Брате Мргуде, у вези Сребренице, западна прича је велика лаж. Нема интернационалне правде и истине јер 'западни' потплаћени људи пишу нову историју о бившој Југославији и касније или сада о Србији.
У ВЕЗИ СРЕБРЕНИЦЕ .......... Филип Корвин је био највиши цивилни заступник Уједињених нација у Босни и Херцеговини тог 11. јула 1995. Он је написао .... да је убијено 30 или 300 цивила било би грозно. .......
Тачнија цифра је око 800. ...... али политичка медија је хтела да шокира читаоце и без икаквих података ставила цирфу 8000.
..... даље пише, ''Такође, постоје докази у овој књизи да је масакрирано хиљаде Срба, протерали, мучени, силовани, и понижавали током ратова у бившој Југославији. Међународна заједница није сматрала важно да објаве те злочине толико енергично као што објављују за Сребреницу.
The
SREBRENICA
MASSACRE
Evidence, Context, Politics
Edited by Edward S. Herman
Foreword by Phillip Corwin
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Alphabet Soup
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Phillip Corwin
On July 11, 1995, the town of Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serb
army. At the time, I was the highest ranking United Nations civilian official in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my book, Dubious Mandate,1 I made
some comments on that tragedy. Beyond that, I decried the distortions of the international press in their reporting, not only on that event, but on the wars in Yugoslavia (1992-95) in general. I expressed the wish that there could have been, and must be, some balance in telling the story of what actually happened in Srebrenica and in all of former Yugoslavia, if we are to learn from our experience.
This book by the Srebrenica Research Group, The Srebrenica Massacre:
Evidence, Context, Politics, answers that call. It presents an alternative and well-documented assessment of the tragedy of Srebrenica, and of the suffering of all the constituent peoples of former Yugoslavia. It is an invaluable document. Of course, there will be those who will disagree with the authors’ perspective. But if we are to open a discussion that has been closed to all but the faithful, if we are to prevent similar tragedies from occurring again, then we must take seriously the accounts put forward by the bright and discerning contributors to this book. No honest reader can doubt the credentials of these authors. And no honest reader should doubt the importance of what they have to say. I congratulate them on their scholarship and their courage.
Coincidentally, I have a personal reason for recalling what happened
on July 11, 1995, for not only was that the day Srebrenica fell, but it was also the day that a Bosnian sniper tried to assassinate me as my vehicle, white and clearly marked as a UN vehicle, was driving over Mt. Igman on the way back to Sarajevo from a staff visit to Gorni Vakuf. The sniper targeted our vehicle as we sped around the hairpin turns of that narrow, rutted mountain road, and it was due only to the courageous efforts of Bruno Chaubert, the Corsican warrant officer who was my driver, that we survived. We knew from the trajectory of the bullet, and the fact that we had identified ourselves only minutes earlier at a Bosnian army checkpoint, that the sniper who fired on us was in Bosnian government controlled territory, and that he knew who we were. Actually, the sniper had targeted the driver, because he knew if the driver had lost control, then the vehicle and all its passengers would have gone over the mountain. At the time, however, I chose not to publicize the event because the Bosnian government would have denied it, and the UN would not have protested, given its gaping lack of credibility with the Bosnian government. But the message was clear. The Bosnian government
considered the UN to be its enemy.
***
In the years since Srebrenica fell, the name itself has become a buzzword for allegations of Serbian genocide. Books have been written, reports have been compiled, and radio and television broadcasts have saturated the air waves with “evidence” of this crime against humanity.
The United Nations Security Council convened an international tribunal
in The Hague to “prove” this pre-trial judgment. It would not be an exaggeration to say some journalists and aspiring politicians have
made careers out of promoting this allegation. But the situation is more complicated than the public relations specialists would have us believe. That there were killings of non-combatants in Srebrenica, as in all war zones, is a certainty. And those who perpetrated them deserve to be condemned and prosecuted. And whether it was three or 30 or 300 innocent civilians who were killed, it was a heinous crime. There can be no equivocation about that. At the same time, the facts presented in this volume make a very cogent argument
that the figure of 8,000 killed, which is often bandied about in the
international community, is an unsupportable exaggeration. The true
figure may be closer to 800.
The fact that the figure in question has been so distorted, however,
suggests that the issue has been politicized. There is much more shock value in the death of 8,000 than in the death of 800.
There is also evidence in this book that thousands of Serbs were massacred, expelled, tortured, raped, and humiliated during the wars within former Yugoslavia. The international community has not seen fit to publicize these atrocities with as much vigor as it has those of Srebrenica.
That simple observation does not justify what occurred in Srebrenica.
But it is another piece of the puzzle that explains the anger of the Serbs when they assaulted Srebrenica. In May 1995, for example, just two months before Srebrenica fell, the Croatian army captured Western Slavonia and expelled 90 per cent of the Serb population in that region.