 11:25 PM)Бенито Пише: Каква су сазнања о падовима авиона од Новог Пазара до југа Албаније? Какав је однос био Арнаута према англо-америчким авијатичарима?